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In developing countries, especially in Africa, the commercialisation of agriculture has proven 
to be a means of increasing the income of farm households and productivity, resulting in 
poverty reduction at the household level. The principal research question addressed by this 
study was why it would make sense for the government to invest in services for small-scale 
fruit or vegetable farmers if these farmers could not increase production because of a lack of 
market access unless they could make a profit, which would probably imply heavy 
subsidisation of marketing infrastructures by taxpayers.  
A vegetable industry development case study was conducted in north-central Namibia. A 
Probit model was used to determine the factors that influence farmers to supply to the formal 
markets. The model results indicated that ownership of a vehicle and distance from farm to 
water source were statistically significant determinants of a farmer’s decision to participate in 
the commercialisation of high-value crops at p=0.009 and p=0.073 respectively. In addition, 
the results indicate that water rights are not clearly defined, and there is no land market and 
limited access to credit for the farmers. 
Moreover, a transaction cost analysis demonstrated that small-scale high-value crop 
production in the study area is experiencing high transaction costs that make the vegetable 
industry to be globally less competitive. The principal reason for high transaction costs is that 
the commercialisation of vegetables is constrained by information asymmetries or principal-
agent problems among actors in the value chain, resulting in the failure of the market, state, 
and community institutional arrangements.  
The study introduced a new approach incorporating insights from transaction cost economics 
in exploring the interrelationship of the market, state, and community institutions in 
agricultural development in developing countries to understand the influence of transaction 
costs on economic performance. The model introduces a public-private partnership as a 
policy instrument linking small-scale farmers to input and output markets through contract 
production. The model identifies and minimises transaction costs among value chain actors, 
to overcome the challenges of the market, state, and community institutions.  
The study concluded that poor implementation of agricultural development initiatives as 




limit agricultural development as community values, norms or beliefs take long to adjust to 
external ideas or technologies due to inadequate information in developing countries. The 
study recommends that there is a need for policy intervention that addresses water rights and 
improved access to credit as well as encouraging production and marketing cooperative to 
reduce costs of accessing input and output markets. An amendment of the Communal Land 
Reform Act No. 5 of 2002 would enable the introduction of land markets and rentals in 
communal areas of Namibia enable farmers to use their land as collateral to obtain credit 
from financial institutions. Amendments to the Communal Land Reform Act should also 
specify how to protect vulnerable and poor people such as women and the youth in 
communities and to ensure that land rights are available as a social safety net.  
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In ontwikkelende lande, veral dié in Afrika, is daar bewys dat die kommersialisering van 
landbou ’n manier is om die inkomste van plaashuishoudings te verhoog en produktiwiteit te 
verhoog as gevolg van die vermindering van armoede op die huishoudelike vlak. Die 
oorhoofse navorsingsvraag wat hier aangespreek word, is hoekom die staat sou belê in 
ondersteuning aan kleinskaalse vrugte- of groenteprodusente in die geval waar hulle nie 
produksie kon verhoog as gevolg van ontoeganklike markte of die onvermoë om wins te 
maak nie, aangesien die staat in sulke gevalle waarskynlik boonop grootskaals sal moet 
investeer in bemarkingsinfrastruktuur. Hierdie studie stel ’n nuwe benadering voor wat 
insigte van ’n transaksiekoste-ekonomie inkorporeer in die verkenning van die verhoudings 
tussen mark-, staats- en gemeenskapsinstellings in landbou-ontwikkeling in ontwikkelende 
lande om die invloed van transaksiekostes op ekonomiese prestasie te verstaan. 
  
’n Gevallestudie wat die ontwikkeling van ’n groentebedryf in noord-sentraal Namibië 
behels, is onderneem. Die resultate stel voor dat die kommersialisasie van landbou beperk 
word deur faktore soos ’n gebrek aan grondbesit, beperkte toegang tot infrastruktuur en 
markte (inset, uitset en krediet), ongereelde besoeke deur voorligtingsbeamptes, kulturele 
verandering, gebrekkige tegnologieë en onvolledige inligting onder akteurs in die 
waardeketting. Die resultate demonstreer ook dat kleinskaalse hoë-waarde gewasproduksie in 
die studiegebied hoë transaksiekostes ervaar, wat die groentebedryf globaal minder 
mededingend maak. Die vernaamste rede vir die hoë transaksiekostes is dat die 
kommersialisasie van groente beperk word deur inligtingsassimetrieë of hoof-agent probleme 
onder die akteurs in die waardeketting, wat ’n mislukking van institusionele reëlings in die 
mark-, staat en gemeenskap veroorsaak.  
 
Gegewe die mislukking van die kommersialisasie van landbou in die studiegebied, is ’n 
model ontwikkel wat vir die verdere ontwikkeling van die groentebedryf gebruik kan word. 
Hierdie model stel ’n openbare-private vennootskap voor as ’n beleidsinstrument wat 
kleinskaalse produsente deur kontrakproduksie aan inset- en uitsetmarkte verbind. ’n 
Vername kenmerk van die model is die identifisering en minimalisering van transaksiekostes 
onder akteurs in die waardeketting as gevolg van die oorkoming van die mislukking van 





Die studie stel ook ’n strategiese beleidsopsie voor om die Gemeenskaplike 
Grondhervormingswet (Communal Land Reform Act) Nr. 5 van 2002 te wysig om dit 
moontlik te maak om grondmarkte en grondverhuring in die gemeenskaplike gebiede van 
Namibië in te voer. Dít sal verseker dat boere grondregte in die gebruiklike grondbesitstelsel 
kan bekom, wat hulle die vermoë sal bied om hulle grond as aanvullende sekuriteit te gebruik 
om krediet vanaf finansiële instellings te bekom. Wysigings tot bogenoemde wet moet ook 
spesifiseer hoe om kwesbare en arm mense, soos vrouens en die jeug in gemeenskappe, te 
beskerm, en om te verseker dat grondregte as ’n maatskaplike veiligheidsnet beskikbaar is vir 
hierdie mense in die gemeenskaplike gebiede. Die studie kom tot die slotsom dat swak 
implementering van landbou-ontwikkelingsinisiatiewe soos deur die staat of die privaatsektor 
(die mark) ingevoer word, asook kulturele inbedding, die ekonomiese aktiwiteit vir landbou-
ontwikkeling kan beperk omdat gemeenskapswaardes, norme en gemeenskapsoortuigings 
lank neem om in ontwikkelende lande by eksterne ideës of tegnologieë aan te pas as gevolg 
van onvoldoende inligting. Hierdie faktore moet in toekomstige landboubesigheidstudies in 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the research 
Globally, increasing agricultural productivity is critical to stimulating the rate of economic 
growth and development in developing countries, especially in Africa. Some studies on 
commercialisation in Africa have shown that it is a means of increasing farm households’ 
incomes, and as a result reducing poverty (Kirsten et al., 2012; Muriithi & Matz, 2014; 
Ochieng et al., 2016). In African countries where agriculture is regarded as the backbone of 
the economy, excluding small-scale farmers from agri-food chains would pose a real threat to 
poverty alleviation and rural development (Kirsten, Dorward et al., 2009; Mmbando et al., 
2015). Increasingly, agricultural expenditure is seen as one of the most important government 
instruments for agricultural development, which suggests a more active role for the state 
(Kirsten, Dorward et al., 2009; Kirsten et al., 2012; Mogues et al., 2012). As a result of poor 
market linkages and institutional failures, however, state-led agricultural development has not 
resulted in meaningful poverty reduction, especially in the rural areas, and consequently some 
physical infrastructure has become a ‘white elephant’ and money invested in these 
programmes has been wasted. These failures suggest that poverty alleviation could only be 
achieved through an integrated strategy addressing the most important factors that constrain 
access to physical, human, and financial resources (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2005:82–83). 
Yujiro Hayami (1988), in his seminal work, discusses the interrelationship of market systems, 
rural community institutions, and government activities in the process of economic 
development in developing countries. He concludes that there can be a market failure, 
government failure, and, in some instances, community failure, either separately or jointly.  
 
Market failure usually occurs because of four generally accepted reasons (Becker, 2008; Hill, 
2013; Mogues et al., 2012; Otsuka & Kalirajan, 2010; Parkin, 2012): The first problem is that 
the presence of externalities does not reflect the true cost or benefits of producing or 
consuming a good. The second problem is the supply of public goods because when they are 
provided for one, they are provided for everyone. Thirdly, organisations can gain 
inappropriate levels of market power, allowing them to block trade, resulting in imperfect 
market competition, which can lead to monopolistic, monopsonistic, or oligopolistic power 
and limited competition. Fourthly, information asymmetry1 (imperfect knowledge) can result 
 
1 Information asymmetry’ refers to when a party has different information to another. Note that ‘'information 
asymmetry leading to opportunism’ refers to situations in which one set of agents in a transaction has more 




in adverse selection, moral hazard, and principal-agent problems, and ultimately institutional 
failures. For instance, asymmetric information will inevitably result in opportunism (hidden 
information known as adverse selection or hidden action known as moral hazard) (Mogues et 
al., 2012; Ortmann & King, 2007a). Consequently, transactions in the market will result in a 
divergence between private costs and social costs and a failure to reach socially optimal 
levels in either the production or consumption of goods.  
 
Moreover, inequality and thus poverty can simultaneously exist within both efficient and 
inefficient markets. Market failure tends to inhibit growth and deepen the incidence of 
poverty, especially amongst the rural poor in developing countries. Market failure thus 
provides a rationale for a variety of government interventions in the agricultural sector, with 
the government defining public policy in an attempt to correct market failure in order to 
improve the overall welfare of society (Chirwa & Kydd, 2009; Otsuka & Kalirajan, 2010). 
Dillon and Barrett (2016:13) contend that as African governments increasingly intervene to 
try to rectify perceived market failures, the onus now rests with researchers to precisely 
locate the sources and causes of market failures, especially those that impede productivity 
and income growth in agrarian communities in rural areas. De Gorter (2008:1) identified the 
following problems that are at the core of explaining inefficiency in government policy 
instruments: First, are the enforcement and commitment problems with regard to politicians’ 
promises regarding policies and individuals who vote for them. Second, are the information 
and agency problems as a result of opportunistic behaviour among various participants in the 
political process.  
 
The government also cannot solve market failure arising from the problem of asymmetric 
information as it does not have access to unobservable information (Otsuka & Kalirajan, 
2010). Hayami has argued that community institutions can support market transactions by 
reducing information asymmetry (Hayami, 2009). This argument is not entirely correct 
because, in the real world, no community is perfect in eliminating opportunistic behaviour by 
individuals within that community. Hence, people within the community can benefit from 
free-riding and opportunistic behaviour, resulting in community failure due to information 
asymmetries and incentive compatibility structures as well as imperfect property rights, hence 





Hayami has also cautioned that any economic development system based on overreliance on 
state and community institutional arrangements would lead to inefficiency and increase 
inequality in the overall socio-economic welfare of the people. State-led agricultural 
development policies in Africa have not generally worked after African countries have gained 
their independence; neither have the market-liberalisation policies that followed. As a result, 
policies have been implemented poorly or not at all, or those that have been implemented 
well have not delivered sustainable benefits (Dorward et al., 2009:7). 
 
Recently, a number of studies have focused on the interrelationship of community, market, 
and state institutions in economic development (Daftary, 2010; De Janvry et al., 2010; 
Hayami, 2009; Mukherji, 2013). These studies indicate that there is a need for further 
exploration, especially of the role of the community in reducing transaction costs in economic 
development in developing countries. For instance, a study by Kalirajan et al. (2010) in India 
showed that community failure occurred as a result of some economically uninformed tribes 
within communities that did not participate effectively in capacity-building development 
programmes implemented by the state due to their traditional beliefs and norms. As 
acknowledged by Hayami, in this context, community failure can be associated with the long 
time that it takes communities to adjust to changing forms of culture, norms, taboos, and 
traditions with regard to the interaction of state and market. Undoubtedly, rural communities 
in developing economies have the potential to transform their norms in response to changes 
in economic environments (Hayami, 2009:114). 
 
Globally, community failure may also be explained by existing shortcomings at the 
community level, such as a lack of knowledge or skills, disorganisation, stratification, 
conflicts of interest, inter-ethnic rivalry, and so on. Thus, community failure may be both the 
result and the cause of government initiatives (De Janvry et al., 2010). Certainly, these 
concerns and the increasing prevalence of the failure of government interventions to 
ameliorate market failure in a developing country, especially in Africa, means that it is 
essential that robust studies be conducted to assess effective ways of bringing about 
agricultural development.  
 
Moreover, in the provision of public goods, politicians act as patrons and provide services to 
their clients (voters) in order to get re-elected (Daftary, 2010; Mason et al., 2013). By 




performance. For example, many young democracies in southern Africa (for example Zambia 
and Malawi) may systematically direct subsidised farmer input support programmes, such as 
fertilisers bought with taxpayers’ money, to areas where the government received strong 
community support in the previous election (Mason et al., 2013:1–4). This process may result 
in inefficiencies that arise not because of political transaction costs but because of the 
political-economic interactions between politicians, voters, and interest groups (De Gorter, 
2008; Keech & Munger, 2015). 
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, especially in Namibia, small-scale farmers are facing various kinds of 
market challenges such as high risks, poor infrastructure, weak provision of finance, 
information asymmetries, economies of scale and weak systems of contract enforcement, 
market uncertainty, and markets that are often constrained by inadequate property rights and 
high transaction costs (Abdulai & Birachi, 2008; Haggblade et al., 2010; Jordaan et al., 2014; 
Masakure & Henson, 2005; Nothard et al., 2005; Ortmann & King, 2010). Other key factors 
important for agricultural productivity are the distance from the market, adequate water, 
labour, crop choice, soil fertility, drought, diseases, pests, and so on (Fiebiger et al., 2010; 
Kuvare et al., 2008). The solutions to these challenges necessitate government interventions. 
Agricultural development in Namibia is also negatively influenced by both government and 
community institutions and organisations as discussed in the coming sections of this study. 
 
1.2 Research problem  
More than half of the Namibian population lives in northern communal areas and is directly 
or indirectly dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods. The country is a net importer of 
most food products. For example, domestic producers contribute about 44 percent of total 
domestic fruit and vegetable demand, while the remaining 56 percent is supplied by imports, 
mostly from South Africa (NAB, 2017). The commercialisation of agriculture in Namibia is 
considered central to employment creation, food self-sufficiency at the household level, rural 
development, and hence poverty alleviation.  
 
The problem concerning Namibian agricultural development is rooted in a long historical 
system of transforming small-scale subsistence farmers into commercial enterprises to 
address skewed income distribution in the country. After the declaration of Namibia’s 
independence from South Africa in 1990, the Namibian government started investing in 




with the potential to improve the living standards of people. Despite government efforts to 
subsidise agricultural developmental activities, the outcome of public investment in 
agriculture is still characterised by low levels of productivity and high transaction costs in 
developing industries such as vegetable production in north-central Namibia. This has 
resulted in a slow pace of reducing poverty and addressing food insecurity.  
 
The main constraints that hinder agricultural development in north-central Namibia and 
ultimately economic growth include land degradation, deforestation, marginal agricultural 
productivity, inadequate infrastructure support, recurring droughts, unpredictable rainfall, 
high temperatures, and poor soil fertility. In addition, land in communal areas in northern 
Namibia is owned by the state and the administration of access to land in these areas is 
handled by the traditional authority (Mendelsohn et al., 2011:1–11). Thus, the state and 
traditional authorities may privatise land at their discretion and have been accused of 
allocating large tracks of communal land to themselves, while politicians, business, and 
wealthier people are accused of illegally fencing off land at the expense of small-scale poor 
households. Since land belongs to the state, farmers cannot use it as collateral to obtain credit 
from financial institutions due to the absence of property rights. This means that farmers have 
limited access to land as they have only user rights without title deeds. 
 
Despite constraints to agricultural development in north-central Namibia the natural resources 
in the region are ideal for vegetable production under irrigation, but the area is remotely 
located to access both input and output markets. For the provision of inputs (seeds, fertilisers, 
and pesticides) farmers experience high transport and other transaction costs as these inputs 
are imported from South Africa. With the Namibian population estimated at 2.3 million 
(NSA, 2017), the domestic market for high-value crops is limited. The largest domestic 
market for horticultural produce is the capital, Windhoek (about 900 km south from the study 
area), which is not easily accessed by small-scale producers from the north-central regions 
due to high transport costs. Most of the supermarkets or retailers operating in the domestic 
market are owned by South Africans and procure food and fresh produce through their head 
offices that are based in South Africa. 
 
As a result, these retailers often do not procure directly from Namibian producers, especially 
small-scale producers. Thus, the small-scale producers in Namibia are excluded and 




through imports mainly from South Africa or favour larger farmers who can comply with 
their food quality standard requirements (Emongor & Kirsten, 2009). In addition, because of 
an increase in consumer demand and food safety concerns, the need to control for high 
perishability and safe handling involves specialised production, packaging techniques, and 
refrigerated transport, all of which require large capital investment, which small-scale 
producers are unable to make on their own (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002:504).  
 
The South African farmers have a comparative advantage over local farmers due to lower 
costs of production and higher transport costs to some extent are absorbed by a larger scale of 
production that lower unit costs. The local farmers also lack knowledge because they come 
from a community that does not prepare them for agricultural commercialisation. The 
constraints stated above obviously need government interventions to improve the 
competitiveness of small-scale farmers in Namibia. 
 
However, many categories of government inefficiencies exist, for instance, inefficiencies 
stemming from government administration and inefficiencies stemming from democracy or 
government policy-making (De Gorter, 2008; Keech & Munger, 2015). A study by Vink 
(2012:2) raises two fundamental questions that agricultural economists in southern Africa 
must investigate, namely:  
First, what is the influence of public policy on the structure of agriculture? Here the 
structure of agriculture refers to the institutional organisation of the sector (in the 
public, private and voluntary/community spheres); its geographic organisation in 
terms of what is produced and then processed, distributed, and consumed, and where 
this takes place; and its business structure in terms of the modes of production 
practiced and the resulting mix of farm sizes. Second, what is the influence of the 
governance of farm businesses and agriculture businesses on their success from a 
financial, economic, social, and environmental point of view? 
 
Furthermore, the problems associated with community institutions and organisations in 
agricultural development projects in Namibia need to be identified and assessed. Gonzalez 
(2014; refer also to Otsuka & Kalirajan, 2010) has identified three problems that can result in 
community failure: First, the poor within the community behave opportunistically due to 
information asymmetry or have limited information and as a result, their perceptions can 




distributed within communities, allowing some individuals to use it to control the benefits 
from the service more than others. Second, rural communities are poor and have very limited 
resources that can be very costly to obtain, sometimes resulting in conflicts and 
disagreements over available resources. In addition, the community is undermined by the 
costs of resisting the power of dominant interest groups and the temptation to free ride. 
Finally, the sustainability of managing agricultural development initiatives is constantly 
threatened by the conflicts of interest and the inequalities that exist amongst communities, 
such as the technical and entrepreneurial expertise required to manage new complex projects. 
 
As discussed above, one can argue that the priority of the state (government) is not based on 
the reality of the market functions and is not aligned with the objectives of the community. 
As a result, little is understood about the impact of how the Namibian government deals with 
policy-inefficient instruments for the sustainable and equitable development of the agriculture 
sector.  
 
For Namibia, only a handful of studies have addressed agricultural development based on 
linking development agendas to issues concerning the interrelationship of government, 
market, and community failure (Fiebiger et al., 2010; Newsham & Thomas, 2009; Shapi & 
Likuwa, 2016). Detailed information on small-scale farmers in the commercialisation of 
agriculture schemes in Namibia is limited. This study aims to contribute to the literature. In 
southern Africa as a whole, some studies have addressed problems related to a lack of 
markets for both inputs and outputs (Louw et al., 2008; Louw et al., 2009; Mason et al., 
2013). Other problems cited by these studies include a lack of appropriate technologies and a 
lack of access to those technologies, inefficient extension services, insufficient physical and 
marketing infrastructure, a lack of credit as well as insufficient development of processing or 
manufacturing industries. Thus there is a need to design appropriate strategies for effective 
agricultural commercialisation policy implementation in Namibia and perhaps in other 
developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
This study intends to contribute to and fill the gap found in the literature, as shown above, by 
identifying and assessing the main transaction costs (information, enforcement, monitoring, 
and searching costs) inhibiting agricultural development because of inefficient systems, 
combining the market, community and state institutions. The research question that this study 




scale fruit or vegetable farmers if these farmers will not increase production, due to a lack of 
market access, unless they can make a profit, which probably implies heavy subsidisation of 
marketing infrastructures by taxpayers? In order to answer this question, the study uses a 
vegetable development case study in north-central Namibia. The researcher argues that 
successful agricultural development is directly related to effective government interventions 
to create and enforce institutional arrangements to deal with the transaction costs that are 
based on the reality of market and community institutions. The study explores the major role 
that insights from new institutional economics (NIE), especially transaction cost economics 
(TCE), play in the interrelationship of community, state and market institutions in agricultural 
development and is intended to develop a framework that should contribute to the 
development of agriculture where large amounts of public money are invested. 
  
1.3 Objectives of the study  
The main objective of this study is to determine the transaction costs between market, state, 
and community institutions in the small-scale production and marketing of high-value 
horticultural crops in the semiarid and isolated north-central region of Namibia. From this 
main, broad objective, the following five specific objectives were formulated with respect to 
the interrelationship between state, market, and community institutions in the development of 
small-scale enterprises:  
1. To assess the role of different sources of inefficiency with regard to the interaction of 
market, government, and community in promoting agricultural development in 
developing countries (Chapter 3).  
2. To determine socio-economic characteristics that influence small-scale vegetable 
farmers’ participation in the production and marketing of high-value crops in north-
central Namibia (Chapter 4). 
3. To examine transaction characteristics that arise from the need to make investments in 
physical infrastructure by the state and on-farm activities by farmers that are specific 
to small-scale, high-value vegetable production and marketing activities (Chapter 5). 
4. To develop an institutional framework based on the reality of the interrelationship of 
the market, community institutions, and government objectives in the development of 
the vegetable industry in north-central Namibia (Chapter 6). 
5. To formulate relevant strategic policy options for further development of the 




the highly demanding globally competitive markets for high-value horticultural crops 
(Chapter 7). 
 
1.4 Conceptual framework 
The commercialisation of the agriculture sector in sub-Saharan Africa requires an 
understanding of the factors inhibiting the growth and development of this sector. As Hayami 
(2009) acknowledges, the nature and role of the community can best be understood through 
comparisons with the market and the state, which together comprise the economic system that 
coordinates economic activities in society. As can be seen from Figure 1.1, the first problem 
that leads to community failure, market failure and government failure in related transactions 
exchange amongst these economic systems is information asymmetry as a result of agency 
problems rooted in opportunistic behaviour. Second are the enforcement problems with 
regard to agricultural development initiatives by politicians who serve their interest in being 
re-elected, making policy implementation impossible. The third problem is associated with 
ill-defined property rights, which cannot be solved by market forces, resulting in social 
inequality or inefficiencies in resource distribution among citizens. From the conceptual 
framework in Figure 1.1 two thematic prepositions can be deduced that are described in the 
next subsection. Therefore, the presence of high transaction costs significantly contributes to 
the failure of agricultural development projects in most developing countries. As shown by a 
number of studies in rural areas, farmers are unable to overcome high transaction costs and as 
a result, are not able to enter into markets (Barrett, 2008; Haggblade et al., 2010; Jordaan et 
al., 2014; Mmbando et al., 2015). Similarly, the existence of significant transaction costs can 
pose an insurmountable barrier to collective solutions quite simply because such costs are 
likely to outweigh the potential gains resulting from cooperation (Blandford, 2007). In 
addition, rural farmers lack reliable market information as well as information on potential 





Figure 1.1: Conceptual framework of the interrelationship of community, market, and state 
 
Information asymmetry is of growing importance in policy formation and evaluation in 
agriculture (Blandford, 2007). As agricultural policy evolves, the information required can be 
more complex and difficult to obtain. For instance, asymmetric information will inevitably 
result in opportunism (adverse selection or moral hazard) and high transaction costs (Mogues 
et al., 2012; Ortmann & King, 2007a). Thus, the optimal completeness of a contract depends 
on the trade-off between marginal benefits and costs (Ortmann & King, 2007a).  
Notably, agents often take advantage of the high cost of measuring their characteristics and 




principal lacks the relevant competence to judge ex-ante incentives and ex-post governance 
aspects and often depends on the agent for such judgements (Mogues et al., 2012). Thus, 
there is a need to further understand the principal-agent relationship by focusing on the 
incentive versus risk-sharing trade-off of contracts aimed at aligning the interests of the agent 
with those of the principal.  
Technically demanding agricultural projects often have high transaction costs (negotiating, 
monitoring, or enforcing project responsibilities) and are more difficult to sustain as a 
community-driven process (Mukherji, 2013:1549). Of the transactional properties that have 
been examined empirically, asset specificity, or the redeployability of assets that support a 
given transaction to a different use or different user, is argued to be the most important and 
has subsequently been seen the most testing in the empirical literature (Macher & Richman, 
2008:5). Transaction frequency has received far less treatment in the empirical literature in 
comparison with asset specificity and uncertainty; however, as Menard (2005:285) argues, all 
three are notoriously difficult to measure. Almost all the empirical literature avoids any 
attempts at measuring transaction costs directly, using instead a reduced-form model in which 
transaction costs are assumed to be minimised.  
Transaction and related costs are the core of NIE. TCE is built on the important assumption 
that organising transactions involve costs (Parkin, 2012:115). In addition to the positive 
transaction costs, the allocation of resources and the development of new technologies 
depends on the prevailing governance structures such as the modes of governance to organise 
transactions and the characteristics of property rights (Menard, 2001:86).  
There has been little systematic statistical analysis of agriculture or the organisation of 
agricultural transactions from a transaction cost perspective (Macher & Richman, 2008:36). 
Masten (2000) suggests that agricultural transactions display a broad range of governance 
structures, including the location-specific nature of the investments required and the temporal 
specificities associated with the perishability of agricultural products. As Masten (2000:190) 
argues, agricultural transactions provide a rich and largely unexplored area for application 
and refinement of transaction cost theory. Yet, the future of agricultural development in 
developing countries, especially in southern Africa, will depend on a successful model that 
combines the three pillars of economic organisation of community, market, and state and 
their complementary role in improving the welfare of society considering the influence of 




propositions to be considered in understanding the triangular relationships of market systems, 
government interventions, and community institutions and how these constrain agricultural 
development and economic welfare in the fragile agro-ecological and socio-economic 
environment. 
 
1.5 Key research themes 
The government is supposed to set up and enforce institutional rules according to which 
markets operate and to mitigate market inefficiencies for the overall benefit of society. The 
first proposition in this study concerns the relationship between market and government 
failures, which could be attributed to the presence of a high level of transaction costs 
(Haggblade et al., 2010; Jordaan et al., 2014; Mmbando et al., 2015; Shiimi et al., 2012) at 
both production and marketing stages along the supply chain for emerging small-scale 
vegetable producers in north-central Namibia. The first proposition is stated as follows: 
Proposition 1: The design of agricultural development initiatives by the government 
is fraught with a poor understanding of community institutions and is not aligned with 
market reality, resulting in the failure of projects and the decline of economic welfare. 
The role of community institutions in many developing countries, being an important 
economic system affecting the development of agricultural initiatives, is being undermined 
(Hayami, 2009). For instance, community failure can stem from informal institutions 
including societal norms, customs, and traditions as their slow rate of change would require a 
longer period for communities to adjust to changing resource endowments and technologies 
as well as information asymmetry (Kalirajan et al., 2010). In this context, the possibilities for 
implementing government interventions conducive to agricultural development and economic 
welfare are constrained by inefficient resource allocation stemming from government 
officials’ administration and probably a lack of trust and incomplete information among 
project stakeholders. The question is what would happen when community institutions fail to 
manage resources when both market systems and government interventions have already 
failed to enhance agricultural development and economic welfare? The second proposition is 
stated as follows: 
Proposition 2: The possibilities of the government implementing new agricultural 
development initiatives sustainably are constrained by the presence of information 
asymmetries and incentive compatibility problems and also agent problems that are the 




1.6 Methodology and data used 
1.6.1 Small-scale vegetable producer case study 
The study uses surveys, historical data, and in-depth interviews of key informants within 
north-central Namibia as a case study. Alston (2008) advocates the use of case studies 
because they allow the researcher to isolate the impact of theoretical concepts in a more 
detailed manner. Case studies mainly investigate a small number of units of interest 
purposefully selected out of a population of possible units such as countries, firms, 
households, groups, individuals, transactions, resources, regions, and political parties but also 
events such as revolutions, disasters, crises or wars, using mainly qualitative techniques 
(Beckmann & Padmanabhan, 2009:343). Although the number of units may be small, each 
unit may contain sufficient quantities of subunits that can be investigated using quantitative 
methods (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Case studies rely on observable or recorded data and 
are capable of investigating historical as well as contemporary units or events. Information 
may be gathered in a variety of ways, such as documents, interviews, surveys, and participant 
observation. The main tool for verifying acquired data is triangulation, such as the 
simultaneous use of different sources of information (Beckmann & Padmanabhan, 2009:343).  
 
One problem with specific case studies is that detailed facts can always be found to question 
the prevailing explanation, hence the necessity of a robust theory to direct the interpretation 
of these facts (Menard, 2001, 2017). Case studies are especially important for NIE and TCE 
in particular because they enable us to analyse both the determinants and consequences of 
institutions and institutional change (Alston, 2008). According to Menard (2001:89), two 
types of case studies can be distinguished: One has to do with the construction of a stylised 
fact and is intended to provide an in-depth analysis of a specific question and related 
explanatory concepts. The other type of case study is developed by comparative case studies 
particularly relevant in NIE because of the need to deal with a limited number of discrete 
organising transaction modes that characterise society, both at the micro-level and at the 
institutional level. What is essential to the success of this approach is that a limited number of 
variables be isolated and kept under strict control by the researcher as the analysis proceeds 
(Menard 2001:90). 
Although case studies are often criticised because of their lack of generality and possible ex-
post rationalisation, they can be especially important to empirical TCE research when they 




practices or the unique features of certain governance environments (as opposed to offering 
mere description) (Macher & Richman, 2008:8). Case studies are an important and necessary 
complement to econometric analysis (Masten & Saussier, 2000). Case studies provide a 
richer description and perspective than many statistical analyses offer and frequently 
represent the initial research steps that lead to subsequent refinements of transaction cost 
theory or future quantitative examinations (Macher & Richman, 2008:8). In this study, the 
case study technique is significant in understanding the historical dynamics of institutions and 
institutional arrangements that affect the efficiency of market systems, community 
institutions, and government activities.  
The objectives of the study are achieved by using small-scale vegetable producer schemes as 
a case study in north-central Namibia. The case study includes producers directly supported 
by the Namibian government via the Green Scheme Project, (Etunda Irrigation Project) and 
the surrounding private vegetable producers (around Olushandja Dam) in the Omusati Region 
who do not receive direct government support for vegetable production. The Etunda 
Irrigation Project farmers are expected to commercialise given the resource availability and 
the support they receive from the government compared to private farmers around 
Olushandja Dam. Considering agro-ecological and socio-economic constraints, this case 
study was chosen because the Omusati Region is the most viable in north-central Namibia 
with the potential for irrigated small-scale vegetable production due to access to water from 
the Kunene River. In addition, small-scale vegetable producers have increased in recent years 
owing to government support in investing in physical, marketing, and processing 
infrastructure facilities, thus creating market access for domestic farmers. As a result, small-
scale vegetable producers compete among themselves and with larger fresh produce 
producers as well as fresh produce imports from neighbouring countries such as South Africa 
for the same domestic market. Finally, the case study was chosen to assess the competitive 
advantage of small-scale vegetable producers given the existing policies, economic 
structures, and social, physical, and technological factors in the semiarid north-central regions 
of Namibia.  
 
1.6.2 Research design and data collection 
A mixed research approach, using qualitative and quantitative methods (Creswell, 2014) was 
adopted for this study. A qualitative design was used to collect in-depth information for 




this manner provides insights into the relationship and alignments between state, community, 
and market institutions which have resulted in the failure of some projects and the decline of 
the economic welfare of the farmers. Furthermore, information gathered with the qualitative 
approach provides insights into the information asymmetries, incentive compatibility 
problems, and also agent problems that are the root cause of the failure of community 
institutions. In addition, a quantitative approach was used to assess the relationships between 
socio-economic and agro-ecological variables in which small-scale vegetable enterprises 
operate.  
 
The objectives of the study were achieved through methodological triangulation2 such as the 
use of multiple methods to study a single problem (Wysocki et al., 2003:119). This study 
relied on the following multiple data collection procedures: a household survey by face-to-
face interviewing of individual farmers, direct observations, and interviewing of key 
informants. In order to address objective 1, secondary sources of data including the reviewing 
of existing literature associated with market systems, community institutions and state 
(government activities) as well as the theory of NIE and the development of the horticultural 
subsector in Namibia and elsewhere from both published and unpublished information were 
used. Specifically, the data that were collected for each case study included historical 
information concerning farmers’ linkages with both input and credit suppliers, and with 
market and trading partners. Sources of data include historical records from producers, 
agricultural boards or marketing agencies, and grower associations. Historical data were also 
obtained by purposefully selecting farmers and experts in the study area, such as local 
traditional leaders, regional councillors, extension officials, and teachers for interviews. The 
aim was to gain insights into the factors influencing the interrelationship of the market, state, 
and community institutions in the commercialisation of the agriculture sector in northern 
Namibia. 
 
In addition, a household survey with structured questions was conducted (APPENDIX A) to 
collect information that was used to address objective 2 of the study. The survey aimed to 
augment the qualitative information and to identify the characteristics of vegetable farmers 
 
2  Methodological triangulation is similar to what Bonoma (1985) called ‘perceptual triangulation’ as a method 
for providing a more complete picture of the business unit under study. Prime sources for perceptual 
triangulation include financial data, market performance data, market and competitive data, written archives, 




(participants) in the study area. The 100 percent (census) farm household survey was 
conducted from May to July 2014. Because the vegetable industry in north-central Namibia is 
still in its infancy, only 78 farm households were selected purposefully and interviewed. 
Objectives 3, 4, and 5 were addressed using a combination of data sources that included 
observations, recorded data, key informant interviews, and household survey questionnaires. 
  
1.6.3 Method of analysis 
The research objectives were achieved by applying insights from TCE. The structural 
framework of analysis in this study was drawn from the arrangement of the market, state, and 
community institutions in agricultural development (Hayami, 1988) and TCE (Williamson, 
1985, 2010). In order to address objective 2, nonparametric (descriptive) statistics and 
statistical analysis were applied to identify and analyse the factors (Fox, 2003; Gelman & 
Hill, 2007) constraining the sustainable production and marketing of vegetables in the case 
study. In order to examine transaction characteristics that arise from the need to make 
investments in physical infrastructure by the state and on-farm activities by farmers that are 
specific to small-scale, high-value vegetable production and marketing activities (objective 
3), descriptive statistics (Gelman & Hill, 2007) was used together with thematic analysis 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). Descriptive statistics (Gelman & Hill, 2007) and thematic analysis 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006) were also used to develop a framework based on the reality of the 
interrelationship of the market, community institutions, and government objectives in the 
development of the vegetable industry in north-central Namibia to address objectives 4 and 5.  
 
1.7 Structure of the dissertation  
This dissertation comprises three parts. The first part consists of chapters 2 and 3. These 
chapters provide a description of TCE and the arrangement of the market, the state, and the 
role of community institutions in the development of agriculture. Dealing with the theoretical 
issues of TCE was deemed important because it could be expected to facilitate the analysis of 
the development of the vegetable industry.  
• In Chapter 2, a brief review of the theory of TCE is provided as insight into the 
theoretical underpinnings is important to establish inefficiencies in agricultural 
development in developing countries. Specific attention is paid to a discussion of 
property rights, principal-agent relationships, and collective action, and associated 
transaction costs used in the study. This is followed by a description of the 




• In Chapter 3, the assessment of the major challenges facing the development of 
agriculture in developing countries is discussed with special attention to market-led 
and state-led policies and community institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. The study 
aimed to investigate the market failure, state failure, and community failure and 
possible solutions for the commercialisation of agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa, 
specifically in Namibia. 
The second part of the dissertation consists of empirical chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. The chapters 
focus on a case study of small-scale vegetable farmers carried out in north-central Namibia in 
order to answer the central research question of the study.  
• In Chapter 4, a description of types of farmers, socio-economic and agro-ecological 
characteristics that constrain the commercialisation of agriculture in the study area, 
and the farmers’ decision to participate in the high-value crop (vegetable) industry is 
provided.  
• In Chapter 5, transaction costs associated with governance structures in the study area 
are aligned with transaction attributes of asset specificity, frequency, and uncertainty 
based on TCE (Williamson, 1985). The chapter further discusses the influence of 
transaction costs or inefficiencies of the prevailing policy environment on the 
development of agriculture (vegetables) in Namibia.  
• In Chapter 6, a model based on the interrelationship of the market, community 
institutions, and government objectives in the development of the vegetable industry 
is presented. The model aims to minimise transaction costs and enhance 
competitiveness in the development of the vegetable industry.  
• In Chapter 7, strategic policy options for further development of the agricultural 
sector in particular agricultural commercialisation in communal areas such as north-
central Namibia are discussed.  
The final part of the dissertation is Chapter 8. In this chapter, a summary is given and the 
answers to the specific research objectives and some strategic policy options from the study 
are discussed in order to draw overall conclusions from the study. The chapter ends with 




CHAPTER 2: THE TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS APPROACH IN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND CONTEXT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of the chapter is to discuss thematic aspects from literature relevant to the 
development of the agricultural sector in developing countries, specifically the 
commercialisation of agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, the TCE theory was 
reviewed. This helps to explain why it is necessary to consider the combination of market, 
state, and community institutions in the commercialisation of agriculture in developing 
countries, specifically in southern Africa where agro-ecological and socio-economic factors 
constraint the development of high-value crops. The focus in this chapter is based on the 
argument that there could be several institutional issues within the community and its 
organisation that could lead to the failure of agricultural development initiatives introduced 
by the state or the private sector (the market). It is also important to have a clear 
understanding of the literature on why market-led and state-led policies have failed in most 
developing countries after their independence. 
 
The starting point in this chapter is a brief discussion of the TCE theory in order to establish 
the relevance of institutions and organisations to economic development. This is followed by 
a discussion of transaction costs, governance structures (markets, hybrids, and hierarchies) 
and selected aspects of property rights, the principal-agent relationship, and collective action 
used in the empirical parts of the study. Attention is paid to a discussion of the arrangement 
of state and community institutions employed in the study. This provides a better 
understanding of the relevance of combining market, state, and community institutions in 
agricultural development in developing countries. The chapter ends with reflections on how 
TCE can broadly assist in a better understanding of the dynamics of the arrangement of the 
market, state, and community institutions in the economic performance of developing 
countries such as Namibia. 
 
2.2 A transaction cost analysis approach 
The term ‘transaction cost economics’ (TCE) was first introduced by Williamson (1975), but 
the concept of transaction cost was introduced by Coase in 1937 who established that market 
exchange was not costless. He associated transaction costs with searching, information, 




Arrow (1969), cited by Furubotn and Richter (2000:40), defined transaction costs as the costs 
of running the economy. As a result, a transaction may be said to occur when goods or 
services are traded across a technologically separable interface. By definition, the 
organisation of technologically separable activities is not technologically determined but is a 
matter to which the comparative analysis of alternative forms of governance may usefully be 
brought to bear (Williamson, 1993:16). A major challenge when using a comparative analysis 
relates to the variety of conditions behind the diversity of organisational solutions (Menard, 
2017:3). For example, different types of soil might impose a specific organisation and the use 
of irrigation might require extremely good cooperation between stakeholders to minimise 
transaction costs. 
 
Moreover, Coase (1960) contends that the neoclassical result of efficient markets is only 
obtained when it is without cost to transact, but when it is costly to transact, institutions 
matter. However, transaction costs need to be distinguished from production costs, which 
tend to be a preoccupation of neoclassical analysis. Neoclassical theory assumes inter alia 
that transaction costs are zero (in other words the costs of obtaining information about 
alternatives and the costs of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing contracts are zero), 
adjustment costs are zero, all resources are fully allocated and privately held, and owners 
allocate resources to use purely in response to pecuniary incentives (Royer, 1999:45). In a 
review of NIE and development theory Bardhan, (1989) relates transaction costs of market 
exchange to market failure.  
 
NIE analysis at the microeconomic level takes the transaction as the basic unit of study and 
focuses on transaction costs, using contractual arrangements or agreements to bring about a 
transaction cost minimisation outcome among trading parties. According to Williamson 
(2010), TCE assumes that an organisation has the rationale of economising on transaction 
costs. Thus, governance structures, according to NIE theory, are aligned with transactions as 
the basis of effecting minimisation of transaction costs (McCann, 2013). A firm should select 
the institutional arrangement that minimises the sum of its production and transaction costs 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1990; Royer, 1999). Therefore, this study needed to review and 
understand the scope and nature of TCE which is essential in the assessment of the vegetable 
industry in the north-central part of Namibia. In this context, there is a need to explain market 
failures by employing TCE theory in analysing the development of government-supported 




2.2.1 Basic assumptions of transaction cost economics 
NIE assumes that individuals have incomplete information and limited mental capacity. 
Because of this, they face uncertainty about unforeseen events and outcomes and as a result 
incur transaction costs to acquire information. Yet, NIE makes a better understanding of 
actual human behaviour, institutions, and resource outcomes possible. 
  
TCE’s first behavioural assumption is that individual human beings are limited in knowledge, 
foresight, skill, and time (Williamson, 1989:139). Thus, bounded rationality, which dates 
back to Simon’s work (1957), has since come to be associated with TCE as a result proposes 
several categories that limit an individual's choices. These are (1) imperfect and/ or 
incomplete information, (2) the complexity of problems, (3) limited human information-
processing capacity, (4) the time available for decision-making processes, and (5) the 
conflicting preferences decision-makers have for organisational goals (Gonzalez, 2014: 76).  
 
TCE’s second behavioural assumption refers to “self-interest seeking with guile” 
(Williamson, 1985:47). This opportunism includes deceit, theft, cheating by abusing trust or 
breaking an agreement between negotiating or trading parties whenever it is deemed 
beneficial to one’s position. Imperfect information makes economic actors vulnerable to 
opportunistic behaviour (Poulton & Lyne, 2009:143). As a result, transaction costs include 
both the costs associated with the adverse consequences of opportunistic behaviour and the 
costs of trying to prevent them (Royer, 1999:46). 
 
Royer (1999:47) describes the three causes of incomplete contracts, namely: (1) bounded 
rationality (i.e. limits on the capacity of individuals to process information, deal with 
complex issues, and consider all possible contingencies); (2) difficulties in specifying or 
measuring performance; and (3) asymmetric information (in other words when the parties do 
not have equal access to all information relevant to the contract), which will inevitably result 
in opportunism – hidden information, known as adverse selection, or hidden action, known as 
moral hazard – and transaction costs.  
 
According to Mogues et al., 2012, adverse selection refers to information about the 
conditions of the contract held by one party that other parties do not hold or cannot learn. A 
moral hazard is an action taken by one party that affects contract performance but cannot be 




on the trade-off between marginal benefits and costs (Ortmann & King, 2007a:53). The 
existence of a well-developed body of contract law can help prevent some of the problems of 
opportunism that can arise because of incomplete contracting by specifying a set of standard 
provisions applicable to broad classes of transactions and by eliminating the need for parties 
to specify these provisions in every transaction (Royer, 1999).  
 
2.2.2 Dimensions of transactions  
Because of bounded rationality and opportunism, three characteristics of a transaction that 
exert systematic influence on economic behaviour are critically important in determining the 
optimal institutional arrangement, namely (1) the frequency (F) with which transactions 
occur; (2) uncertainty (U); and (3) the degree of asset specificity (AS) or idiosyncrasy of the 
transaction (Williamson, 1985, 2010). Together, these three attributes determine the 
following relationship (the symbols show the predicted impact of a positive variation of each 
characteristic on transaction costs (TC) (Menard, 2005:285). 
TC = f(AS(+), F(-), U(+))         (1) 
Williamson (1991) argues that transaction costs increase with a higher degree of asset 
specificity and a higher degree of uncertainty and decrease with the frequency of transactions. 
As Menard (2005:285) suggests, all three are notoriously difficult to measure. Almost all the 
empirical literature avoids any attempts at measuring transaction costs directly, using instead 
a reduced-form model in which transaction costs are assumed to be minimised. Therefore, the 
more complex3 a transaction, the more difficult and costly it is to encapsulate all its 
dimensions (ex-ante) and predict all adaptations required (ex-post). A simple framework of 
contracts may be preferable or even the only possible solution.  
 
In light of the above, it is important to understand the problem and complexity associated 
with the measurement and definition of asset specificity, uncertainty about a transaction, and 
the frequency of a transaction. These transaction characteristics or attributes are relevant in 




3 For instance transaction characteristic that involve privacy and technical change are increasingly complex with 
regards to the development and protection of new technology. In addition the higher the degree of 
programmability, the lower the level of supervision required and the higher the degree of non-separability the 




2.2.2.1 Degree of asset specificity 
Asset specificity refers to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses 
and by alternative users without sacrificing productive value (Williamson, 1991:281). 
Williamson (1991:281) distinguishes different types of asset specificity: (1) site-specificity; 
(2) physical asset specificity; (3) human asset specificity; (4) dedicated asset specificity; (v) 
intangible asset specificity (brand name capital); and (6) temporal specificity (Sykuta & 
Chaddad 1999).  
 
Royer (1999:48) explains the first four asset specificities as follows: Site specificity involves 
assets that are located nearby to economise on transportation or inventory costs or to achieve 
processing efficiencies. Physical asset specificity is associated with assets with physical 
properties specifically tailored to a particular transaction. Human asset specificity refers to 
acquired skills and knowledge of a group of workers that are more valuable within a 
particular relationship than outside it and that may interfere with conversion to another 
relationship. Dedicated assets are assets in which an investment is made based on a promise 
of a particular customer’s business without which it would not be profitable. Brand name 
capital refers to the realisation of the future value of the brand name, which can only be 
ensured within a particular transaction (Groenewegen et al., 2010). According to Sykuta and 
Chaddad (1999:73–74), temporal specificity results from the time-sensitive value of 
agricultural products and production processes that create another margin that may entice 
opportunistic behaviour by trading parties. 
  
In the studies by Milagrosa (2007) and Jordaan & Grové (2013), the specific types of asset 
specificity are elicited using proxies (Table 2.1). This approach was used in this study to 
assess the attributes of the transaction that contribute to the transaction costs faced by 





Table 2.1: The specific types of asset specificity and their proxies 
Asset specificity Proxies 
Site assets 
Agricultural production, 
Access to productive land, 
Availability of water,  
Climatic conditions (droughts),  
Incidence of pests and diseases 
Physical assets 
Own vehicles used for farming activities, 
Access to equipment and inputs (fertilisers, seeds, chemicals),  
Availability of cold storage facilities, packing materials, 
Temporal assets 
Availability of physical assets (cooling and packing facilities)  
Timing of delivery,  
Quality and value of the product that is sold 
Human assets 
Number of years of formal education,  
Years of experience in horticultural production 
Frequency Number of times the fresh produce is sold during the previous season 
Uncertainty 
Information asymmetries (withholding important information on produce), 
Opportunistic behaviour,  
Delay payment from trading partners, 
The demand for fresh produce and consumer preferences 
Source: Adapted from Jordaan & Grové 2013; Milagrosa 2007; Royer 1999; Williamson 
1985 
 
A strategic aspect relevant to many agricultural producers is the problem of asset specificity 
that may render them vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour by product-purchasing firms 
(Torgerson et al., 1998:7). Thus, a problem of hold-up arises “when one party in a contractual 
relationship seeks to exploit the other party’s vulnerability due to relationship-specific assets” 
(Royer, 1999:49). Once investments in relationship-specific assets have been made, the 
trading parties involved may have few or no alternative trading parties. This eliminates 
competitive trading; the asset’s opportunity cost will fall because its value in its next-best use 
will be less than its value in its current use, creating quasi-rents4 as a result. 
 
2.2.2.2 Degree of uncertainty surrounding the transaction 
Gӧdel’s incompleteness theorems for the philosophy of the mind in 1951 argued that human 
intellectual capability is not representable by a Turing Machine: or, we can never know with 
mathematical certainty what such a machine is (Fano & Graziani, 2011). This argument 
enables us to understand in analytical depth the real implications of the philosophy of the 
mind. Thus it is important to distinguish between risk and uncertainty. Knight (1921) makes a 
crucial distinction between risk and uncertainty. He argues that situations with risk are those 
 
4 A quasi-rent is the portion of a relationship-specific asset’s earnings in excess of the minimum required to 
keep the owner from exiting the relationship once the investment has been made. A quasi-rent is the 
difference between the revenue that the owner of the asset actually receives and the revenue that the owner 




in which decision making involves unknown outcomes but known ex-ante probability 
distributions. In uncertain situations, the exact set of all possible outcomes and/or the 
probability of a possible outcome are unknown (Groenewegen et al., 2010:16). Thus, 
transactions often involve uncertainty with regard to both the behaviour of the contracting 
parties and market developments (Groenewegen et al., 2010:121). Uncertainty surrounding 
the organisation of a transaction may involve significant costs, whether from agents’ 
behaviour, organisational deficiencies, inadequate institutions, or the nature of the state 
(Menard, 2005:285).  
 
2.2.2.3 Frequency of transaction 
According to Williamson (1985, 2010), the frequency of transaction matters, because the 
more often a transaction takes place, the more widely spread are the fixed costs of 
establishing a nonmarket governance system. The frequency of transactions at which trading 
parties interact may result in implicit mutual understandings that reduce the need for formal 
contractual enforcement mechanisms. This may lead to substantial investments in 
transaction-specific resources, which make it more expensive to look for another trading 
partner and make it harder for rivals to take over the same position. Williamson (1989:144–
145) refers to this process as a fundamental transformation.  
 
2.2.3 Dimensions of governance  
Governance can be defined as the body of rules, enforcement mechanisms, and corresponding 
interactive processes that coordinate the activities of the persons or network of organisations 
involved to allocate and monitor assets with regard to a certain outcome (Fischer et al., 
2007:123, Menard, 2017:2). Thus, governance may be defined as the institutional framework, 
broadly consisting of markets, hierarchies, and hybrids, through which a transaction is 
channelled (Menard, 2017:2). Williamson (1991) also argues that increases in asset 
specificity, the degree of uncertainty, and the frequency of transaction which are necessary to 
the results of this study are associated with shifts from spot markets to hybrids to hierarchical 
forms of governance.  
 
2.2.3.1 Market governance 
Markets represent a costly subset of the many institutional arrangements that have developed 
over time for transferring rights (Menard, 2005:303). Hence, markets specialise in the 




involved and coordinate the decentralised decisions made by agents using the information 
provided through the price system (Coase, 1937). One characteristic of markets from a 
transaction cost perspective is that they are organised (Furubotn & Richter, 2005); that is, 
markets are embedded in institutions that shape them. Thus, the neoclassical model serves as 
the benchmark for NIE when discussing market issues: supply, demand and the price 
mechanism form the hardcore of markets, as exemplified by spot markets (Menard 2005:302; 
Eaton et al., 2008: 20). The spot markets are preferred by small-scale horticultural farmers in 
north-central Namibia as formal markets will have quality requirements which they are not 
able to satisfy (Fiebiger et al., 2010). Thus, the market governance structure is relevant to the 
study of the high-value crop market in north-central Namibia. 
 
Market transactions are supported by classical contract law, which means that more formal 
terms supersede less formal terms should a dispute arise (Williamson, 1991:271). Thus, 
according to Chaddad (2009:7), markets adapt autonomously to disturbances as partners react 
to changing relative prices and other market signals and reposition themselves. Williamson 
(1991) says that A-adaptation (autonomous adaptation) prevails. This is in line with the 
neoclassical price model in which consumers and producers respond independently to 
parametric price changes to maximise their utility and profits. Moreover, the market works on 
the basis of high-powered incentives, little administrative control, and a contract-law regime 
which is well suited to implementing autonomous adaptations but poorly suited to effecting 
cooperative adaptations (Williamson, 2005:7).  
 
2.2.3.2 Hierarchical governance or vertical integration 
Hierarchies bring all parties and activities into a single entity and use administrative rules to 
decide the allocation of rights (O’Malley, 2009:9). Firms rely most on the hierarchy for 
coordinating. Hierarchies, which use organisational command and control to allocate 
resources (Dorward et al., 2009:26), are the basis of operations in government, parastatal 
agencies, most nongovernmental organisations, and anything other than the smallest private 
firms.  
 
Hierarchy uses low-powered incentives and considerable administrative control and the 
courts are differential (Williamson, 2005:7). The courts do not usually intervene in disputes 
among branches of hierarchies (Williamson, 2005:9–10). The parties in a dispute resolve 




settlement, drawing on fiat that is not possible in the market (Chaddad, 2009:8). The implicit 
contract law of internal organisation is grounded in the principle of forbearance (Williamson, 
1991) as courts following the business judgment rule refuse to hear disputes among internal 
divisions. According to Williamson (1991:274), the hierarchical type of governance is its 
court of ultimate appeal a situation not experienced in the agricultural sector in north-central 
Namibia. 
 
Therefore, hierarchies adapt to unanticipated disturbance of the distribution of rewards by 
administrative coordination. Adjustment to an unanticipated change in the distribution of 
rewards can be rapid, with high bureaucratic costs, but the stranding of specific assets can be 
avoided (O’Malley, 2009:9). However, to overcome the main costs of maladaptation during 
the bargaining interval, recourse to a different coordinating mechanism is needed. The 
adaptation of these kinds of coordination mechanisms’ is referred to by Williamson 
(1991:279) as C-adaptation (coordinated adaptation). 
 
2.2.3.3 Hybrid forms of governance, intermediate contract or partial ownership 
Hybrids as an intermediate form of governance possess the combined characteristic 
advantage of the market and vertical integration (Milagrosa, 2007:26). In particular, hybrids 
are characterised by semi-strong incentives, an intermediate degree of administrative 
apparatus, semi-strong adaptations of both kinds, and a semi-legalistic contract law regime 
(Williamson, 1991:281). The viability of the hybrid depends on the efficacy of credible 
commitments (penalties for premature termination, information disclosure and verification 
mechanisms, specialised dispute settlement, and the like), the cost-effectiveness of which 
varies with the attributes of transactions (Williamson, 2005:7).  
 
Hybrid forms of governance structure include various types of long-term contracts, joint 
ventures, dual sourcing (partial vertical integration), holding companies, and public 
enterprises (Joskow, 2005:302). Hybrid forms of the organisation include sharing 
arrangements such as franchising or agricultural sharecropping, groups of firms organised as 
networks, clusters or alliances, and reciprocal investments or reciprocal trading arrangements 
(Menard, 2004:21–22). Additionally, cooperatives are also conceptualised as a hybrid with a 
distinct governance model blending market-like attributes with hierarchy-like mechanisms 
(Chaddad, 2009; Makadok & Coff, 2009). Menard (2004) classifies the variety of hybrid 




and formal government, which are defined as intermediate governance modes between 
markets and hierarchies. Thus, the hybrid models seem to be relevant to the study of the high-
value crop market in north-central Namibia. 
 
Menard (2017:12-15) discusses three problems related to hybrid governance arrangements. 
The first problem is how hybrids can secure cooperation in order to achieve coordination 
without losing the advantage of decentralised decisions. The second problem is the existence 
of relational contracting, which also plays a crucial role in other forms of organisations. But 
what distinguishes hybrids is that their contracts link activities and resources among partners 
who simultaneously operate unconnected transactions (Menard, 2005:296). A third problem 
is hybrids’ relation to competition, which also exists among agents in a firm. The difference 
in the case of hybrids lies in the combination of interdependence and autonomy: partners 
remaining residual claimants in charge of their own decisions. Thus, partners compete against 
each other and hybrids usually compete with other arrangements, including other hybrids. 
  
2.2.4 Transaction costs associated with property rights 
The question of whether ownership should be private (individual) or social (collective) has 
been discussed widely in literature (Alston & Mueller, 2005:573–590; Furubotn & Richter, 
2005:79–198). Property rights are defined as the claims, entitlements, and related obligations 
among people regarding the use and disposition of a scarce resource (Furubotn & Pejovich, 
1972:1139). This definition is relevant to arrangements of the market, state, and community 
institutions in agricultural development which is the focus of this study. Three elements of 
property right ownership are outlined in the literature (Furubotn & Richter, 2005; Mwangi & 
Meinzen-Dick, 2009). The first is the right to make use of an asset (usus), such as the right to 
access the resource. Examples are to withdraw from or consume a resource (pick some wild 
plants) or to exploit a resource for economic benefit (graze cattle on common pastures). The 
second is the right to the income or appropriate returns from the asset (usus fructus). This 
includes the right to earn income from a resource even when using it indirectly can be 
separated from use and management of the resource, for example when government 
departments collect revenue from water users or when communities in parts of eastern and 
southern Africa collect a charge from tour operators in their common lands. The third is the 
right to change the form and substance of the asset, including the right to bear consequences 




exclusion (prevent others from accessing the field), and alienation (rent out, sell, bequeath or 
give the rights). 
 
Property rights include the right to benefit or harm oneself or others (Demsetz, 1967:347). 
Based on Coase’s (1960) article “The problem of social cost” or Coase’s theorem, 
externalities can be internalised if property rights are well established in a world with zero 
transaction costs. Although Coase’s theorem was aimed at the legal and political treatment of 
economic and environmental externalities, the same principles apply in the context of the 
firm organisation (Sykuta & Chaddad, 1999:73). Coase’s argument was used to counter 
Pigou’s call for government taxes to curb negative externalities.  
 
In the presence of transaction costs, different systems of property rights may produce 
different outcomes of efficiency as well as equity (Kherallah & Kirsten, 2002; Kirsten et al., 
2009). Establishing property rights to assets involves transaction costs. NIE links the 
minimisation of these transaction costs with the creation and design of different forms of 
organisation and contracting (Torgerson et al., 1998:7). In a world of zero transaction costs, 
contracts would be fully complete (Sykuta & Chaddad, 1999:72).  
 
Property rights theory regarding incomplete contracting of the firm was developed by 
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990, 1999) and became known as the 
Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) model. The property rights theory is based on the idea that 
ownership of non-human assets is a source of bargaining power when contracts are 
incomplete (Hart, 2017:741). The incomplete contract theory has been useful for 
understanding topics such as the meaning of ownership and the nature and financial structure 
of the firm. The incomplete contracts refer to property rights and are concerned with why 
ownership of assets (human and physical) matters (Kirsten et al., 2009:50). In general, 
ownership matters because it provides power when contracts are incomplete. Contracts are 
necessarily incomplete because information is presumed to be asymmetric between trading 
parties and/or because signals regarding at least one party’s performance and/or the state of 
the world are not verifiable (Sykuta & Chaddad, 1999:72). According to Torgerson et al. 
(1998:6) many policy analysts, the economics of property rights can help explain and correct 






Thus, the private property system could imply that all resources are in the possession of 
private owners who receive all the benefits and bear all the costs associated with ownership 
(Groenewegen et al., 2010:95). Note that goods are exclusive if other people can be 
prevented from effectively using those goods and that goods are said to be rival when 
consumption reduces the amount of the goods available to others. Thus, private goods 
(property) are both exclusive and rival, while purely public goods are nonexclusive and non-
rival (collective consumption goods). According to Poulton and Lyne (2009:144), most 
agricultural goods and services are indeed private goods. However, some supporting services 
required by agricultural producers, for example, technical and market knowledge, exhibit 
characteristics of public goods. This relationship is relevant to understanding the 
development of the agriculture sector in northern Namibia. 
 
Moreover, state (public) property or state governance means that the rights to the resource are 
vested exclusively in government, which in turn makes decisions concerning access to the 
resource and the nature of exploitation thereof (Feeny, 1990:5). Individuals and communities 
frequently have rights of access, use, and sometimes even decision making on communal 
land that is officially government (public) land (Mwangi & Meinzen-Dick, 2009:296). In the 
case of communal land in Namibia, which is the focus of this study, the land is governed by 
the Communal Land Reform Act, No. 5 of 2002. The problem of commons and common 
property started when Gordon (1954) used the term ‘common property’ to describe open 
access (nonproperty) of fisheries. The misunderstanding continued with papers such as 
“Toward a theory of property rights” (Demsetz, 1967) and “The tragedy of the commons” 
(Hardin, 1968). The key distinction here is between common property resources and open 
access. 
 
Common property is a management regime that closely resembles private property for a 
group of co-owners (Bromley, 1991:94), while open access is what Demsetz (1967:356) 
refers to as communal property: this is prone to mismanagement by users. Open access refers 
to the absence of well-defined property rights; access to the resource is unregulated, and 
anyone is free to use the asset regardless of how their use affects the use of others (Alston & 
Mueller, 2005; Feeny, 1990). This means that in the absence of constraints on users such as 
those provided by informal community norms, more formal property rights, or other types of 
state regulation, individuals competitively exploit the resource rapidly and wastefully 




eventually, resulting in its depletion and destruction a situation experienced in north-central 
Namibia. 
 
Ostrom (1990:1, 2008:17–18) recommends that the ‘state’ control most natural resources to 
prevent their destruction; alternatively, privatising those resources will also solve the 
problem. This thesis will use insights from property right theory that may help in minimising 
transaction costs associated with the commercialisation of agriculture and how communities 
can operate collectively to facilitate the production and maintenance of public goods in 
agricultural development initiatives in developing countries as will be discussed in the 
coming chapters. 
 
2.2.5 Transaction cost associated with collective action 
In Olson’s The logic of collective action (1965)5, he explains the decisions involved in 
interest groups’ use of collective goods. This theory of collective action includes the use of 
common-pool resources such as water, land, fisheries, wildlife, and forests by interest groups. 
The economic theory of collective action is concerned with the provision of public goods and 
other goods and services that are collectively consumed through the collaboration of two or 
more individuals and with the impact of externalities on group behaviour (Kirsten et al., 
2009:50). Unless a group has very specific characteristics, the provision of the collective 
goods is doomed to fail (Reuben, 2003:2). Collective action is not found everywhere, and 
even where it is found, it is not always inclusive, especially of the poor (Meinzen-Dick, 
2009:328). Collective action problems are particularly acute in situations involving multiple 
governments across international boundaries, such as global warming (Alston & Mueller, 
2005:582). 
 
It is important to note that individuals cannot be excluded from consuming collective goods 
even though they might not contribute to their production. This may lead an incentive to free-
riding, which tends to result in inefficient collective outcomes in that public goods are 
underprovided (Nabli & Nugent, 1989:1338). As a result, to overcome free-riding will 
therefore increase the transaction costs involved in joint ventures and this is very likely to 
produce collective action failures because it lowers the production of the public good. 
According to Gonzalez, (2014: 87) contracts that oblige individuals to monitor the activities 
 




of other parties are a critical strategy for minimising transaction costs by ensuring that they 
make sure that other parties do not fail to meet their obligations. However, the development 
of contracts and the coordination of interactions among individuals is always a costly process 
in the provision of a common good or service. Coordination of common resources is more 
commonly achieved by the state or collective action institutions than by the market 
(Meinzen-Dick, 2009:321). According to Meinzen-Dick (2009:321), much of the 
coordination that takes place is embedded in broader social institutions, such as people 
adhering to social rules and norms as well as social networks.  
 
In addition, collective action is a useful tool for analysing how the free-rider problem can be 
overcome, according to Kherallah and Kirsten (2002:116), with cooperative solutions for the 
management of common resources or the provision of public goods. Similarly, studies 
(Kirsten et al., 2009) have shown that special local institutional arrangements, including 
customs and social conventions designed to induce cooperative solutions, can overcome the 
difficulties of collective action and help to achieve efficiency in the use of such resources 
(Bernard & Spielman, 2009; Marcos-Matas et al., 2013). As a result, small-scale farmers can 
use collective action through agricultural cooperatives to improve their access to markets. 
The use of farmer groups for technology dissemination and even for demanding technologies 
indicates the potential of collective action to improve access to information (De Janvry et al., 
2010; Place et al., 2002). 
 
It is easier to invoke collective action to manage resources when people live near one another 
and when they live close to the resource because such proximity increases the regular 
interaction of people with one another and with the resource (Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Ostrom, 
2014). However, if people do not expect any benefit from the resource, they are less likely to 
contribute and cooperate. As a result, one can argue that collective action is successful when 
the total social benefits exceed the total social costs of a particular public good or institutional 
change. Collective action theory thus can significantly enhance our understanding of how 
participants maintain motivation and how incentives encourage them to cooperate or to 






2.2.6 Transaction costs associated with agent theory 
The principal-agent theory originated with articles by Ross (1973) and Stiglitz (1974). 
According to Barry et al. (1992:1220), the agent relationship also referred to as the principal-
agent relationship, is defined as an explicit or implicit contract in which one or more persons 
(the principal) engage another person (the agent) to take action on behalf of the principal. At 
the centre of the agent relationship lies the alignment of the objectives of each party and the 
distribution of information among parties. An agent is expected to follow the objectives of 
the principal so that these objectives can be achieved optimally.  
 
Problems with regard to the principal-agent relationship arise because the objectives of the 
agent are usually not the same as those of the principal, and thus the agent may not always 
best represent the interests of the principal (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Ortmann & King, 
2007b; Royer, 1999; Sykuta & Chaddad, 1999). The principal should have the power to 
discipline the agent and therefore to enforce agreements (North, 1990:33), but problems of 
policing and enforcement are not trivial for principals, as they do not have complete 
information on all the attributes or characteristics of the performance of an agent, and have to 
devote costly resources to measure and monitor them (North, 1990:32). The agent’s self-
interest causes informational asymmetry and uncertainties about future events, resulting in 
incomplete contracts. The terms of an agency relationship are usually defined in a contract 
that specifies the compensation to be paid by the principal to the agent conditional on the 
execution of specific actions by the agent and/or the observation of particular outcomes by 
the principal (Royer, 1999:50). Agency theory’s primary focus is on incentive and 
measurement problems, and while the basic unit of analysis in TCE is the transaction, in 
agency theory it is the individual (Mahoney, 1992:567). 
 
The theory is relevant for analysing issues related to share-cropping contracts, rural credit, 
incentive contracts in corporations and cooperatives, and insurance contracts based on the 
transactional contract between principals and agents (Sykuta & Chaddad, 1999:72). Agency 
theory is thus very relevant to the institutional structure of cooperatives because employed 
agents (managers) may not act in the best interests of cooperative owners/members 
(principals) (Ortmann & King, 2007a). Cooperatives experience greater principal-agent 
problems than proprietary firms because of the lack of capital market discipline and a clear 
profit motive, and the transitive nature of ownership (Bernard & Spielman, 2009; Marcos-




Agency theory will enable us to understanding the funding or sponsorship relationship 
between actors in many agricultural development schemes in most developing countries that 
are relevant to this thesis. Agent theory will enable us to identify problems associated with 
politician captured of community leaders for self-interest and how to overcome these 
problems. In addition, the agent theory enables us to identify the costs and difficulties that 
principals incur in monitoring and sanctioning the activities of actors involved in running 
agricultural development schemes which are the focuses in this thesis as discussed in the 
coming chapters. 
 
2.3 Transaction costs associated with the institutional arrangement of the state  
The concept of a state as defined by Ellis (1996:8) includes the whole set of public 
institutions responsible for administration and enforcement of policy decisions. In this 
respect, economic concerns are about inefficiencies created by state intervention in the 
economy of a particular country, including its implementation of, for example, agricultural 
development programmes and projects. Furthermore, many inefficiencies and biases in 
resource allocations by the state are not merely the effect of bad decisions but are more 
fundamentally the consequences of the weakness or absence of mechanisms through which 
society can hold the state accountable for its actions on government policies and programmes 
that do not meet societal needs (Farrington et al., 1993:9). As a result, there is a need to better 
understand state interventions and, in turn, state failure, as will be discussed in the coming 
chapters. 
 
The state has a legitimate role to intervene through enhanced capacity and new forms of 
governance, correct market failures, regulate competition and engage strategically in public-
private partnerships to promote competitiveness in the agribusiness sector and to support the 
greater inclusion of small-scale farmers (World Bank, 2007:8). Unfortunately, the 
government can fail; for instance, the very nature of government can lead to systemic failures 
that prevent it from adequately and appropriately addressing the needs of citizens (Becker, 
2008:17). The public choice theory assumes that government failure occurs mainly because 
of (1) misuse of budgets; (2) division of principal-agent interests; and (3) excessive 
regulation due to seeking ‘institutional rents’ (see, for example, Abers et al., 2017; Becker, 
2008; Otsuka & Kalirajan, 2010). This means that the main categories of government 
inefficiency stem from government administration and policy setting, both of which were 




Furthermore, state enforcement or implementation mechanisms of new agricultural initiatives 
are vulnerable to disinformation. As a result, they do not operate well unless a 
complementary mechanism ensures the accuracy and veracity of the shared information 
(Fafchamps, 2004: 25). The problems of commitment thus prevail, which according to De 
Gorter (2008:9) are twofold: First, politicians (incumbent or rival) cannot make binding 
commitments regarding their future actions. Second, voters cannot commit to politicians in 
the future because the latter no longer possess the political power to enforce such promises. 
Thus, there is a need to assess formal institutions such as constitutions or other legal 
institutions that can enhance the commitment to enforce contracts among economic agents. 
This is so because, most importantly, political promises are not formal legal contracts and as 
a result, contractual penalties between politicians and voters are not enforceable by third 
parties (De Gorter, 2008:9). Thus, politicians may renege on their policy promises while 
voters may renege on their promised votes. In view of this argument, political enforcement 
mechanisms such as elections are imperfect. The inefficiencies arise not because of political 
transaction costs but because of the political-economic interactions among politicians, voters, 
and interest groups (De Gorter, 2008:9). Thus, in Chapter 6 an investigation on the 
information, monitoring, and enforcement costs or transaction costs associated with state 
interventions in the commercialisation of agriculture or the development of the vegetable 
industry in north-central Namibia is presented. 
 
Due to incomplete or asymmetric information, administrators (politicians) and farmers alike 
have the incentive to behave opportunistically for their benefit from government programmes 
or projects. For example, in the case of politicians, the fundamental principle is to deceive 
voters or withhold information from “rationally ignorant voters” (De Gorter, 2008:12). 
Incomplete information increases politicians’ re-election chances by increasing the costs of 
the project or programme evaluation. One reason for this is that property rights, for instance 
to a particular agricultural project or programme and its benefits and costs are not well 
defined in the political marketplace. For agricultural products, whenever access to 
information about possible sources of demand or supply is limited, economic exchange 
involves high searching costs (transaction costs). In the case of farmers, De Gorter (2008:12) 
argues that farmers are assumed to have more information on agricultural policy effects, for 
example with regard to budgets and interests of different segments of the farming sector. In 




information that is not known by administrators of agricultural projects in many developing 
countries such as Namibia.  
 
It is also important to understand the theoretical concepts of institutional issues within the 
community and its organisation that could lead to the failure of development initiatives 
introduced by the state or the private sector (market), which are discussed next. 
 
2.4 Transaction costs associated with the arrangement of community institutions 
A community is defined as a group of resource users at the local level that is formally or 
informally constituted with a common purpose. Members share the same culture, traditional 
norms, interests, values, and beliefs and cooperate, socialise, and network according to these 
(see Agrawal, 1996:6; McCay & Jentoft, 1998:22). In this regard, public choice theorists take 
a methodological individualist stance and tend to see communities as the aggregate outcomes 
of the strategies of individuals, influenced by incentive structures to which some of them may 
have contributed via collective action (McCay & Jentoft, 1998:22). Thus, with regard to the 
development of agriculture in most developing countries, which was the focus of this study, 
free riding and opportunistic behaviour can result in community failure due to information 
asymmetries and incentive structures as well as imperfect property rights, hence market 
failures. This means that in the absence of constraints on users such as those provided by 
informal community norms, more formal property rights, or other types of state regulation, 
individuals competitively exploit the resource rapidly and wastefully (Libecap, 2005:545). 
Each user would have the incentive to overuse the resource eventually, resulting in its 
depletion and destruction. Ostrom (1990:1, 2014: 17–18) recommends that the “state’ control 
most natural resources such as land to prevent their destruction; alternatively, privatising 
those resources will also solve the problem. 
 
It is therefore important to have a clear understanding of social embeddedness, which means 
the extent to which an entity is subject to its social environment (Karaan, 2009:203) and its 
influence on the development of agriculture in developing countries such as Namibia. Social 
embeddedness refers to the nature of interpersonal relations and social networks as well as 
personal contacts between managers and other actors who are important to the performance 
of the economic activity (Knutsen, 2003:560). One aspect of social embeddedness is that 
culture and tradition influence peoples’ relationships and seem to play a particularly 




2002:10). Social embeddedness, which is located at Level 1, the highest level of 
Williamson’s (2000) framework of social analysis, means that the rate of institutional change 
is very slow and changes take place over centuries or millennia. Informal institutions 
governing social embeddedness include societal norms, customs, traditions, and religion 
(Williamson, 2000:596). NIE suggests that institutions usually change as the result of a long 
and often painful process of competition and adaptation and that those changes are only 
sustained if beliefs and norms change as well (Shirley, 2005:632). It is important to note that 
social embeddedness does not strictly fall within the realm of economics but rather within 
that of social theory; however, its profound impact on the economic functioning of 
institutions necessitates that it be considered integral to a comprehensive understanding of the 
origins and roles of institutions (Kirsten et al., 2009:58). In this study, social embeddedness 
was analysed from the perspective of trust and collective action shaping the development of 
the high-value crop industry in north-central Namibia. 
 
Moreover, analysis of community institutions draws on social capital theory6 (Milagrosa, 
2007:22). Social capital is considered an important factor in explaining the economic success 
of countries (Beugelsdijk & Van Schaik, 2001; Durlauf & Fafchamps, 2004). Therefore, it 
was necessary for this study to review the institutional structure and organisation within the 
communal areas of north-central Namibia governed by traditional tribal village chiefs and 
their communities’ contribution towards improving social capital and trust in reducing 
transaction costs. Thus, appropriate strategies to contribute to agricultural development in 
rural areas could be identified. Trust is a central component of social capital as it determines 
the strength of social ties (Durlauf & Fafchamps, 2004; Milagrosa, 2007; Murray, 2008). 
Thus, trust minimises transaction costs and contributes to flexibility. 
 
Portes and Landolt (2000:532) highlight four negative consequences of social capital, namely 
(1) the exclusion of outsiders from networks; (2) excess claims on individuals who are 
network members (due to free riders); (3) restrictions on the individual freedom of those 
within the network; and (4) downward levelling norms (in networks that are considered 
undesirable or suboptimal). Milagrosa (2007:24) claims that this might occur especially in 
tribal communities strongly tied by their culture such as those in rural areas of Namibia.  
 
 
6 Putnam (1995:67) defines social capital as features of social organisation such as trust, norms and networks 




2.5 Summary  
The objective of this chapter was to discuss thematic aspects from literature relevant to the 
development of the agricultural sector in developing countries, specifically the 
commercialisation of agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa. The analytical scheme considered 
two economic development models, namely Williamson’s (1985, 2010) TCE and Hayami’s 
(1988) economic development approach (combined market, state, and community 
institutions). These models were considered in the study because both consider the analysis of 
transaction costs in their structures. The Hayami model also considers the need to investigate 
institutional issues within the community and its organisation that could lead to the failure of 
development initiatives introduced by the state or the private sector (market). Despite the 
limitations associated with these theoretical approaches, the frameworks were found to be 
essential to achieve the objectives of this study. The theoretical frameworks will feature in 
the remainder of the chapters of the dissertation.  
 
The chapter presented a general overview of TCE, which defines transaction characteristics 
that help in understanding inefficiencies in the development of agriculture in developing 
countries. TCE improves our understanding of why individual human beings are limited in 
knowledge, foresight, and skill, as a result of which their choices may constrain the 
development of agriculture. The three attributes of transactions that influence economic 
behaviour and are critically important in determining the optimal institutional arrangement 
are (1) the frequency with which transactions recur; (2) uncertainty regarding transactions; 
and (3) the degree of asset specificity. These are the principal dimensions relevant to a 
meaningful transaction analysis in this study. Asset specificity is the most important 
transaction attribute because a high degree of asset specificity may render the owner of the 
asset vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour by product-purchasing firms or individuals. A 
problem of hold-up arises when one party in a contractual relationship seeks to exploit the 
other party’s vulnerability due to relationship-specific assets. For instance, in vegetable 
production, opportunity losses might arise when a trading partner depends on specialised 
processing or knowledge of products from another partner. 
 
The transaction cost analysis in this study was also based on matching transaction attributes 
with the most appropriate generic forms of governance structure, namely market, hybrid, and 
hierarchy. This was done because of the increases in asset specificity, the degree of 




hierarchical forms of governance. For instance, the market governance structure prevails in 
less efficient situations with low asset specificity and low uncertainty when compared to 
hierarchy and hybrid governance structures. The hierarchy governance structure prevails in 
most efficient situations with high asset specificity and high uncertainty where transactions 
are governed by administrative rules (authority). The hybrid governance structure is more 
efficient in a situation where an intermediate form of governance prevails with moderate 
levels of both asset specificity and uncertainty. The governance structures that seem to be 
relevant to the study of the vegetable industry are the market and hybrid models. These are 
governance structures that can exist between farmers and traders or agents in the high-value 
crop market. 
 
Insights from TCE also improve our understanding of transaction cost analysis associated 
with property rights, collective action theory, agency theory, and institutional analysis in the 
development of agriculture in developing countries. Thus, in this study, it was important to 
examine transaction costs and problems associated with theories on property rights, collective 
action, and principal agents, especially when using common-pool resources or public goods, 
as well as the resultant kinds of market failures that may result into missing input, output and 
credit markets, especially for small-scale farmers. Understanding transaction costs would 
give insight into how people (community) shape their choices on the utilisation of public 
goods and their opportunistic behaviour as well as the costs involved in accessing and using 
the information in the commercialisation of agriculture. It was also deemed necessary to 
investigate problems of asymmetrical information, incentive compatibility, and politicians’ 
self-interest in the development of the vegetable industry. 
 
TCE may also provide us with insight into the arrangement of the market, state and 
community institutions in the development of agriculture and as a result allow us to focus on 
issues such as competition for resources, how they are allocated and how benefits and costs 
are distributed. It will enable us to understand why markets, states, and communities fail in 
the development of agriculture in developing countries. Policy-makers need to promote 
institutional innovations that adjust to both the cultural and the institutional environment to 
be reliable within competitive market systems and to promote the country's welfare. It is then 
essential to have a better understanding of market-led and state-led policies as well as the role 
of community institutions in the development of agriculture in developing countries, as 




CHAPTER 3: CHALLENGES OF AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIALISATION IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the major challenges facing the 
commercialisation of agriculture because market-led and state-led policies as well as 
community institutions have failed in fulfilling their role in the development of agriculture in 
most developing countries after these countries had gained their independence. The chapter 
focuses on the arrangement of the market, state, and community institutions for two reasons: 
The first is to understand constraining factors in the interrelationship among the community, 
the market, and the state in agricultural development. The second is to understand why 
investments in agricultural development increase while most projects have failed, especially 
in developing countries of sub-Saharan Africa. These arguments require a sound application 
of economics and other social sciences to understand the economic implications and 
economic performance of poor agrarian economies. The chapter thus mainly provides 
answers to Objective 1 of this study.  
 
The chapter commences with a discussion of agricultural development in developing 
countries with an emphasis on transaction costs and market failures relevant to market-led 
and state-led policies. The second section briefly discusses the opportunities and challenges 
of agricultural commercialisation that are relevant to the evaluation of the economic 
performance of the vegetable industry, which was the focus of this study. The third section 
briefly outlines the implications for agricultural development in Namibia, which can be used 
as a basis of transaction cost and market failure analysis in the vegetable industry. A 
reflection on the chapter is presented in the summary and conclusion section. 
 
3.2 Agricultural development in Africa: An overview 
There is extensive literature on the role of agricultural development in broader development 
processes, including the work of Johnston and Mellor (1961) and Timmer (1988), supported 
by the more recent empirical work of among others Barrett et al. (2010), Carr (2001), 
Christiaensen et al. (2011), and Collier and Dercon (2014). Millions of people in Africa live 
in rural areas, and directly or indirectly depend on a large part of their livelihoods on 
agriculture. Although increasing agricultural growth has been a critical driver of poverty 




disappointing, with continual low per capita growth over the years. For example in sub- 
Saharan Africa excluding Nigeria, per capita income rose by just 1.1 percent in 2017 (African 
Development Bank, 2018:6). Yet agriculture is seen to play a key role in the economies of 
most developing countries in Africa, like Namibia, as the sector (1) contributes to gross 
domestic product (GDP), (2) contributes to foreign exchange earnings, (3) contributes to the 
employment of a number of people as farmers or farm workers, and (4) contributes to the 
household food security of poor people (FAO, 2002a:7). As a result, large amounts of public 
money have been invested in agricultural development projects and programmes that have 
been implemented across African countries for many years since the 1960s (see, for example, 
Carr, 2001). However, in most circumstances, public investment in agriculture is usually low 
and sometimes declining (Mogues et al., 2012:17). In other circumstances, it is sufficient for 
agricultural development but, as Troskie (2013:6) argued, the main constraints are a lack of 
well-defined interventions for the sector. 
 
Public spending was a success story in yielding sizeable marginal benefits in terms of poverty 
alleviation and income generation in rural areas in the south, east, and southeast Asia, in 
countries such as India and China (Mogues et al., 2012). Thus public investments have led to 
sustainable and impressive agricultural productivity that was called the Green Revolution. 
This included public investments in technology and services, as well as infrastructures such 
as roads, agricultural research and development, and education. In Africa, for example, the 
deleterious impact of the decades-long downward spiral of public investments in agriculture 
has led to the initiation of a concerted, continent-wide effort since the early 2000s to increase 
agricultural investments in the form of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP) (Mogues et al., 2012). Thus this programme was proposed to support 
African governments in establishing public investment priorities and strategies for promoting 
rural economic growth and poverty alleviation. 
 
There have, however, been some important agricultural development successes in most 
African countries in both the pre-colonial and postcolonial periods. Examples are the use of 
ox ploughs in Uganda; the cultivation of such new cash crops as cocoa, coffee, cotton, and 
groundnuts across the continent; the release and adoption of improved high-yielding maize 
varieties in east and southern Africa; and horticultural enterprises (Carr, 2001; Dorward et al., 
2009; Eaton et al., 2008; Gabre-Madhin & Haggblade, 2003; Tiffen, 2003). In addition, 




varieties (New Rice for Africa [NERICA]) and the control of cassava mosaic virus and 
cassava mealybug in a pan-African action that benefited millions of farmers and consumers 
(Gabre-Madhin & Haggblade, 2003).  
 
The increase in demand for high-value fresh and processed food products was driven by 
rising disposable income, population growth, rapid urbanisation, liberalised trade, advancing 
technology as well as consumer taste and preferences, and access to information (Kapoor & 
Kumar, 2015; Weatherspoon & Reardon, 2003; Wiggins, 2005). However, these successes 
have, with a few exceptions, been too limited in scope to significantly increase overall 
agricultural productivity and improve the welfare of farmers and consumers in Africa – 
especially in sub-Saharan countries (Dorward et al., 2009). As a result, there is a need for a 
better understanding of market failures with respect to market access to credit, input, and 
output as will be discussed in subsequent sections. The next subsection is about agricultural 
intensification and its roles in agricultural development. 
 
3.2.1 Intensification 
One of the objectives of agricultural development in Africa is to achieve sustainable 
intensification with the adoption of new technologies that use, for instance, integrating soil 
fertility strategies (combining organic and inorganic fertilisers) and intensifying production in 
combination with the preservation of functional biodiversity (Marongwe et al., 2012; Phalan 
et al., 2011; Tscharntke et al., 2012). The aim is to increase land and labour productivity. 
There is, however, a growing concern that the expansion and intensification of agriculture 
may lead to degradation of the natural resource base such as soil, water, vegetation, and 
biodiversity, resulting in a decrease in agricultural production. For instance, conventional 
agricultural intensification often results in contamination by pesticides and fertilisers, which 
can affect human health and create non-target effects on wildlife and functional agro-
biodiversity (Tscharntke et al., 2012:56). However, FAO (2002a:20) argued that the lack of 
sound management practices and access to appropriate technology and inputs for agriculture, 
rather than intensification, is the most serious cause of environmental degradation. 
Sustainable intensification is made difficult in the production of staple food (e.g. maize, 
millet, and wheat) crops which are meant for household food security and with low 
productivity. This is because the presence of large numbers of producers, small-scale traders, 




investment in technology and in coordinating institutions is discouraged (Dorward et al., 
2009:12). 
 
Intensification is also associated with problems, including poor roads and 
telecommunications; poor human health; lack of a well-developed and diversified monetary 
economy; and inadequate markets for agricultural inputs, outputs, and finance, despite 
significant direct and indirect dependence of the local economy on agriculture (Dorward et 
al., 2009; Marongwe et al., 2012). Other general problems unique to small-scale agricultural 
circumstances in Africa include limited insurance (Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1986; Shapi 
& Likuwa, 2016), the prevalent HIV/AIDS epidemic (which can affect the productive labour 
force); relative scarcity of water (both for human basic needs and for direct production in 
irrigation agriculture); and low levels of soil fertility (see, for example, Carr, 2001; Newsham 
& Thomas, 2009; Sartorius et al., 2014). Furthermore, Fafchamps (2004:11–12) noted 
challenges with high transaction costs in Africa, which make market exchanges more costly, 
cumbersome, time-consuming, and unpredictable than elsewhere in the world.  
 
3.2.2 State-led agricultural development  
State-led agricultural commercialisation is a result of government intervention in the presence 
of market failure when there is a divergence between private costs and social costs, and 
socially optimal levels in the production or consumption of goods cannot be reached as a 
result of market failures. Hence, state intervention was considered an effective instrument for 
agricultural development. For example, state intervention enables access to public sector 
financial resources to invest in organisational and human resource development; 
infrastructure; and the coordinated delivery of research, extension, financial, and input and 
output marketing services. Thus, Hill (2013:96) has argued that policy initiatives ostensibly 
developed to deal with the market failure need to take into account corresponding state 
failure. 
 
In general, the state-led agricultural development policies in poor rural economies of most 
developing countries in Africa did not work after these countries gained independence, 
despite large government expenditure on agricultural development. This is so because many 
policies have not been implemented or have been implemented only in part or very poorly; 
those that have been implemented well have often not delivered sustainable benefits 




Moreover, policies to address poverty in rural and agricultural areas take many forms (De 
Gorter, 2008; Mogues et al., 2012; OECD, 2010; Rausser & Swinnen, 2010; Russo et al., 
2011). The first prominent policy that is intended to have the most direct and immediate 
effect is the provision of direct transfers in the form of cash, food, or other in-kind goods to 
lowest-income households. These transfers either are without additional requirements or are 
conditional on household investments in human capital or labour contributions for 
agricultural or other investments. The second widely used expenditure measure as a poverty-
alleviation tool is the subsidisation of poor small-scale farmers’ costs (mainly costs of 
production), such as the provision of price subsidies on agricultural inputs. However, these 
policy instruments typically have perverse distributional effects, with larger farmers 
benefiting more than small-scale farmers (OECD, 2010:14).  
 
In addition, one group of theories (Cox & McCubbins, 1986; De Janvry et al., 2010; Dixit & 
Londregan, 1996) put emphasis on the supporter model that suggests that politicians act as 
patrons and provide services to their clients (voters) in the form of provision of public goods 
to the communities where they have received the strongest electoral support as rewards for 
loyalty to be re-elected. In other cases, the emphasis is put on the swing-voter model that 
predicts that politicians target communities with more swing voters whose political behaviour 
could be influenced by public goods provision. As a result, reaching small-scale farmers, 
most of whom are poor, is thus overshadowed by evidence that subsidy programmes have 
promoted political patronage and the interests of rural elites (Mason & Ricker-Gilbert, 2013; 
Smale et al., 2014; Xu et al., 2009).  
 
There are many complementary determinants of agricultural productivity, but the most 
important ones emphasised in the literature are fertiliser and improved seed ( Chibwana et al., 
2012; Holden & Lunduka, 2010; Mason & Jayne, 2013; Minde et al., 2008). Fertiliser market 
development is a strategy to improve farmers’ access to fertiliser; that is to say, improving the 
policy environment, strengthening and expanding the network of private agri-input dealers 
with training and credit, and providing farmers with information about fertiliser use through 
advisory services and demonstration plots (Minot & Benson, 2009:4). Thus, many 
governments throughout sub-Saharan Africa devote a large share of their public budgets to 
implement subsidy programmes (Mason & Jayne, 2013:55). However, many African small-
scale farmers seem to use much less commercial fertilisers than is economically optimal 




farmers are also risk-averse in the face of uncertain rainfall and lack the cash to pay for 
fertiliser because of low income and poorly functioning credit markets (Minot & Benson, 
2009:2). 
 
Equally, price support and input subsidies are inefficient, and governments, therefore, use 
infra-marginal support policies such as quotas, hectare restrictions, farm payment limits and 
so on that are at the same time more efficient and prevent dilution by reducing the number of 
farms receiving support (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001:649). Thus, the inefficient 
redistribution policies in agriculture, such as price supports and input subsidies, are enacted 
to encourage newcomers in order that farmers uphold future political power (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2001:650). In this case, the inefficient policy instruments do not arise because of 
political transaction costs, but because of the political-economic interactions between 
politicians, voters, and interest groups (De Gorter, 2008:9). Furthermore, Rausser and 
Swinnen (2010:312) have identified three agricultural policy instruments on the role of 
governance structures in the implementation of public policy in developing countries such as 
Namibia. The first set is quantitative public goods policies, such as agricultural research and 
development. The second set is quantitative redistributive policies, which would include 
direct farmer support, such as dryland crop subsidy programmes. In contrast to quantitative 
policies, the third set is structural policies that seek to modify economic institutions, such as 
laws, property rights, and contractual arrangements. As a result, structural policies involve 
changing transaction costs.  
 
Government interventions also involve organisational interventions, such as parastatals, state-
sponsored cooperatives, and agricultural finance organisations (Dorward et al., 2004). 
Farmers’ organisations, for example, can function as an important catalyst for innovation 
adoption and upgrading of production systems through promoting efficient information flows 
(Fischer & Qaim, 2012:1267). Despite many successes, producer organisation effectiveness 
is frequently constrained by legal restrictions, low managerial capacity, elite capture, 
exclusion of the poor, and the failure to be recognised as full partners by the state (World 
Bank, 2007). 
 
According to Dorward et al., (2009:14), government intervention in most developing 
countries was thus seen as causing distortions in the economy via, for instance, protecting 




development. Consequently, government intervention was considered to be a corrupt and 
expensive drain on already overspent government budgets and hence leading to difficulties in 
macroeconomic stability (FAO, 2002a:25).  
 
Furthermore, government interventions in African countries, especially in southern Africa, 
are also needed to ensure good access to markets, especially for small-scale farmers, for two 
reasons which are becoming increasingly important, as was noted by Carr (2001). The first 
derives from the growing prosperity of developed countries and their demand for luxury 
products and for organically grown produce. This is not an easy market, but it is one that 
African countries such as Namibia should not ignore. The second is the expanding urban 
population within Africa itself, which offers real opportunities for farmers. 
 
3.2.3 Market liberalisation and agricultural development 
In many developing countries, especially in Africa, governments have undertaken to privatise 
inefficient state-owned enterprises and to eliminate marketing boards and other inefficient 
regulatory agencies in recent decades (FAO, 2002a). In addition, nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs) have promoted the privatisation or dismantling of agricultural 
marketing parastatals and deregulation of these markets; and, as a result, eliminated credit, 
input, and output subsidies (Dorward et al., 2009:15). However, Namibia still follows the 
model concept of agricultural marketing boards, such as the Namibian Agricultural Board 
(NAB), but the role of this board in agricultural commercialisation is not well defined. 
 
The outcome of the market liberalisation and structural adjustment (or market-led) policies 
was, however, mixed (Dorward et al., 2009). For example, these policies appear to have 
successfully stimulated growth in poor countries with dense populations, good infrastructure, 
and diversified agriculture and rural economy, such as Bangladesh. Similarly, these policies 
appear to have benefited lower- to middle-income countries, where staples production is no 
longer the basis of the livelihoods of most of the poor. On the other hand, for most African 
countries in sub-Saharan such as Namibia, the record has not been so bright. These policies 
have not generally succeeded in enhancing agricultural development in poor rural economies 
owing to the lack of transformation of the agricultural sector. The state has failed to 
implement market liberalisation policies. Thus, it is fair to ask why both state- and market-led 
approaches to development generally appear to have failed in Africa, whereas both have 




development of new institutional frameworks involving the state, the private sector, and 
stakeholder groups in agricultural development (Kirsten, Dorward et al., 2009:xxii).  
 
3.2.4 Public-private partnership 
The private sector in Namibia has a role to play, not only by being a catalyst for economic 
growth and development but also by working with the government to implement 
developmental policies through public-private partnerships (NDP4, 2012:53). Governments 
are increasingly turning to public-private partnerships to build and operate public 
infrastructures such as roads, schools, prisons, hospitals, and water facilities (Valero, 
2015:111–112). In this case, the contractual relationships will depend heavily on the 
following assumptions (Valero, 2015:113). First, consider a strong institutional framework 
that allows the private sector to enter into long-term contracts knowing that the government 
commits itself not to engage in opportunistic behaviour. Second, consider a weak institutional 
framework in which the government cannot commit to long-term contractual agreements. In 
this case, the long-term nature of contracts leads the government to behave opportunistically. 
On the other hand, strict guidelines should be in place for the implementation and monitoring 
of private firms (public-private partnerships) by governments to prevent opportunistic 
behaviour because of incentives associated with principal-agent relationships. Recently, the 
OECD (2015) developed a policy framework for investment that addresses the issue of 
sustainable and inclusive development through the lens of private sector-led development. 
 
There is a need for private sector involvement in agricultural development (OECD, 2015). 
However, the government’s diminished ability to engage the private sector cooperatively may 
be related to issues of limited efficiency. However, the reasons may also be financial. The 
government and private sector alike can help small-scale farmers to expand and upgrade their 
range of assets and practices to meet the new requirements of supermarkets and other 
coordinated supply chains (World Bank, 2007:127). The options include public good 
investments to increase farmers’ productivity and connectivity to markets; policy changes to 
facilitate trade and market development; and public-private efforts to promote collective 
action and build the technical capacity of farmers to meet the new standards (World Bank, 
2007:128). Investors will need to work with local communities to engage small-scale farmers, 
and a variety of institutional arrangements (land rental, contract farming, and out-grower 
schemes) can be used to combine the assets of investors (capital, technology, and markets) 




(Deininger et al., 2011:34). In addition, the role of community as an important economic 
system, as introduced by Hayami (1988), is significant for sustainable agricultural 
development and is discussed next. 
 
3.2.5 Role of community in agricultural development 
Yujiro Hayami’s (1988) work suggested a triangular model to conceptualise the role of the 
rural community in development, as it specified jointly the roles of the state, the market, and 
community institutions in economic performance. His model was based on how the 
community could play an important role in making both the markets and government work 
better. There were high expectations that the community could assume functions that markets 
and states could not perform so well (Platteau & Abraham, 2002:105). Understanding this 
interrelationship is important for developing countries, such as Namibia, where governments 
are investing in agricultural commercialisation of high-value crops to improve small-scale 
living standards. 
 
A number of studies have shown how the Hayami model works (De Janvry et al., 2010; 
Feder et al., 2010; Hayami, 2009; Kalirajan et al., 2010). First, there are distinctive features 
of the community such as local information, trust and norms, and social capital, and 
interlinked transactions that can help reduce transaction costs, adverse selection, and moral 
hazard, overcoming many market failures. Second is that the community can assume 
functions on behalf of or instead of the state, such as the delivery of public goods and, as a 
result, regulating externalities across community members. The state reciprocally works with 
the community in helping it more effectively to assume these functions. This includes 
reinforcing local administrative capacities, promoting inter-community cooperation when 
there are economies of scale beyond the community, and changing community institutions for 
instance on property rights or towards more participatory decision-making processes (De 
Janvry et al., 2010).  
 
Hayami (1988) pointed out that agricultural production activities by nature are strongly 
interdependent because of the agro-ecological interdependence of biological processes. Thus, 
an example of a major source of market failures in an agrarian community in a developing 
country is pervasive externalities. For instance, diversion of irrigation water upstream may 
result in a water shortage for downstream farms along a river basin. In this case, individual 




community relations are sometimes relied upon to reduce conflicts over the use of such a 
resource and to correct such market failures. Thus, the institutions that govern the use of 
resources efficiently in the villages are customary rules such as norms, rather than formal 
laws and explicit contracts (Hayami, 2009).  
 
Hayami (2009) furthermore noted that the community can also become an obstacle to growth. 
As a result, the community can oppose new agricultural development initiatives. For instance, 
it is difficult for market-oriented producer organisations, which are the potential source of net 
social benefits, to be established in community structures with high social homogeneity (as a 
result having a strong capacity to enforce sharing norms) and high exposure to natural risks 
(as a result of the need for sharing mechanisms) (Bernard & Spielman, 2009; De Janvry et 
al., 2010). In this case, institutional richness under formalised rural community organisations 
does not always translate into substantial economic benefits. Consequently, the community 
remains an under-used opportunity to support the competitiveness of small-scale farmers and 
rural development (Bernard et al., 2008:2203) in developing countries, including Namibia. 
 
Moreover, sustainable community development employs a community assets (capital) 
framework that suggests communities comprise six assets or capital: natural, physical, 
economic, human, social, and cultural (Hendrickson et al., 2011:54). As a result, community-
driven development projects have attracted a lot of interest as an alternative to top-down, 
centralised mechanisms for managing local public goods (Mukherji, 2013:1549). However, 
strong participation is only possible for a limited range of services, as problems associated 
with participation can only be avoided by finding effective ways of balancing the need for 
bottom-up control with top-down authority (Brett, 2003:18). In this case, asymmetrical 
information is expected to make top-down approaches less effective in agricultural 
development, while asymmetrical power relations at the local level and weak accountability 
mechanisms in the use of public funds can open the door to politician capture (De Janvry et 
al., 2010). In this study, it is important to assess how rural projects are managed in Namibia 
and how the decentralisation policy is implemented. For example, in Namibia, the interests 
and influence of traditional authorities and elites (politicians) are that management of and 
rights over communal land remain unregulated, and it is due to these influences that no action 
has been taken against people who have appropriated large farms, even though the practice is 





Wealthier members of the community often become transformed into greedy individuals who 
show less and less restraint in enriching themselves at the expense of their community, as 
they are legitimated by politicians (De Janvry et al., 2010). For example, in sub-Saharan 
Africa, it is a frequent practice for chiefs to co-opt new elites in their village ‘associations’, 
such as by creating neo-traditional titles that are then sold to the new rich eager to acquire a 
political base in the rural areas (Platteau & Gaspard, 2003:1688). On the other hand, in order 
to curb the unbearable influence of the vested interests of local power holders, a strong and 
effective central government must exist that is determined to confront the clientelism of rural 
areas in an environment rife with rent-seeking opportunities (Platteau & Gaspard, 
2003:1697). There are also examples of communities that fail even when projects were 
identified by the community through community-based organisations because the 
implementation is dictated by the central government (De Janvry et al., 2010).  
 
Moreover, the state is not singularly responsible for community failure, as communities are 
pressured by internal and external forces such as markets. For example, in some cases, the 
state and/or market forces have played a critical role in eroding the capacity of collective 
action of communities (Otsuka & Kalirajan, 2010). In other cases, the failure may be 
explained by already prevailing shortcomings at the community level, such as lack of 
knowledge, disorganisation, stratification, conflicts of interest, inter-ethnic rivalry, and so on. 
Equally, lack of capacity building, especially the building of organisational skills at the 
community level, and lack of ‘ownership’ of the projects by the beneficiary groups have been 
recognised to be among the main limitations of agricultural development projects in 
developing countries (De Janvry et al., 2010; Platteau & Gaspard, 2003). 
 
3.3 The role of agricultural commercialisation in the high-value crops sector 
Agricultural commercialisation refers to the process by which farmers increase their 
productivity (efficiency) by producing greater output per unit of input (land and labour) and 
produce greater farm surpluses, which can be sold in the market, thereby increasing farmers’ 
market participation and, as a result, raising their income and improving their standard of 
living (Jayne et al., 2011:1). The goal of the process is to achieve greater output and 
agricultural growth, which implies a process that links a large proportion of the rural farming 
population to commercial high-value chains (Jayne & Muyanga, 2011). As a result, 




al., 2012; Maertens et al., 2012; Meemken & Qaim, 2018; Muriithi & Matz, 2014; Tapela, 
2008). 
 
Kirsten et al. (2012:2) argue that agricultural commercialisation can occur on either the 
output or input side. First, on the output side, a farming household can become 
commercialised by increasing its marketed produce. However, most small-scale farmers fail 
to participate in markets as sellers because they sometimes have no or inadequate surpluses to 
sell (Barrett, 2008; Jayne et al., 2010). The lack of marketable surplus results from no or 
inadequate use of improved techniques of production owing to lack of investment, which 
eventually leads to low yields – a situation referred to as a low equilibrium poverty trap 
(Barrett, 2008). Second, on the input side, a farming household can become more commercial 
by increasing its usage of purchased agricultural inputs. In essence, many subsistence farmers 
use very few purchased inputs, but as they gradually shift from subsistence farming towards 
market orientation, they start to increase their investment in farming (Kirsten et al., 2012:2).  
 
In the past two decades, horticulture has been identified as one of the fastest-growing 
agricultural subsectors in sub-Saharan Africa (Henson & Jaffee, 2008). For example, 
McCulloch and Ota (2002) show that contract farming in Kenyan horticulture export chains 
significantly increases farmers’ incomes. These authors found that small-scale farmers’ 
access to horticulture export chains in Kenya is determined by farm size and access to 
irrigation. Some studies indicate that the sex of farmers also matters, and that female farmers 
are largely excluded from supplying high-value export chains (see, for example, Kirsten et 
al., 2012; Maertens & Swinnen, 2009). Jayne et al. (2002), Masakure and Henson (2005), 
and Ortmann and King (2010) indicate various kinds of market failure such as high risks, 
poor infrastructure, weak provision of finance, information asymmetries, inadequate 
economies of scale, and weak systems of contract enforcement, market uncertainty and 
markets that are often constrained by inadequate property rights and high transaction costs. 
Other key factors which affect agricultural productivity are the distance from the market; 
water and labour availability; crop choice; declining soil fertility; drought; disease and pest 
outbreaks; and land fragmentation (Fiebiger et al., 2010; Kirsten et al., 2012). In addition, 
other studies mention increasingly stringent requirements for product quality and food safety 
as demanded by supermarkets and wholesalers, consistent quantity (volume), high quality, 




small-scale farmers wishing to compete in international markets (Emongor & Kirsten, 2009; 
Louw et al., 2008; Weatherspoon & Reardon, 2003).  
 
The debate on agricultural development, and hence commercialisation, follows different 
arguments, with some scholars arguing for the efficiency of small-scale agriculture (Delgado, 
1999), while others argue for large-scale, modernised commercial farming (Collier & Dercon, 
2014; Hazell et al., 2010) and for large estates and state farms (White et al., 2012). Some 
scholars furthermore point to emerging patterns of commercial farming on so-called 
“medium-scale farms” (Jayne et al., 2014; Sitko & Jayne, 2014), while others argue for 
integration arrangements between estates and out-growers through contract farming (Von 
Braun & Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Moreover, Tipraqsa and Schreinemachers (2009:45) grouped 
the origins of the different types of agricultural commercialisation as follows: 
• In some cases, commercialisation involves contract farming. 
• In some cases, the commercialisation is initiated externally by companies or 
governments.  
• In some cases, commercialisation is more gradual and driven by farmers 
supplementing their subsistence production by various cash crops, in order to 
augment their incomes. 
The last two types of commercialisation are taking place in north-central Namibia, where this 
study is focused. On one hand, commercialisation is initiated by the government where farm 
households are selected to participate in high-value crops with direct support from the 
government in terms of both physical and marketing infrastructures, as well as input 
subsidies. On the other hand, individual farm households participate through self-selection by 
participating in cash crop production to meet their households’ needs and sell the surplus. In 
both, the contractual relationship is limited, with most farm households deciding individually 
what crops to grow and where to sell them (mainly local informal markets). 
 
The risk of investing in, for example, high-value crops in Namibia is high where various 
issues and concerns include poor agricultural organisation and lack of knowledge in 
vegetable production, as well as difficulties influenced by socio-economic and agro-climatic 
conditions (Fiebiger et al., 2010; Newsham & Thomas, 2009). Yet on-going agricultural 
commercialisation in Namibia continues to favour small-scale farms rather than large-scale 




elsewhere in Africa can be found in Maertens and Swinnen (2009) for a case in Senegal; in 
Maertens et al. (2012) for a case in Madagascar; and in McCulloch and Ota (2002) for a case 
in Kenya. These studies indicate the need for further research into agribusiness value chains, 
especially relating to high-value crops with the potential for export to global markets and as 
such contributing to the alleviation of poverty among rural households. Noteworthy is the 
work of Kirsten et al. (2012:11), who provide evidence from studies in sub-Saharan Africa 
that demonstrate that the socio-economic characteristics of small-scale producers are an 
important determinant of the success of commercialisation. For instance, household 
characteristics such as the size of a household, educational and literacy levels, age, and 
gender of the household head are found to determine a household’s decision to participate in 
commercial markets as well as in determining the type of crops that households 
commercialise (Kirsten et al., 2012:11). The factors that constrain agricultural 
commercialisation in north-central Namibia will be discussed in the coming chapters. 
 
3.4 Summary  
In many developing countries, especially in Africa, agriculture contributes to foreign 
exchange earnings, income generation, and employment, and the household food security of 
poor people; hence, the sector contributes significantly to the GDP. Increasing agricultural 
growth has been a critical driver of poverty reduction in some parts of the world; however, in 
most parts of Africa, specifically in sub-Saharan countries such as Namibia, performance in 
agriculture has been disappointing, with continual low per capita growth over the years due to 
socio-economic and agro-ecological constraints such as changes in climatic conditions and 
the global financial crisis. Consequently, tax payers’ money invested in agricultural 
development programmes has been wasted, which necessitated an investigation into market 
failure, state failure, and community failure. In the subsequent chapters, the results of this 
investigation, which was based on the development of the vegetable industry in north-central 
Namibia, will be presented. 
 
One of the objectives of agricultural development in Africa has been to achieve sustainable 
intensification with the adoption of new technologies that use integrating soil fertility 
strategies (combining organic and inorganic fertilisers) and intensifying production in 
combination with the preservation of functional biodiversity. There is, however, a growing 
concern that the expansion and intensification of agriculture may lead to degradation of the 




to a decrease in agricultural production. Intensification is also associated with problems 
including poor roads and telecommunications, poor human health, lack of a well-developed 
and diversified monetary economy, and thin markets for agricultural inputs, outputs, and 
finance despite significant direct and indirect dependence of the local economy on 
agriculture. Understanding these market failures and transaction costs, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, is essential for the study of the development of the vegetable industry.  
 
Moreover, small-scale farmers are facing challenges as participants in the commercialisation 
process in Namibia and other developing countries, including agro-ecological and socio-
economic constraints, which were examined in this study. The risk of investing in, for 
example, high-value crops in Namibia is high because various market failures, poor 
agricultural organisation, and lack of knowledge of vegetable production among farmers 
hamper the development of agriculture. The obstacles include low and uncertain rainfall or 
limited access to water, poor soils, and limited access to markets for output, input, and credit 
owing to high transaction costs. Thus, government interventions are required to correct these 
market failures and to improve social welfare and the economic development and 
performance of the country. Yet, state-led agricultural development policies in Africa have 
not generally worked after independence; neither have the market-liberalisation policies that 
followed.  
 
The subsequent chapters will discuss the results of the case study of the vegetable industry in 
north-central Namibia. The objective of the next chapter 4 is to determine farmers’ socio-
economic characteristics and evaluate the performance of small-scale farmers who produce 
vegetables with access to government support (project farmers) and those with limited 






CHAPTER 4: DETERMINANTS OF SMALL-SCALE VEGETABLE PRODUCERS’ 




The description of a conceptual framework for the interrelation among market, state, and 
community institutions in Chapter 1 shows that the development of the vegetable industry in 
north-central Namibia is influenced by socio-economic and agro-ecological characteristics. In 
Namibia, the main objective of horticulture development is to increase the local production 
and supply of fruit and vegetables to both local and international markets. The objective of 
this chapter is to describe farmers’ socio-economic characteristics, to present the influence of 
small-scale vegetable farmers with access to government support (project farmers) and those 
with limited government support (non-project farmers), and to demonstrate the differences 
found between them during the case study. Because the vegetable industry in the study area is 
in its infancy, the data presented in this chapter come mainly from the farm household survey 
that was conducted during the period from May to July 2014. Only households specialising in 
high-value crop production were surveyed. The information and factors presented in this 
chapter will be used in the coming chapters to discuss the efficiency and competitiveness of 
the vegetable industry in north-central Namibia. 
 
The results of the survey were used to verify and test whether there were significant 
differences between project and non-project farmers and to provide an answer to Objective 2 
as presented in Chapter 1. The various elements of the commercialisation of agriculture 
(vegetable enterprises) were evaluated based on survey results. Although the factors related 
to the propositions of this study are interrelated, this chapter is more relevant to Proposition 1 
of this study as presented in Chapter 1. The chapter starts with a brief background on 
vegetable production and marketing, followed by a description of the study area and the 
results of the survey, and ends with a summary. 
 
4.2 The Namibian vegetable industry 
4.2.1 Status of production and consumption 
The Namibian horticultural (fruit and vegetable) industry is still in its infancy, and the 
development of the sector relies on irrigation. The main objective of horticulture 




international markets. The most suitable areas for fruit and vegetable production in the 
country are the Orange River at 52 percent, Karst at 25 percent, the Kavango regions at 5 
percent, southern Namibia at 5 percent, north-central Namibia (the focus of this study) at 4 
percent and Zambezi at 1 percent (NAB, 2017) (Figure 4.1). It is estimated that potentially 
about 43 500 ha of underdeveloped agricultural land could be irrigated by water obtained 
from the perennial rivers (Orange, Kunene, Okavango, and Zambezi) that border the country 
as well as from excess underground water that is available countrywide (Iita, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Map of vegetable production areas in Namibia   
 
The horticultural industry contributes about 10 percent of the GDP (NAB, 2017). Notably, 
local production of horticultural products is recorded only for those products that are traded 
formally to retailers and supermarkets and thus there is no record for the products that are 
traded informally to consumers. Table 4.1 indicates some of the horticultural products that 




tonnes of horticulture fresh produce in the formal market, estimated at a value of N$643 
million with 28 599 tonnes (34 percent) marketed locally whereas 52 854 tonnes (66 percent) 
were imports. The total value of imports was N$504 in 2015/2016, N$415 million in 
2016/2017, and N$421 million in 2017/2018. This probably implies a need for local farmers 
to increase production. Table 4.1 also indicates that the five most important vegetables 
produced and imported by Namibia are potatoes, onions, tomatoes, carrots, and lettuce. 
 
Table 4.1: Local production and imports for 2017/2018 
Product Local production Imports Total (local production 
plus imports) 
  Tonnage Percent Tonnage Percent Tonnage Percent 
Potatoes 7 843 27 23 655 45 31 498 39 
Apples 0 0 6 772 13 6 772 8 
Onions 3 184 11 1 898 4 5 081.94 6 
Bananas 0 0 5 016 9 5 015.56 6 
Tomatoes 2 914 10 1 356 3 4 269.83 5 
Oranges 404 1 3 126 6 3 530.12 4 
Carrots 2 505 9 562 1 3 067.18 4 
Lettuce 885 3 1 294 2 2 178.62 3 
English cucumbers 1 772 6 402 1 2 173.49 3 
Cabbage 1 747 6 38 0 1 784.95 2 
Butternuts 1 364 5 136 0 1 499.58 2 
Peppers 821 3 449 1 1 270.60 2 
Sweet potatoes 650 2 357 1 1 007.75 1 
Grapes 268 1 710 1 977.27 1 
Pumpkins 657 2 133 0 789.82 1 
Avocados 0 0 721 1 720.79 1 
Mushrooms 553 2 127 0 680.28 1 
Watermelons 311 1 275 1 586.68 1 
Broccoli 160 1 427 1 586.65 1 
Pears 0 0 556 1 556.37 1 
Total other 2 561 9 4 844 9 7 405 9 
Grand total 28 598.56 100 52 853.92 100 81 452.48 100 
Source: Agro-Marketing and Trade Agency (AMTA), 2018  
 
The horticultural industry production initiatives in Namibia currently are being developed 
and promoted under the Green Scheme7 and the National Horticulture Development Initiative 
 
7 The strategy of the Green Scheme is to attract and enable large commercial farming enterprises to establish 




that were established in 2002 (Government Republic of Namibia, 2008). These strategic 
interventions in the development of the country’s horticultural industry ultimately led to fresh 
fruit and vegetables to be gazetted as controlled products during 2002, under Section 2 of the 
Agronomic Industry Act No. 20 of 1992. The NAB is a statutory body instituted by the 
government of the Republic of Namibia in terms of the Agronomic Industry Act. The main 
objective of the NAB is to facilitate border control, including issuing of permits and checking 
and controlling the cross-border flow of agronomic and horticultural products.  
 
The Green Scheme is a national programme8 that aims to encourage the development of 
irrigation-based agronomic production. The Agricultural Business Development Agency 
(AGRIBUSDEV) is responsible for crop production and was created in 2011 by the 
Namibian government to oversee the management of government Green Scheme projects 
(irrigation projects) through monitoring and creation of an ideal environment in order to 
achieve the Green Scheme Policy objective of the commercialisation of agriculture. One of 
the problems with AGRIBUSDEV is the lack of financial resources to run the Green Scheme 
projects sustainably as most of the allocated funds end up as salaries of agency staff. Another 
problem is that the production activities are not linked to any marketing system, making it 
difficult for small-scale farmers in these projects to access markets. 
 
From a total of 9 429 ha of agricultural land, 3 435 ha are under production in Green Scheme 
projects in the //Kharas, Kavango, Zambezi, and Omusati regions (Iita, 2012). The small-
scale farms found in Green Scheme projects occupy a total of 825 ha (Iita, 2012) that are 
directly supported by inputs (e.g. fertilisers, seeds, and pesticides) and services (e.g. water, 
ploughing, and electricity) as well as training in fruit and vegetable production in order to 
commercialise. In northern Namibia, scattered small-scale vegetable farmers are also found 
with limited support from the government with regard to inputs. These farmers find it 
difficult to sell their produce to supermarkets and other retailers, as they cannot meet the food 
safety, quantity, and quality standards set by them. 
 
small-scale producers (Mushendami et al., 2006:31). The service providers therefore ensure effective 
production on a cost recovery basis and facilitate the transfer of skills to small-scale horticulture farmers. 
8 The national Green Scheme projects are Orange River (300 ha) and Tantjieskoppe(1 000 ha) in the //Kharas 
Region;  Hardap (130 ha) in the Hardap Region;  Etunda (1 200 ha) in the Omusati Region; Shadikongoro 
(1 000 ha), Ndonga Linena (800 ha), Mashare (200 ha), Uhvungu Vhungu (600 ha), Shitemo (1 000 ha), Musese 






4.2.2 The vegetable markets 
Namibia is a net importer of most fruit and vegetable products. The Market Share Promotion 
(MSP) policy that aims to reduce imports and to increase horticulture production was 
established by the NAB in 2005. The estimated maximum import substitution through local 
production of high-value crops under the domestic MSP is 60 percent of domestic demand 
(NAB, 2017). The initial MSP started at 5 percent of local production in 2005 but increased 
to 44 percent in 2017 (NAB, 2017).  
 
The Agro-Marketing and Trade Agency (AMTA) is the implementing agent of the NAB. 
AMTA is responsible for marketing and trade and was created in 2013 by the Namibian 
government as a specialised agency with the mandate to manage the fresh produce business 
hubs and the national strategic food reserve infrastructure towards the attainment of food 
safety and food security in the country. AMTA currently operates fresh produce business 
hubs in Windhoek, the capital of Namibia, Ongwediva in north-central Namibia, and Rundu 
in Kavango East. The fresh produce hubs are very important as they create market access for 
local fresh produce farmers and are also where local retailers can source their produce for 
distribution to the domestic and international markets. Thus, local farmers need to comply 
with accreditation and certification that are in line with stringent international food safety and 
agricultural standards such as Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point, International Standards 
Organisation 9001, and global good agricultural practice (GAP). One of the main challenges 
facing AMTA is to organise farmers appropriately into a self-help scheme and to make 
financial resources available timeously to ensure that the fresh produce infrastructure is 
utilised to avoid it becoming a ‘white elephant’. The agency’s marketing activities are also 
not linked to the production activities of farmers, making it difficult for farmers to meet the 
required standards. In addition, most of the financial resources allocated to AMTA by the 
government end up as salaries of staff, especially top managers (Immanuel, 2019). 
 
The Namibian vegetable industry is still an infant industry and is, therefore, less competitive 
globally. Domestic vegetable producers thus compete with imports, mainly from South 
Africa. With regard to exports, a small amount of Namibian fruits and vegetables are traded 
to larger markets such as the European Union, the United States of America, China, the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (principally South Africa), and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) (principally Angola). The total value of exports 




2017/2018. Figure 4.2 shows the export quantities of selected vegetables during the 
2017/2018 fiscal year. Tomatoes (9 475 tonnes), onions (7 537 tonnes), peppers (2 368), 
sweet melons (839), and butternuts (757) are the most important vegetables produced for 
export in Namibia. These vegetables are mainly exported to South Africa and Angola. Due to 
favourable climatic conditions, Namibian vegetable growers have a regional comparative 
advantage as they can harvest watermelons earlier and export them to South Africa (Cape 
Town), which has a different growing season. Similarly, Namibian farmers can produce 
tomatoes throughout the year, thus satisfying demand in neighbouring Angola during its off-
season (October and November) (Togarepi et al., 2018).  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Selected vegetable export quantities (tonnes) 2017/2018 
Source: AMTA, 2018 
 
4.2.3 Leasehold versus freehold land tenure in the Namibian agricultural sector 
This subsection briefly discusses the difference between the leasehold and freehold land 
tenure systems in Namibia in order to clarify the subsequent sections in this chapter. The 
details of the land tenure systems and suggested policies for enhanced investment in 





















In Namibia, the land is divided into 44 percent freehold (commercial), 36 percent communal, 
and 20 percent state land (Mendelsohn et al., 2011). The redistribution of freehold 
agricultural land is addressed by the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act No. 6 of 
1995, whereby the government buys freehold farms and resettles landless Namibians on those 
farms under state leasehold tenure. Land redistribution is aimed at redressing land access 
imbalances created by the past political system while empowering the majority economically 
by equalising income distribution. In order to do this, the Namibian government has 
introduced a variety of land reform instruments to promote economic development and land 
ownership, including the Affirmative Action Loan Scheme, communal land registration, and 
the National Resettlement Policy. 
 
Under the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act No. 6 of 1995 and the National 
Resettlement Policy, the state purchases freehold commercial farms on a willing-seller 
willing-buyer basis, subdivides these into smaller parcels, and allocates the parcels to selected 
potential farmers. Under this land redistribution process, it is expected that leasehold rights 
will enable small-scale farmers to be economically productive and to enter the mainstream 
economy by using the lease agreements to access capital and investments to support 
agricultural production (Werner & Bayer, 2017). Notably, the right of leasehold would grant 
the holders the opportunity to access financial capital to invest in their properties and as a 
result to improve their living standard. 
 
The Communal Land Reform Act No. 5 of 2002 and the Traditional Authorities Act No. 25 
of 2000 constitute the most important policies for land management in communal areas in 
Namibia (Meijs & Kapitango, 2009:6). The Communal Land Reform Act stipulates that any 
land used for commercial activity has to be registered as a leasehold.9 This means that holders 
of customary land rights, who make up the great majority of residents, are prevented from 
using their land for income-generating enterprises unless they go through lengthy processes 
of converting their land rights into leaseholds (Mendelsohn et al., 2011). At present, the 
tenure regulation in communal areas has created conditions that (a) are not conducive to 
economic development and (b) cause residents to lose their commonage resources10 
 
9 The customary land right is for the natural life of a holder and can be inherited by the surviving spouse and the 
children. The leasehold is for a maximum of 99 years and is also transferable. 
10 The former largely concerns the rights of individuals to use and invest in their properties to create wealth, 




(Mendelsohn et al., 2011). Namibia’s commercial financial institutions such as banks do not 
accept registered leaseholds over state land as collateral as they are not allowed to sell 
leaseholds in the event of a borrower’s defaulting (Werner & Bayer, 2017), a problem 
experienced by small-scale vegetable farmers in north-central Namibia, as will be presented 
in subsequent sections and chapters. Notably, the problem of commons is described by 
Hardin (1968) as the ‘tragedy of commons’. Ostrom (2008:17–18) identified the following 
fundamental requirements when designing governing systems for diverse commons that are 
relevant for improving communal land in developing countries: 
• Accurate and relevant information: The system as well as the individual’s experience 
changes over time. As a result, regular updates and the latest accurate information are 
essential.  
• Dealing with conflict: Those involved in the commonage system should have rapid 
access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflict among participants. 
• Clearly defined boundaries: The boundaries of the system should be clearly defined, 
as should be the rules specifying the resource entitlements and materials or labour or 
cash inputs. 
• Collective choice arrangements: All those affected by the rules governing the use of 
resources should be involved in any modification of these rules. 
• Graduated sanctions: Participants who violate rules are to receive graduated sanctions 
(depending on the seriousness and context of the offence) from the designated 
authority. 
 
4.3 Description of the study area 
The study was conducted in north-central Namibia in the Omusati Region, which was 
purposefully selected from the four regions in the area due to its potential for small-scale 
irrigated vegetable production (Fiebiger et al., 2010). The region is composed of 6 percent 
urban dwellers and 94 percent rural households, of whom 70 percent depend directly or 
indirectly on agriculture (NSA, 2011). The Omusati Region has a total population of 243 166, 
of whom 109 545 (45 percent) are men and 133 621 (55 percent) are women.11 The total area 
of the Omusati Region is estimated to be 26 551 km2. In this region, economic, social and 
natural resource constraints hinder agricultural development and, ultimately, economic 
growth. These constraints include limited market access, land degradation, deforestation, 
 




marginal agricultural productivity, and inadequate infrastructure support. In this area, the 
incidence of organic matter in the topsoil is low, about 1–5 percent (Newsham & Thomas, 
2009) with nutrient deficiency, low soil fertility, and susceptibility to salinity. The climate in 
the region is described as semiarid with an erratic average annual rainfall ranging from 350 
mm to 500 mm. Summers are hot with maximum temperatures between 30 °C and 35 °C 
during the hottest months, and the coldest winter temperatures are around 2 °C to 6 °C (DEA, 
2002). Whereas the adverse effects of drought could result in crop failure (Kuvare et al., 
2008), heavy rains during the rainy season cause environmental damage such as soil erosion.  
 
In the Omusati Region, farmers depend primarily on livestock farming and rain-fed 
subsistence crop production, mainly pearl millet and small quantities of sorghum and maize, 
of which any surplus is sold for income. The small-scale irrigation schemes produce maize 
and vegetables such as cabbage, tomatoes, butternuts, sweet potatoes, and watermelons. In 
the Omusati Region, irrigated crop and horticultural production takes place mainly at the 
government-owned Etunda Green Scheme Irrigation Project and around the Olushandja Dam 
in the same vicinity.  
 
The Etunda Irrigation Project covers an area of 1 200 ha of which 900 ha are under 
cultivation; half of this area is divided into equal small-scale units of production, totalling 
450 ha. Each small-scale farmer, about 80 in total, occupies an area fixed at 3 ha, 6 ha, and 
12 ha and uses the sprinkler irrigation method. The remaining 450 ha, using a centre pivot 
irrigation system, is managed by a service provider who is also responsible for training 
farmers in the project. The land in the Etunda Irrigation Project is state land that is leased to 
farmers on a five-year contract renewal basis for them to commercialise. However, due to a 
lack of collective action and principal-agent problems between farmers and AGRIBUSDEV 
managers as a result of incomplete information, these farmers find it difficult to 
commercialise despite governmental support. 
 
The Olushandja Dam is an artificial permanent dam with a capacity of 42 331 mm3 (millions 
of cubic metres) and a surface area of 29 km2 when full (NamWater, 2015). In the area 
surrounding the dam, about 35 independent vegetable producers with limited government 
support (non-project farmers) were found during the period 2014/2015. The land around the 
Olushandja Dam that is occupied by non-project farmers is communal (state land) that is 




However, communal land is also free for people who are not poor, and many wealthy people 
have used their influence to acquire large farms, mainly through allocation by traditional 
authorities and by unilateral fencing off of land by private individuals (Mendelsohn et al., 
2011:9). The land owned by the non-project farmers is sufficient for small-scale crop 
production but cannot be used as collateral to access credit facilities offered by financial 
institutions. The source of water for irrigated agriculture is the Calueque Dam, fed by the 
Kunene River, which is situated across the border in Angola, and water is pumped into the 
Olushandja Dam and also discharged into the 150-km-long concrete Calueque-Oshakati12 
Canal. The water from the canal is used for both human consumption and horticultural 
production without clearly defined property rights. Fiebiger et al. (2010:31) argue that 
conflict may arise with increased demand for water in Namibia for irrigation as a lack of 
cooperation is being experienced with some Angolan officials. The small-scale farmers 
around Olushandja try to commercialise specialising in vegetable production with limited 
governmental support. It is against this background that this study attempted to assess 
whether these farmers (project and non-project) were efficient in the production of vegetables 
given the political, socio-economic, and agro-ecological constraints associated with the 
development of the horticultural sector in Namibia. 
 
4.4 Analysis of variables affecting the participation of vegetable industry in north-
central Namibia 
This section presents the testing of several variables to determine the significance of the 
difference between a project and non-project commercial vegetable farmers in north-central 
Namibia. Although the factors related to the propositions of this study are interrelated, this 
section is more related to Proposition 1 of this study as presented in Chapter 1.  Table 4.2 
presents the explanatory variables and their hypothesised effect. These explanatory variables 
are also explained in other literature (Bester et al.1999; Hayes et al., 1997; Lishman & 
Nieuwoudt, 2003; Turner et al., 2000). 
 
 




Table 4.2: Summary of independent variables and hypothesis 
Variable Variable type Variable measurement Sign/effect 
Gender of head of household  Dummy 1=male, 0=otherwise + 
Age of head of household Continuous Years + 
Household size Continuous Number +/- 
Total number of years spent on education Continuous Number + 
Type of employment  (full time) Dummy 1=Full time, 0=otherwise +/- 
Farming experience in horticultural 
production Continuous Number + 
Farm income per month Continuous Namibian Dollar +/- 
Farm size  Continuous Hectares + 
Land ownership Dummy 
1=Communal, 
0=otherwise - 
Source of irrigation Dummy 1=Canal, 0=otherwise +/- 
Distance from farm to the water source  Continuous Kilometres +/- 
Distance to major urban market from farm  Continuous Kilometres - 
Ownership of vehicle  Dummy 
1=Own vehicle, 
0=Otherwise + 
Source of Capital Dummy 
1=Agribank, 
0=Otherwise +/- 
The amount borrowed from Agribank Continuous Namibian Dollar +/- 
Total labour (family, permanent, hired) Continuous Number + 
Distance to Extension services  Continuous Kilometres +/- 
Member of any community-based 
Association  Dummy 1=Yes, 0=otherwise +/- 
 
The explanatory variables in Table 4.2 are defined as follows: 
 
Gender of head of household was presented as a dummy variable assuming the value of 1 if a 
household was female and 0 if male-headed. Generally, male-headed households have more 
access to resources as a result this increases the chance of owning land and practicing 
horticulture due to traditional expectations. Gender of head of household is positive and is 
thus expected to increase the chance of farmer participation in commercialisation. 
 
The age of the head of the household was measured in years and is taken as a good proxy for 
the experience of the farmer in the production of vegetables and older farmers are expected to 
farm better than younger ones. In addition, older household heads may have more experience 
in the production of vegetables and may have access to loyal customers. According to Brown 
(2012), throughout the African continent, many young people are avoiding pursuing 
livelihoods within the agricultural sector, particularly as farmers. Age is positive and is 





The total number of years spent in education and agricultural training by a farmer is likely to 
achieve higher yields and incomes as it is expected that the farmer is better equipped with the 
technical skills necessary to produce vegetables. This is likely to increase participation in 
commercialisation. 
 
The type of employment (full-time farmer) is presented as a dummy, assuming a value of 1 if 
a farmer is employed full-time and 0 if not. A full-time farmer is likely to be involved in the 
management of the farm which is likely to lead to high output compared to a part-time 
farmer. Therefore, this variable is expected to have either a positive or negative impact on 
commercialisation. 
 
Farming experience in horticultural production is positive and is likely to lead to production 
efficiency which will likely increase production and participation in commercialisation. 
Moreover, the longer a farmer has been on the farm, the better the understanding of the agro-
ecological and socio-economic constraints.  
 
Farm income per month was presented in Namibia Dollar and is expected to have a positive 
or negative influence towards commercialisation as a farmer with high income may be able to 
access other services as well as invest in production. Lower farm incomes will have a 
negative impact on commercialisation. 
 
The variable farm size measured in hectares is expected to have a positive influence on the 
farmer to commercialise as a farmer with a bigger farm will benefit from economies of size 
that spread fixed costs related to information, management, machinery investment, and 
services over a larger area (Lugemwa & Darroch, 1995). However, in communal areas, farms 
are expected to be smaller. Van Zyl et al. (1995) argue that there is an inverse relationship 
between farm size and efficiency in commercial farming; as a result, efficiency gains could 
be significant if commercial farms became smaller.  
 
Land ownership with secure tenure is presented as a dummy variable in which a lack of 
ownership rights is expected to discourage investments on the farm that may improve 
productivity and lead to commercialisation. Thus security of tenure has a positive influence 





The source of irrigation was a dummy, assuming a value of 1 if a farmer used the Calueque-
Oshakati Canal as a source of irrigation and 0 if not. The main source of irrigation water is 
the canal and the Olushandja Dam which is expected to have either a positive or a negative 
impact on commercialisation. A farmer located closer to the canal is more likely to be 
successful as he or she can produce continuously compared to a farmer who uses the dam for 
irrigation as the dam level recedes in dry seasons, making irrigation difficult and increasing 
the cost of production.  
 
Distance from farm to the water source was measured in kilometres. A farmer who is located 
closer to the water source has a higher chance of producing continuously. Therefore, this 
variable is expected to have either a positive or negative impact on commercialisation. 
 
Distance to major urban markets from the farm was measured in kilometres. Farmers near 
towns are more likely to participate in vegetable markets due to lower transaction costs 
because of lower transport costs and easier access to sources of information about market 
conditions. Thus distance to a major urban market is likely to have a negative impact on 
commercialisation.  
 
Ownership of a vehicle is presented as a dummy variable, assuming a value of 1 if a farmer-
owned a vehicle and 0 if not. Ownership of a vehicle may help farmers to access distant 
vegetable markets. This could imply reducing transaction costs, especially transport costs, 
making it easier for farmers to access vegetable markets. Thus vehicle ownership is expected 
to have a positive impact on commercialisation. 
 
Source of capital (Agribank) is presented as a dummy, assuming a value of 1 if a farmer’s 
source of capital is Agribank and 0 if not. A farmer that has access to credit facilities is likely 
to invest in infrastructure and production leading to high output and this is likely to have a 
positive impact on commercialisation. 
 
The amount borrowed from Agribank was presented in Namibia Dollar. When a farmer can 
borrow an amount that they can pay back then their production will increase but if the amount 
is too much that may affect production and lead to failure. Therefore, this variable is expected 





The total number of farm labourers (family, permanent, and hired) was measured in total 
number of workers per season. The more labourers a farmer has, the less mechanised he or 
she is. However, a bigger number of farm labourers may increase production leading to 
higher incomes that may be invested on the farm to improve efficiency like mechanisation. 
This is likely lead to expansion and positively influencing the farmer to commercialise.   
 
Distance from farm to extension services was measured in kilometres. Farmers near 
extension services are more likely to have access to production and marketing information 
due to regular advice from extension officials. This could reduce the transaction costs of 
searching for production and marketing information. However, extension officials should be 
knowledgeable and have practical experience and skills in horticultural production and 
management. The most important contribution of extension officials is to share information 
that increases the production and marketing of vegetables (Jona & Terblanché, 2015). 
Therefore, this variable is expected to have either a positive or negative impact on 
commercialisation. 
 
Membership of farmers’ organisation was a dummy, assuming a value of 1 if a farmer is a 
member of an association and 0 if not.  A farmer’s membership in an organisation or 
cooperative does not necessarily mean that the probability of successful vegetable production 
and marketing will be increased. A farmer still needs to be able to produce consistently and to 
meet the quality standards as demanded by the markets, which in most instances small-scale 
farmers are unable to do. Therefore, this variable is expected to have either a positive or 
negative impact on commercialisation. 
4.4.1 Comparison of the means of non-project and project farmers  
This subsection presents a comparison of the means of the two groups of farmers that was 
performed to determine whether there were any statistical differences between the two 
groups. 
Group 1: Non-project farmers 
Group 2: Project farmers 
The test for significant difference between the means of two independent and unequal groups 
is based on the t-distribution (Fox, 2003:179). 
Let µ1 and µ2 be the means of the two populations with variance δ
2 and a random sample 
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2 2 2( ; )N N    where 1N  and 2N  respectively refer to the populations 
from which samples 1n  and 2n  were randomly selected. 
 
The hypothesis thus is as follows: 
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The level of significance   is pre-specified. 
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The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4.3, which shows that distance from farm to 
extension services, and the amount borrowed from Agribank are significant at 1 percent 
significance level. The age of the head of the household and farm income per month is 
significant at 5 percent significance level. Household size and distance to a major urban 
market from the farm are significant at a 10 percent significance level. There is no significant 
difference in mean for the remaining variables. The details of each variable are discussed in 





Table 4.3: Comparison of the means of non-project and project farmers 
Variables 
Least squares mean 




(n = 56) 
Std dev 
Household size 5.77 5.191 6.68 3.433 -0.9 0.069* 
Age of head of household 43.64 20.259 42.79 13.54 0.216 0.038** 
Total number of years spent on 
education 10.5 4.351 10.05 3.193 0.5 0.13 
Years of experience in horticultural 
production 7.8 5.115 11.21 5.49 -2.522 0.584 
Farm size (ha) 6.48 8.158 6.04 5.614 0.268 0.184 
Distance from farm to water source 
(km) 0.54 0.624 1.56 2.838 -1.664 0.117 
Distance to major urban market from 
farm (km) 84.55 155.41 66.23 73.44 0.708 0.058* 
Distance from farm to extension 
services (km) 14.77 16.613 6.27 10.35 2.725 0.004*** 
Amount borrowed from Agribank 11818.18 43930.3 68903.59 105729 -2.44 0.005*** 
Farm income per month 3.32 2.514 4.11 5.614 -1.42 0.040** 
Note: ***Significant at P ≤ 0.01, **significant at P ≤ 0.05, *significant at P ≤ 0.1 
 
4.4.1.1 Household characteristics 
A descriptive analysis of the household demographics of the Etunda (project) and Olushandja 
(non-project) farmers interviewed during the survey is given below.  
 
a) Age of the head of household 
Table 4.4 shows that most of the farmers are over 40 years old while the youth (up to 40 
years) makes up 36 percent of those who are involved in vegetable farming. The majority of 
respondents fall within the 41–50 years bracket (33.3 percent) with 27.3 percent and 35.7 
percent found in Olushandja and Etunda respectively. This indicates that there is still a need 
to encourage the youth in the study area to become involved in vegetable farming. A total of 
6.4 percent of respondents are pensioners; 18.1 percent at Olushandja and only 1.8 percent at 
Etunda. This bodes well for the future of the industry since the farming population in the 






Table 4.4: Age of head of household 
  Non-project (n = 22) Project (n = 56) Total (n = 78) 
Age in years Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
Under 31 4 18.2 8 14.3 12 15.4 
31–40 5 22.7 11 19.6 16 20.5 
41–50 6 27.3 20 35.7 26 33.3 
51–60 3 13.6 16 28.6 19 24.4 
Over 60 4 18.1 1 1.8 5 6.4 
 
The age of the head of households of non-project farmers on average is higher than that of 
project farmers (Table 4.4). This difference is significant at 5 percent significance level. This 
implies that older farmers may be more likely to start their vegetable fields with limited 
government support. 
 
b) Educational level of head of household 
Just over 50 percent of the heads of households who were interviewed had secondary 
education as their highest level of education, with non-project farmers at 55 percent and 
project farmers at 64 percent (Table 4.5). Further, 10.7 percent of the project and 22.7 percent 
of non-project heads of households interviewed had tertiary education. This probably 
suggests that some of the farmers with tertiary education see farming as a business with 
higher returns.  
Table 4.5: Educational level of head of household 
Type of farmer Level of education Frequency Percent 
Non-project (n = 22) 
None 2 9.1 
Primary  3 13.6 
Secondary  12 54.5 
Tertiary 5 22.7 
Total 22 100.0 
Project (n = 56) 
None 3 5.4 
Primary 11 19.6 
Secondary 36 64.3 
Tertiary 6 10.7 
Total 56 100 
 
The total number of years spent on education on average is 10 (Table 4.3). This implies that 
most farmers have a formal education up to Grade 10, which makes it easy to enhance 





c) Years of experience in horticultural production  
The Etunda Project farmers have on average 11.21 years of experience compared to the 7.80 
years of non-project farmers around the Olushandja Dam (Table 4.3). This implies that small-
scale farmers in the horticultural industry in north-central Namibia are relatively 
inexperienced in horticultural production, which confirms the infancy status of the industry in 
this area. The difference in years of experience in horticultural production is not significant. 
 
d) Household size 
The households interviewed that were producing vegetables consisted on average of six 
persons for project farmers and five persons for non-project farmers (Table 4.3). The data in 
Table 4.3 show that most families in the community are extended rather than nuclear 
families. This probably explains why most farmers use family labour or relatives who are 
willing to work on the farm for free or for lower pay rather than nonrelatives who are hired at 
a greater cost. The study also found that the number of permanent workers in the vegetable 
industry in north-central Namibia was minimal (ranging from one to three per farmer) with 
average wages of N$480 per month, which was about half of the approved national minimum 
wage for farm workers of N$860 per month during 2014/2015. Most of the workers are 
employed as temporary workers during peak times such as harvesting and are paid a daily 
rate ranging from N$25 to N$50 while some workers accept payment in kind (in vegetables). 
However, most labourers are relatively unskilled13 in vegetable production, which constrains 
productivity.  
 
e) Mean distance from farm to major urban markets  
The nearest town supplied by farmers from both schemes is Outapi, which is about 50 km 
from the schemes. The furthest distance supplied by Olushandja farmers is Windhoek, the 
capital city of Namibia, which is 900 km from the scheme (Table 4.3). Non-project farmers 
on average travel longer distances to sell their vegetables to major urban markets compared to 
Etunda Project farmers (Table 4.3). This variable is significant at a 10 percent significance 
level. This may imply that non-project farmers are faced with high transaction costs due to a 
high degree of searching for trading partners, the high cost of price information, and high 
transport costs.  
 
 
13 It is important to note that knowledge remains a key element of human capital development in farming; 




f) Distance to extension services from the farm 
The non-project farmers cover on average a distance of 14.77 km to access extension services 
compared to project farmers who cover on average 6.27 km (Table 4.3). This implies that the 
role of extension officials with respect to the training of farmers in vegetable production is 
limited for non-project farmers. The difference in distance from farms to extension services 
between the two farmer groups is significant at 1 percent significance level. During the study, 
it was observed that specific extension officials were responsible for farmers in the two 
schemes. The extension officials for the Etunda Irrigation Project were located at the project 
site, while the extension officials for the Olushandja area were located at a maximum 
distance of around 40 km from the site and in most cases were without transport for 
fieldwork. Lack of transport by extension officials, especially for non-project farmers, was 
therefore one of the constraints in field-level extension services. In general, with limited 
resources, extension officials in communal areas found themselves not being able to deliver 
services to their expectations. It was also observed that the extension officials were not 
trained specialists in horticultural production but were rather general agronomists who lacked 
practical farming expertise and skills, making it difficult to provide farmers with appropriate 
information.  
 
Table 4.6 shows access to information by non-project and project farmers in the case study 
area. The results indicate a significant difference in access to training on pricing (P = 0.013) 
and on-farm planning and financial management (P = 0.092) between project and non-project 
farmers. This is probably because training at the Etunda Project is offered to the farmers by 






Table 4.6: Access to information 









Do you keep production 
records? 
No 3 (3.8) 4 (5.1) 7 (9) 
0.815 0.308 
Yes 19 (24.4) 52 (66.7) 71 (91) 
Have you received training on 
vegetable production? 
No 5 (6.40 14 (17.9) 19 (24.4) 0.044 0.542 
Yes 22 (21.8) 42 (53.8) 59 (75.6) 
Do you keep financial records? No 3 (3.8) 8 (10.3) 11 (14.1) 0.005 0.626 
Yes 19 (24.40) 48 (61.5) 67 (85.9) 
Have you received training on 
pricing? 
No 13 (16.7) 16 (20.5) 29 (37.2) 6.2999 0.013** 
Yes 9 (11.5) 40 (51.3) 49 (62.8) 
Have you received training on 
farm planning and financial 
management? 
No 13 (16.7) 22 (20.5) 35 (44.9) 2.505 0.092* 
Yes 9 (11.5) 34 (43.6) 43 (55.1) 
Have you received training on 
fertiliser application? 
No 7 (9) 26 (33.3) 33 (42.3) 1.331 0.179 
Yes 15 (19.5) 30 (38.5) 45 (57.7) 
Have you received training on 
pesticide application? 
No 13 (16.7) 27 (34.6) 40 (51.3) 0.748 0.27 
Yes 9 (11.5) 29 (37.2) 38 (48.7) 
Have you received training on 
financial record keeping? 
No 9 (11.5) 21 (26.9) 30 (38.5) 0.078 0.489 
Yes 13 (16.7) 35 (44.9) 48 (61.5) 
*** Significant at P ≤ 0.01, **P ≤ 0.05, *P ≤ 0.1 
 
g) Inputs  
In principle, non-project farmers (around Olushandja) experience high transport costs when 
procuring inputs such as seeds, fertilisers, and pesticides, which in many cases are not 
available locally or are available only at high prices. For the project farmers (in Etunda), the 
procurement of inputs is done on their behalf by a service provider(s) based at the project 
from South African suppliers such as Aqualand; however, this arrangement is associated with 
high transport costs and delays in consignment delivery and hence production delays. High 
transaction costs still prevail despite the government’s providing subsidised inputs such as 
fertilisers and pesticides and investing in physical farm infrastructures for Green Scheme 
Project farmers at Etunda. This is caused by limited skills and knowledge among farmers in 
the project to use the inputs optimally as well as not managing the crops following GAP. 
Farmers also source their inputs (seeds, pesticides, or fertilisers) from domestic suppliers 
(legal market) in Oshakati, Outapi, Tsumeb, Grootfontein, and Epalela, obviously entailing 
high transport and searching costs. The majority of farmers lack the funds to purchase their 
production inputs. As a result, the majority of vegetable farmers in the target areas, 
specifically those around the Olushandja Dam, purchased few inputs due to a lack of access 




did not keep accurate physical and financial records of their farm produce, making it difficult 
to estimate the total costs of inputs and yield. Table 4.7 shows the estimated costs of tomatoes 
and cabbage as the most produced crops in the study areas. These costs are considered to be 
high by the farmers, which constrains the production of high-value crops. 
 
Table 4.7: Input costs of project farmers 
Item Tomatoes (N$) Cabbage (N$) 
Seeds/ha 9 600 5 000 
Fertilisers/ha 10 537 7 000 
Chemicals/ha 32 748.74 5 000 
Source: Etunda, 2015; Field data 
 
The yield estimates of the two most important crops in the study area for the season 
2014/2015 are provided in Table 4.8. The results in Table 4.8 imply that farmers need to 
improve their production techniques to meet the target yields and in turn increase their gross 
income.  
 
Table 4.8: Tomato and cabbage yields 
 Crop Average target yield/ha Average actual yield/ha 
Project Cabbage 20 000 head/ha (60 t) 16 000 head/ha (48 t) 
Tomatoes  50 t/ha - 
Non-project Cabbage 20 000 head/ha (60 t) 16 000 head/ha (48 t) 
Tomatoes  50 t/ha 20 t/ha 
Source: Etunda, 2015; Field data 
 
h) Credit  
Unlike project beneficiaries who have access to credit backed by the government for 
collateral, non-project farmers have limited access to credit, which leads to a shortage of 
capital that affects productivity. This limits input sourcing, compounded by the socio-cultural 
background of the community that causes them to be risk-averse; they thus are limited in 
borrowing for farming purposes. The community culture does not prepare the non-project 
farmers for taking a risk by borrowing for commercial farming to improve productivity. The 
study found that the nearest credit facility14 that offered agricultural loans to farmers, 
 
14 Individually, farmers can also apply for production loans from commercial banks, the nearest of which are 




Agribank, was situated 130 km away from the study area and that approval of loans took up 
to four weeks. It was found that all project farmers qualified for 100 percent production 
loans, which consisted of a voucher with a value of N$19 000/ha during the 2014/2015 
season, from Agribank. Security was covered by the government, and private collateral was 
not needed.  
 
The repayment period of the loan was one year at an interest rate of 4 percent. The study 
found that no accurate monitoring of the loan repayment system was in place and that some 
producers believed that the period in which to repay the loan was too short. As a result, at 
least 40 percent of producers with farming units at the Etunda Irrigation Project had failed to 
repay their loans on time. In the event of loan default, producers were supposed to be evicted 
from the project and the government would take over the debt; however, at the time of the 
study, no defaulters had been evicted from the project yet. This probably served to maintain 
strong political support as most farmers in the project were supporters of the ruling party. The 
non-project farmers also did not have adequate collateral, which is critical for obtaining credit 
from leading financial institutions such as Agribank, resulting in their investing poorly in 
improved seeds, pesticides, fertilisers, irrigation equipment, and tools. Adverse selection by 
financial institutions has thus caused these farmers not to engage successfully in commercial 
farming.  
 
Table 4.9 indicates the main sources of finance of farmers in the study area. The farmers in 
Etunda (35) revealed that they had borrowed from Agribank at a value of N$80 000 to 
N$87 000 while only 2 farmers from Olushandja had borrowed N$60 000 and N$200 000 
during the 2014/2015 season. The remaining Etunda Project farmers did not share how they 
financed their production, but from observations, it was noticed that they took inputs on 





Table 4.9: Sources of finance 
Source of finance Non-project (n = 22) Project (n = 56) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Own capital 22 (collateral: own 
savings) 
100 1 (collateral: own 
savings) 
1.8 
Agribank 2 (collateral: own 
savings) 
9 35 (collateral: 
government, 5 
indicated life cover) 
63 
The amount borrowed from 
Agribank:  
Significance tests of means  
t-value 
P-value 
   -2.44 
0.005*** 
*** Significant at P ≤ 0.01 
 
i) Gender of head of household 
It was found that more men (46 out of 78 or 59 percent) than women (32 out of 78 or 41 
percent) participated in commercialised agriculture in the study area. More female (54 
percent) than male (46 percent) heads of households were involved in the Etunda Irrigation 
Project (Table 4.10). This is most likely the result of how farmers were selected for the 
project, considering both married couples and the gender balance policy of the government. 
In the case of Olushandja (non-project farmers), men constituted 91 percent and women 9 
percent of the heads of households. Traditionally, men are the ones who apply for customary 
land rights and start clearing the land for both homesteads and fields for crop cultivation. In 
addition, most of the farms around Olushandja are family farms, which are traditionally 
inherited by men and by women only under exceptional circumstances. 
 
Table 4.10: Gender of head of household 
Type of farmer Gender Frequency Percent Cumulative % 
Non-project (n = 56) Male 20 90.9 90.9 
Female 2 9.1 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 
 
Project (n = 22) Male 26 46.4 46.4 
Female 30 53.6 100.0 
Total 56 100.0 
 
 
j) Employment status 
Forty-five percent of the project and non-project farmers were farming on a full-time basis of 
which 41 percent were non-project and 48 percent project (Table 4.11). Forty-eight percent of 
project farmers confirmed that most farmers in the project were well-connected to politicians 




at the expense of poor farmers. This implies that the wealthier and politicians have more 
access to land in rural areas as they can afford, for example, to buy the land allocated by 
traditional chiefs illegally and thus only farm on a part-time basis with the farm managed by 
supervisors or farm managers. 
 
Table 4.11: Employment status of respondents 
Employment status Non-project n = 22 Project n = 56 Total (n = 78) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent  
No off-farm employment 18 81.8 45 80.4 63 81.1 
Own nonfarm business 5 22.7 5 8.9 10 15.8 
Fulltime employment 9 40.9 27 48.2 36 44.6 
Pension 5 22.7 5 8.9 10 15.8 
 
k) Membership of farmers’ organisations  
The study found that no viable or disciplined cooperatives had been established based on 
sound principles that could ensure their sustainability in orderly production and marketing 
arrangements of vegetable farmers. For instance, the farmers in the Etunda Irrigation Project 
were not organised under any producers’ organisation. This lack of organisation most 
probably means a lack of cooperation among farmers; as a result, farmers cannot sell and 
purchase inputs together, resulting in poor input and output market access. The non-project 
farmers (91 percent) indicated during the interviews that they were organised under the 
Olushandja Horticultural Producers Association (OHPA). The OHPA benefits members 
mainly in storing and sorting their vegetables and sometimes arranges training sessions and 
transportation of vegetables to the AMTA fresh produce hub in Ongwediva. It was found that 
the OHPA could not organise farmers into production schedules and was not involved in the 
purchase and marketing of fresh vegetables of members or the arrangement of viable 
marketing channels. Lack of cooperation among farmers is thus a factor constraining the 
development of the vegetable industry in the study area. 
 
4.4.1.2 Household resource endowment  
a)  Ownership of land 
The farmers interviewed confirmed that the land in the Etunda Irrigation Project was state 
land that was leased to farmers by the state while the land around the Olushandja Dam was 




farmers have the right to use the land and may not sell it or use it as collateral to negotiate a 
loan with financial institutions. 
 
Table 4.12: Type of land ownership 
Type of farmer Type of land ownership Frequency Percent 
Non-project Leasing of customary land 22 100 
Project Leasing of state land 56 100 
*** Significant at P ≤ 0.01 
 
Farms in the study area are generally small with a minimum farm size equal to 1 ha for non-
project farmers compared to 3 ha for project farmers (Table 4.3). There is no significant 
difference between the mean farm size of non-project farmers (6.48 ha) compared to that of 
project farmers (6.04 ha). This may imply that crop farming in the study area can only be 
promoted in the form of small-scale enterprises. 
 
b) Farm income 
Only 36 percent of non-project and 45 percent of project farmers indicated that they earned at 
least N$5 000 per month (Table 4.13). This implies that a significant number of farmers do 
not make a profit from their sales of fresh vegetables. 
 
Table 4.13: Farm income per month 















Non-project 8 (36.4) 6(27.3) 8(36.4) 22(100) 
Project 9(16.1) 22(39.3) 25(44.6) 56(100) 
Total 17(21.8) 28(35.9) 33(42.3) 78(100) 
Significance 
tests of means  
t-value 
P-value    
-1.42 
0.040** 








c) Ownership of a vehicle 
The study found that 59 percent of non-project farmers owned vehicles while only 32 percent 
of project farmers owned vehicles (Table 4.14). For farmers to participate successfully in 
horticultural production, they need to own a vehicle that can be used to access input and 
output markets.  
 
Table 4.14: Ownership of a vehicle 




Non-project (n = 22) None 9 40.9 
Own 13 59.1 
Total 22 100 
Project (n = 56) None 38 67.9 
Own 18 32.1 
Total 56 100 
 
Interviews with the farmers also revealed that in the absence of their vehicle, farmers opted to 
use, although, to a limited extent, public transport (taxis), which was unreliable with much 
negotiation/bargaining regarding transport cost, and that producers experienced regular 
delays in reaching local markets. Etunda Irrigation Project producers were dependent on a 
truck hired from a service provider at the project to reach the large regional urban market of 
Oshakati (130 km from the project). Transport was considered by farmers to be expensive at 
a minimum cost of about N$12.50 per km during the 2014/2015 season. Farmers also lacked 
access to refrigerator trucks to transport their fresh produce from the farm directly to the 
supermarkets or retailers. As a result, they experienced barriers of high transaction costs from 
the farm to the final buyers and were thus in many instances excluded from opportunities in 
formal or lucrative markets. 
 
d) Ownership of tractor 
The study found that owning or having access to a tractor was among the most significant 
determinants of farmers’ participation in vegetable production. In the Etunda Irrigation 
Project, farmers used tractors that they had to hire from the service provider at the project at 
an average price of N$400/ha while Olushandja farmers could hire tractors from private 
operators at between N$400/ha and N$550/ha during the 2014/2015 season. While subsidised 
government tractors could be hired at N$180/ha, it was associated with free-rider problems, 
thus benefiting mainly relatives and friends of government administrators as well as the 




e) Ownership of irrigation systems 
The survey results revealed that the non-project farmers used different methods to irrigate 
their crops, namely drip (77 percent), sprinkler (45 percent), and flood-furrow (27 percent) 
irrigation whereas farmers in the Etunda Irrigation Project only used sprinkler irrigation (100 
percent) (Table 4.15). It was also observed during the study that non-project farmers used 
multiple irrigation systems at the same time in the same field to irrigate their crops. Access to 
water for irrigation was found to be a major problem for non-project farmers along the 
Olushandja Dam during the dry season (drought years) when the level of water in the dam 
dropped, resulting in increased investment in buying extra pipes and in high fuel costs to 
pump water up the slope. It was found that non-project farmers around the Olushandja Dam 
were not paying for water at the time of conducting this study; however, they indicated 
during the interviews that the high fuel cost of pumping water from the dam reduced their 
profitability and discouraged potential farmers from participating in vegetable production. 
With respect to the Etunda Irrigation Project, farmers paid N$0.46/m3 for irrigation water
15 
during the 2014/2015 season, including electricity prices. This price was considered by 
farmers to be high, which created unhappiness among them.  
 
Table 4.15: Type of irrigation system 
Type of farmer Type of irrigation system Frequency Percent 
Non-project (n = 22) Drip   17 77 
Sprinkler 10 45 
Flood-furrow  6 27 
Drip, flood-furrow, and sprinkler 17 77 
Project (n = 56) Sprinkler 56 100 
 
f) Ownership of nurseries and greenhouses 
It was observed that all farmers visited during the study owned a nursery where seedlings 
were prepared before being transplanted into the field. No greenhouses were found in the 
study area at the time of the study. Farmers thus produced their vegetables depending on 
natural conditions with minimal modification of the crop environment. 
 
 
15 With regard to farmers around the Olushandja Dam, an average watering of three times per week is estimated 




4.5 Testing the difference between a project and non-project farmers in the study area 
4.5.1 Discriminant analysis 
From the descriptive analysis and characteristics of farmers presented in earlier sections of 
this chapter, it is clear that not all farmers were able to participate successfully in the 
production of vegetables in the case study area. This section presents the results of the linear 
discriminant analysis (LDA) that was used to determine the variables that discriminated 
between project and non-project farmers because the government mainly supports project 
farmers to be included in commercialisation. Although the factors related to the propositions 
of this study are interrelated, this section is more related to Proposition 1 of this study as 
presented in Chapter 1. Discriminant analysis was conducted to determine which variable 
discriminated between the small-scale vegetable farmers within the government scheme 
(Etunda Irrigation Project) and private producers (Olushandja Dam). Explanatory variables 
that distinguished between non-project and project farmers were analysed using a 
discriminant analysis statistical technique. LDA can be used to determine (a) multivariate 
differences between groups; (b) which variables are the most useful for discriminating 
between groups; (c) whether one subclass of variables works as well as another; and (d) 
which groups are similar and which are different (Klecka, 1980; Norusis, 1994; Wysocki et 
al., 2003).  
 
4.5.1.1 Computing discriminant analysis 
In order to determine the variables that discriminated between the project and non-project 
farmers, a linear combination of the independent variables was formed and served as the 
basis for grouping cases. This means that the LDA distinguished between the two farmer 
groups using discriminating variables to investigate differences between the groups and to 
discard variables that were only slightly related to group distinction. The equation for LDA is 
as follows:  
 
D = a + W1X1 + W2X2 +…WiXi       (4.5.1) 
 
Where D, the discriminate function, was estimated for each farmer and compared to the mean 
score for each farmer group, and the farmer was then classified into the group with the score 
most similar to his or her own. W, the discriminant coefficient or weight for that variable, is 




associated respondents’ score for the variable X while a is a constant and i is the number of 
predictor variables.  
 
Hypothesis 
The LDA was intended to contribute to the answer to Proposition 1 and Objective 2 of this 
study as presented in sections 1.3 and 1.5. The model presented in Section 4.5.1 aimed to test 
the hypothesis that discriminated between the two groups of non-project and project 
vegetable farmers. The hypothesised variables that discriminated between the decisions to 
participate as a project or non-project farmers are described below: 
 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables consisted of two variables (types of farmers) in the model 
description, namely project, and non-project farmers. 
 
Independent variables 
The expected signs and hypothesised effect of the independent (explanatory) variables 
(Lishman & Nieuwoudt, 2003; Turner et al., 2000) that discriminated between the two groups 
of non-project and project vegetable farmers are described in section 4.4 and will not be 
repeated in this section. 
 
4.5.1.2 Discriminant function distinguishing between project and non-project farmers 
This section covers the results of discriminating between project farmers that are directly 
supported by the government and non-project farmers with limited governmental support in 
vegetable production in north-central Namibia. Table 4.16 shows the results of significance 
tests, standardised coefficients, and classification of the model distinguishing between 
farmers who participated in the government-supported project and those with limited 
government support (non-project farmers). The overall chi-square value of 37.8198 
(significant at 1 percent of probability [p < 0.000]) means that explanatory variables can be 
distinguished significantly between project farmers and non-project farmers. Wilks’ lambda 
(λ) examines the ratio of the within-group sum of squares to total sum squares (Wysocki et 
al., 2003). Here λ = 0.598 indicates a high level of discriminating power. The Eigenvalue, 
which is the ratio of between-group to within-group sum squares of 0.673, and the canonical 
correlation, which is the degree of association between discriminant scores and group 




known cases that were correctly classified is 87.20 percent. The estimated model classified 
about 63.6 percent of non-project farmers and 96.4 percent of project farmers correctly.  
 









Years of experience in horticultural production 0.481***     
Total number of farm labourers (family, permanent and 
hired) 
-0.56***   
  
Source of irrigation 0.763***     
Discriminant function statistics     
Chi-square   37.8198***   
Wilks’ lambda   0.598   
Canonical correlation   0.634   
Eigenvalue   0.673   
Predicted group membership (percentage in brackets)   
Actual group  Number of cases   1 2 
Non-project 1 22   14 (63.6) 8 (36.4) 
Project 2 56   2 (3.6) 54 (96.4) 
Overall percentage classified  87.20 
***Significant at P ≤ 0.01 
 
Three of the coefficients estimated that the predictor variables were statically significant at 
the 1 percent level. The discriminating variables that strongly account for most of the 
variability between project and non-project farmers, thus making them different, are years of 
experience in horticultural production, the total number of farm labourers (family, permanent 
and hired), and source of irrigation. 
 
From the discriminant analysis above, it is clear that the years of experience in the 
horticultural production variable is important when selecting farmers to participate in 
agricultural projects. This means that years of experience in horticultural production is a key 
variable as the more experienced a farmer is, the more likely the farmer is to succeed in 
agricultural production. When farmers are selected to be part of the Green Scheme 




hence, the majority do not have farming experience that may increase the probability of 
successfully commercialising. 
 
The next most important discriminating variable between project and non-project farmers is 
the presence of alternative farm labour (family, permanent, or hired) systems. Thus, farmers 
with alternative labour systems are unlikely to be project farmers.  
 
Source of irrigation is also an important variable; despite the fact that all farmers have access 
to water, those who obtain irrigation water from the Olushandja Dam have the disadvantage 
of receding water levels in dry months, which affects production.  
 
4.6 The decision of a farmer to participate in agricultural commercialisation: The 
probit model 
Various statistical models to deal with the problem of self-selection are discussed in the 
literature, including those by Tobin (1958) and Heckman (1979). In this study, the decision of 
farmers to participate as a project or non-project farmers was modelled by the probit model. 
The model was used to determine the factors that influenced the probability of farmers’ 
selling and supplying their vegetables to the formal market or not. This model is discussed 
extensively by Finney (1971) and Gill et al. (1986). Although the factors related to the 
propositions of this study are interrelated, this section is more related to Proposition 1 of this 
study as presented in Chapter 1. 
 
The probit regression model is generalised linear regression model of the following form 
(Sweet & Grace-Martin, 2011): 
 
0 1 1 2 2( ) ...Y n nf X X X    = + + + +               (4.6.1) 
 
The major drawback of the linear probability model is the assumption that the conditional 
probability function is linear. Consequently, 1( 1/ ,..., )nP Y X X=  is not restricted to lying 
between 0 and 1 as per the definition of probability. The probability can even be above 1 or 




problem of equation 4.6.1, instead of using ( )Yf Y = as the outcome, a function of the mean 
of Y is used. This function is called the link function.  
 
The logit link function is as follows: 









ln = nn XXXX  ...221100 +++             (4.6.2) 
A probit regression uses an inverse normal link function as follows: 
( )yf  = ( )P1−                          (4.6.3) 
The cumulative normal distribution function  (.) is used in probit regression to model the 
regression function when the dependent variable is binary. We assume that 
0 1 1( / ) ( 1/ )  ( )E Y X P Y X X = = = +              (4.6.4) 
0 1 1X +  in (4.6.2) acts as quantile z where 
 ( ) ( ),  (0,1)z P Z z Z N =    
The probit coefficient 1  in equation 4.6.2 is the change in z associated with a unit change in 
X . The effect of the change in X  on z  is linear and the link between z and the dependent 
variable Y is nonlinear since   is a nonlinear function of X ; in fact, the relationship is 







+          (4.6.5) 











+                   (4.6.6) 
 
4.6.1 Variables in the model and working hypothesis 
In this section, the explanatory variables that are included in the model to estimate the 
decision of a farmer to participate in agricultural commercialisation are discussed. 
 
Dependent variables 
The probit model was used to estimate data collected from 78 small-scale farmers (22 from 
Olushandja and 56 from Etunda irrigation project). Of these farmers, some supply the 




settlements), and other supply the formal markets (retailers, supermarkets, institutional 
buyers (catering and restaurants).  The dependent variable consists of a variable that the 
probability that a farmer participates in the formal market supply chain for vegetables by 
selling to formal markets. This variable assumes 1 for those who participate in the formal 
market supply chain and 0 for those who supply informal markets. Fresh fruit and vegetables 
are high-value crops that are being promoted by the Namibian government with the aim to 
contribute to the incomes of households involved in these activities. These products also can 
be sold directly to formal markets and informal markets. 
 
Independent variables 
The independent (explanatory variables) used in the model are explained below while other 
variables that were explained under section 4.4 will not be repeated in this section. The 
variables explained in section 4.4 are household size, age of head of household, the total 
number of years spent on education, farming experience in horticultural production, the total 
number of farm labourers, source of irrigation, type of employment (full-time farmer), farm 
income per month, farm size, land ownership, distance from farm to the water source, 
distance to major urban market from farm and ownership of a vehicle. These variables were 
also explained in the literature (Bester et al.1999; Hayes et al., 1997;  Lishman & Nieuwoudt, 
2003; Turner et al., 2000). 
 
The type of scheme was presented as a dummy variable, which assumed the value of 1 if a 
farmer is in the project or 0 for non-project. This variable’s impact on commercialisation is 
positive. 
 
Professional training in agriculture was a dummy, assuming a value of 1 if a farmer received 
professional training in agriculture and 0 if not. A farmer that received professional training 
in agriculture is more likely to achieve higher yields and incomes and able to adjust to new 
technologies as they have skills and knowledge in production. Thus professional training is 
likely to influence farmers to commercialise. 
 
The land type was presented as a dummy variable assuming the value of 1 if a household was 
the leasing of customary land and 0 if leasing of state land. The farmers cannot use customary 




available. Thus having customary ownership has a negative impact on access to formal 
markets as farmers cannot invest in the land to improve production. 
 
The type of irrigation was a dummy, assuming a value of 1 if a farmer used drip irrigation 
and 0 if not. Therefore, the type of irrigation is expected to have either a positive or a 




The model was intended to contribute to the answer of Proposition 1 and Objective 2 of the 
study as presented in sections 1.3 and 1.5. Table 4.17 shows the variables hypothesised to 
show the probability of the farmers to supply to the formal or informal markets. A positive or 
negative sign in the model indicates the relationship between dependent and independent 






Table 4.17: Hypothesised relationships between farmers participating in agricultural 
commercialisation 




Dependent variables    
Marketing channel for 
vegetables 
Supplying to Formal market =1, 
informal market=0 
 MRKTCHNEL   
Independent variables    
Type of farm or scheme Type of farm or scheme (project = 1, 
non-project = 0) 
SCHEME + 
Gender of head of household  Gender of head of household (female = 
1, male = 0) 
GENDER + 
Age of head of household Age of head of household (years) AGEHOH + 
Household Size Number of household members HHSZE +/- 
Total number of years spent on 
education 
Total number of years spent on 
education (years) 
EDUYR + 
Professional training in 
agriculture 
Professional training in agriculture (yes 
= 1, no = 0) 
TRAININGP + 
Farming experience in 
horticultural production 
Farming experience in horticultural 
production (years) 
FARMINEXR + 
Farm income per month Amount of income per month 
(Namibian dollar) 
FARRMINC +/- 
Farm size Farm size (hectares) FARMSZ + 
Land type 
 
land type (leasing of customary land = 
1, leasing of state land = 0) 
LNDSIZE + 
Land Ownership  Secure tenure for land (yes = 1, no = 0) TENRLND - 
Total labourer (family, 
permanent, hired) 
Total number of farm labourers (total 




Source of irrigation Irrigation source (canal = 1, other = 0) IRRIGSOUR -/+ 
Type of irrigation Type of irrigation (drip 1, other = 0) IRRTYPE -/+ 
Distance from farm to the 
water source 
Distance to the water source  (km) DISTWS +/- 
Distance to major urban 
market from farm 
Distance to market (km) DISTM - 
Ownership of vehicle Ownership of vehicle (yes = 1, no = 0) OWNVEHCL + 
Membership of any 
community-based association 
Membership of association (yes = 1, no 
= 0) 
ASSOCM -/+ 
Distance from farm to 
extension services 
Distance from farm to extension 
services (km) 
KMEXTN -/+ 
Type of employment (full-time 
farmer) 
Type of employment (fulltime farmer 
yes = 1, other = 0) 
EMPFULTM -/+ 
 
4.6.1 Probit results 
The probit regression model was specified as follows: 
Pr (MRKTCHNEL) = f (SCHEME GENDER AGEHOH HHSZE EDUYR TRAININGP 
FARMINEXR FARRMINC FARMSZ LNDSIZE TENRLND TOTFARMLABR  






Probit analysis as shown in Table 4.18 was used to determine the factors that influenced the 
probability of farmers’ to supply to the formal market. The results show that the chi-square 
value (LR-statistics) for the model is significant at 10 percent level. The McFadden’s R2 
indicates that 39.3 percent of the variance is explained by the independent variables. The 
signs indicate the direction of change in the probability to supply to the formal market with a 
positive sign showing an increase in probability to supply to the formal market while a 
negative sign indicates a decrease in probability.  
 
The ownership of a vehicle was significant at 1 percent probability level while the distance 
from farm to the water source was significant at 10 percent. The type of farm or scheme is 
not statistically significant therefore it can be concluded that whether a farm belongs to the 
project or not, it does not influence their decision as to which market it will supply to. This 
would suggest that the project farms have no greater inclination to produce for formal 
markets than non-project farms. The type of farm or scheme, the gender of head of 
household, type of employment (full-time farmer), farm income per month, farm size, land 
type, land ownership, distance from farm to the water source, distance to major urban market 
from farm and ownership of vehicle had a positive sign, implying that they would increase 
the likelihood for farmers to supply vegetables to the formal market, however, they were not 
statistically significant.  Household size, age of head of household, the total number of years 
spent on education, farming experience in horticultural production, professional training in 
agriculture, the total number of farm labourers, source of irrigation and type of irrigation had 
a negative sign, implying that they were likely to decrease the probability of farmers 





Table 4.18: Probit model summary for estimating likelihood to supply to the formal 
market 
Variable Coefficient Standard error Z-value Pr(>|z|) 95% confidence interval 
Constant -11.87762 353.7363 -0.03 0.973 -705.188 681.4328 
 Type of farm or scheme 2.200727 2.370812 0.93 0.353 -2.44598 6.847434 
Gender of head of household 0.314821 0.6809204 0.46 0.644 -1.019758 1.6494 
Age of head of household -0.0005726 0.0191583 -0.03 0.976 -0.0381223 0.036977 
Household Size -0.1149061 0.0713464 -1.61 0.107 -0.2547425 0.0249304 
Total number of years spent on education -0.1235265 0.0774677 -1.59 0.111 -0.2753605 0.0283075 
Professional training in agriculture -0.009419 0.2192323 -0.04 0.966 -0.4391065 0.4202685 
Type of employment (fulltime farmer) 0.5197518 0.7066095 0.74 0.462 -0.8651773 1.904681 
Farming experience in horticultural production -0.1495457 0.2231114 -0.67 0.502 -3.067357 1.502196 
Farm income per month 0.7698178 1.04494 0.74 0.461 -1.278228 2.817863 
Farm size 0.0299158 0.0415134 0.72 0.471 -0.0514489 0.1112806 
Land type 0.6782835 1.135164 0.6 0.55 -1.546597 2.903164 
Land Ownership 0.7604906 0.998209 0.76 0.446 -1.195963 2.716944 
Total number of farm labourers -0.0006831 0.0274319 -0.02 0.98 -0.0544486 0.0530824 
Source of irrigation -7.226425 353.7026 -0.02 0.984 -700.4709 686.018 
Type of irrigation -0.4194831 0.8038863 -0.52 0.602 -1.995071 1.156105 
Distance from farm to water source 0.3768445 0.2100507 1.79 0.073* -0.0348472 0.7885363 
Distance to major urban market from farm 0.003723 0.0029881 1.25 0.213 -0.0021335 0.0095795 
Ownership of vehicle 1.339249 0.5110994 2.62 0.009*** 0.3375128 2.340986 
Number of observations 78           
LR (model) X2 (23) 34.93           
Prob> X2 0.0529           
McFadden's (Pseudo) R2 0.3933           
Log-likelihood -26.939289           
*Significant at P ≤ 0.1; **significant at P ≤ 0.05; ***significant at P ≤ 0.01 
 
4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, an analysis of the results of the determinants for small-scale vegetable 
producers’ participation in agricultural commercialisation that were relevant to the market, 
state, and community institutions was presented. Household size, age of head of household, 
distance to major urban market from the farm, distance from farm to extension services, 
amount borrowed from Agribank, and farm income per month were found to be statistically 
significant determinants of a farmer’s decision to participate in the commercialisation of 
high-value crops in north-central Namibia. The results showed that farmers participating in 
agricultural commercialisation were moderately educated and had access to production 




farmers were facing the following constraints that discouraged them from participating in the 
high-value crop (vegetable) industry: 
• Lack of land ownership, meaning that land cannot be used as collateral to obtain 
credit from financial institutions. 
• High input costs due to high transport costs associated with the procurement of seeds, 
fertilisers, and pesticides with resulting in high production costs. 
• Limited access to credit facilities. For example, the cropland in the areas is 
customary-owned or state-owned land that cannot be used as collateral to obtain a 
loan from financial institutions. 
• Limited access to supermarkets or retailers due to the poor quality of fresh produce 
and inconsistent demand by supermarkets or retailers. 
• Limited technical production (such as application of fertilisers and pesticides) and 
marketing (such as pricing, cold chain, and processing) information. 
• No viable farmers’ organisation within the community based on international 
principles was found. This resulted in poor cooperation among farmers and confirmed 
that state and market institutions were not aligned with community institutions. 
The presence of these factors means that the vegetable industry is less efficient and less 
competitive in the study area because of the high cost of production and high transaction 
costs as well as negative impacts of climatic change on crop production. These results show a 
need for policy intervention on landownership and improving access to credit for farmers as 
well as encouraging cooperative marketing to reduce the costs of accessing output markets. 
 
The discriminant analysis carried out with respect to the two groups identified three 
explanatory variables that differentiated between these groups: years of experience in 
horticultural production, the total number of farm labourers (family, permanent and hired), 
and source of irrigation. These variables should be considered when selecting farmers in 
high-value commercial activities in north-central Namibia.  
 
In addition, the probit model was also used to estimate the factors that influenced small-scale 
vegetable producers’ participation in agricultural commercialisation. The McFadden’s R2 
indicated that 39 percent of the variance was explained by the independent variables. 
Household size, age of head of household, the total number of years spent on education, 




number of farm labourers, source of irrigation and type of irrigation had a negative sign, 
implying that they were likely to decrease the probability of farmers to supply to the formal 
market. The variables ownership of a vehicle (p=0.009) and distance from farm to the water 
source (p=0.073) were statistically significant. The results with respect to distance from farm 
to water source imply that there is a need to provide water infrastructure such as piped water 
or canal to the farmers to reduce the distance to the water sources to improve the reliability 
and availability of water. This would reduce the cost of pumping water for irrigation and 
improve production efficiency. The type of farm or scheme is not statistically significant 
therefore it can be concluded that whether a farm belongs to the project or not, it does not 
influence their decision as to which market it will supply to. This suggests that the project 
farms have no greater inclination to produce for formal markets than non-project farms. Thus 
production for the formal market as the target of the government support has failed. 
 
Farmers in the study area should consider effective agricultural practices and quality 
standards when producing high-value crops to be globally competitive. Understanding the 
arrangements of market transactions and the role of the government and the community in the 
prevailing policy environment with respect to the commercialisation of the vegetable 





CHAPTER 5: THE DEVELOPMENT OF VEGETABLE ENTERPRISES IN THE 




The government of the Republic of Namibia is responsible for all citizens in the country; 
thus, the support of agricultural development is intended to benefit both commercial and 
communal farmers. The political challenges of alleviating poverty via agricultural activities 
are therefore to increase household food security, create employment and enhance income 
generation of previously disadvantaged communities, meaning that economic empowerment 
favours small-scale farming rather than large-scale farming. Chapter 4, evaluate the 
performance of small-scale vegetable farmers with and without access to government support 
(project farmers) and those with limited government support (non-project farmers).  Thus, 
this chapter presents an assessment of the transaction costs associated with the prevailing 
policy environment, including political, economic, and social factors that are relevant to the 
arrangements of the market, state, and community institutions in the development of small-
scale agriculture. The chapter presents a theoretical discussion, household survey results, and 
information provided during interviews with experts familiar with the horticultural industry 
in Namibia as outlined in Chapter 1. 
 
The study results presented in this chapter provide answers mainly to Objective 3 as 
presented in Chapter 1 and thus can assist in public policy and business strategy formation. 
The results also show whether the vegetable industry is globally competitive or not, 
considering the transaction costs associated with the need for farmers and the government to 
make investments in production and marketing infrastructures as well as social 
embeddedness within the community, which constrain agricultural development. Although 
the factors related to the propositions of this study are interrelated, this chapter focuses more 
on Proposition 2 as presented in Chapter 1. The chapter starts with an assessment of the 
prevailing policy environment and social interaction and cooperation of the community and 
their associated transaction cost characteristics. This is followed by an assessment of market 
transactions and forms of governance structure in the development of the vegetable industry 





5.2 Transaction in the prevailing policy environment 
This section discusses the historical and social factors, macroeconomic forces, and natural 
resources and related policies that have a significant impact on the development of the 
vegetable industry of north-central Namibia with respect to the market, state, and community 
institutions. The section presents multiple approaches to assess the factors that contribute to 
transaction costs associated with the prevailing institutional environment, including 
theoretical discussion, household survey results, and interviews with key informants. For key 
informants, interviews took place in the form of multiple office visits or by means of 
telephone and the internet (e-mails). Respondents included farmers, managers, traders, 
agronomic boards, or government agencies officials.  
 
5.2.1 Prevailing political factors  
Historically, the institutional framework for the development of the Namibian horticultural 
industry with specific reference to vegetable production has been influenced by the country’s 
colonial history from German rule (1884–1915) to South African rule (1915–1990).16 This 
history, together with the country’s natural resources in a fragile environment has 
overwhelmingly influenced the institutional framework and property rights such as 
agricultural land ownership of the Namibian society. For instance, the South African colonial 
administration did everything in its power to support white farmers settling in Namibia and 
paid little attention to the needs of the native black farmers living in native reserves, even in 
areas that were rich in natural resources suitable for crop diversification. 
 
This study found that an increase in investment in the horticultural industry in Namibia with 
the objective to alleviate poverty among poor rural communities was only established after 
 
16 According to Mendelsohn et al. (2006:8), the German administration from 1892 to 1915 focused on attracting 
and establishing German settlers who would be productive and develop the country into being as self-sufficient 
regarding its food needs as possible. As a result, much effort was put into the production of diverse foods 
(vegetables, fruit, butter, milk and meat), experimentation and support for white farmers. German colonial rule 
came to an end in 1915, and South-West Africa became a protectorate of Great Britain, from 1915 to 1920; no 
legislation existed under which land settlement could be carried out during this period (Odendaal, 2005:1). 
According to Mendelsohn et al. (2006:8), South African influences from 1920 to 1990 changed the complexion 
of Namibian agriculture. The country became like a fifth province of South Africa, with its agricultural policies 
tailored to the needs of South Africa. Farmland was used for the resettlement of landless white people from 




1990 when Namibia gained independence from the South African colonial administration. 
Through the Green Scheme Policy (2008), the government has invested in infrastructure (for 
example marketing, communication, and irrigation facilities) and services in support of 
agricultural commercialisation to improve the conditions of mainly black farmers in 
communal areas. The commercialisation of agriculture (e.g. vegetables) in north-central 
Namibia was negatively influenced by poor implementation of the agricultural policy (2015) 
and the Green Scheme Policy (2008). For example, the government spent at least N$110 
million and N$115 million on the construction of the Ongwediva Fresh Produce Hub during 
the period 2011/2012–2013/2014 and the Rundu Fresh Produce Hub during the period 
2011/2012–2013/2015 respectively (Government of the Republic Namibia, 2016). It was 
observed that government services and funding of agricultural activities were inadequately 
decentralised to local or regional authorities and were in many instances costly and 
ineffective. The result is inefficiency due to high bureaucracy costs and in some cases no 
authorisation of funding for the development of the small-scale vegetable industry.  
 
Namibia is a member country of the SACU. As a result, the domestic prices of fresh produce 
are influenced by especially the South African pricing system plus high transport costs of 
inputs. Therefore, in many cases, the prices of fresh produce that are charged by local farmers 
are higher than the prices of imports. However, the infant industry status as provided for 
under SACU arrangements has created a competitive advantage for the vegetable industry to 
grow crops that have potential in the fragile environment of Namibia.  
 
5.2.2 Prevailing economic factors 
Most of the production inputs (such as seeds, fertilisers, and pesticides) are imported from 
South Africa, resulting in high transport costs. Table 5.1 shows that 76 percent of farmers 
travel to a source of production inputs (fertilisers, chemicals, and seeds) about 10 times per 
production season. The table also indicates that 70 percent of project farmers suffer from 







Table 5.1: Farmers’ perceptions of economic factors leading to high transaction costs in 
the vegetable industry 






Percent Number of 
respondents 
Percent Number of 
respondents 
Percent 
Times that you visit 








-From 0 to 10 20 91 39 70 59 76 Moderate 
-More than 10 2 9 17 30 19 24 
Any delays in 
input/material supply 
(yes) 








0 0 56 100 56 72 Unknown 
Number of farmers 
without insurance 
against theft or loss 
21 96 46 82 67 86 Moderate 
Payment for 
irrigation water (yes) 
0 0 56 100 56 72 Low 








Very good 2 9 8 14 10 13 
Good/have adequate 
knowledge or skills 
10 45.5 26 47 36 46 
Satisfactory/know a 
little bit 
10 45.5 22 39 32 41 
 
Barriers experienced by new entrants are especially that the vegetable industry is prone to 
high input costs and lack of knowledge of how and when to apply these inputs. It is further 
constrained by factors such as lack of access to land for agricultural activities, lack of access 
to water for irrigation, lack of availability of skilled labour, and lack of subsidies (Table 5.1).  
 
Specifically, it was observed that the scarcity of productive agricultural land as a result of the 
high cost of acquisition of agricultural land in Namibia made it difficult for potential small-
scale farmers to have ownership of the land that they cultivate. In addition, the cost of leasing 
is high and the high risk of being removed from state property, in many cases to pave the way 
for development initiatives, makes it difficult for many farmers to invest in the land that they 
occupy for agricultural activities. Table 5.1 shows that the land occupied by farmers in the 
study area is state land that is leased to farmers. As a result, this land cannot be used by 




observed that due to limited agricultural production land, the farmers found it difficult to 
expand their crop fields. For example, for the project farmers at Etunda, many of whom farm 
on 3 ha, it is difficult to expand their agricultural land. For non-project producers who farm 
on communal land (Olushandja), many of whom own limited productive agricultural land 
(average 6 ha), expansion of the farms in many cases is impossible because the relatively 
productive land is currently occupied by subsistence farming households who are not active 
in vegetable production.  
 
Moreover, it was observed that the key macroeconomic factors that acted as constraints in the 
development of the Namibian vegetable industry included the low exchange rate of the 
Namibian dollar when compared to other currencies such as the United States of America 
dollar (Figure 5.1), the global financial crisis, the increase in the oil price and the high 
inflation rate of commodity prices. For instance, the average annual inflation rate of about 7 
percent has resulted in high prices for food products when compared to neighbouring 
countries such as South Africa. In addition, Namibia became part of the Common Monetary 
Area in 1992 and issued its currency (Namibian dollar) in 1993, which is pegged to the South 
African Rand. Thus, South Africa has a decisive influence on the exchange rate and both the 
monetary and fiscal policies of Namibia.  
 
This study found that only a handful of research and development projects had been carried 
out by consultants sponsored mainly by the government and to an extent by donor agencies 
with respect to fresh vegetables and fruit (Decosa, 2001; Togarepi et al., 2018). The 
incidence of HIV/AIDS and the associated medical costs among employees also have a 






Figure 5.1: Namibian dollar against GBP, USD, and EUR 
GBP = Great Britain pound, USD = United States of America dollar, and EUR = Euro. 
Source: Bank of Namibia, 2018 
 
5.2.3 Prevailing social factors 
The non-project farmers around the Olushandja Dam and the Calueque-Oshakati Canal were 
made up of Aawambo (Owambo)-speaking farmers who are indigenous to north-central 
Namibia. The farmers selected to participate in the Etunda Irrigation Project were mainly 
from the north-central (Ohangwena, Oshikoto, Oshana, and Omusati) and north-eastern 
(Kavango and Zambezi) regions of Namibia. These farmers’ traditional farming methods 
were similar in many cases; traditionally, they produce under the subsistence farming system.  
 
Table 5.2 shows the perceptions of farmers on the most important factors in selecting them 
for agricultural commercialisation initiatives and the associated level of transaction costs in 





















Table 5.2: Ranking of factors affecting vegetable development initiatives by project and 
non-project farmers 
Factors Non-project n = 22 Project n = 56 Total number of 




Response Ranking Response  Ranking Response  Ranking 
Strong ties to local 
community 
13 (59%) 2 17 (30%) 3 30 (38%) 3 High 
Close political 
connections 
14 (64%) 3 15 (27%) 3 29 (37%) 3 High   
Membership of a 
business association 
9 (41%) 2 17 (30%) 2 26 (33%) 2 Moderate 
Past experience of 
starting a farm 
11 (50%) 2 21 (38%) 2 32 (41%) 2 Moderate 
Information or advice 
from other farmers 
11 (50%) 2 17 (30%) 2 28 (36%) 2 Moderate 
Help from government 
agency 
8 (36%) 2 28 (50) 1 36 (46%) 2 Moderate 
Being a woman 9 (41%) 3 21 (38%) 3 30 (38%) 3 High   
Being a native-born 
citizen 
10 (45%) 3 14 (25%) 3 24 (31%) 3 High 
Specific ethnic or 
language group 
10 (45%) 3 30 (54%) 3 40 (51%) 3 High   
Specific religious 
affiliation 
13 (59%) 3 31 (55%) 2 44 (56%) 3 High   
Note: 1 = helps a little, 2 = helps very much, 3 = makes much more difficult, 4 = makes a 
little more difficult and 5 = do not know. Low (1), moderate (2), and high (3) stand for 
strength of the presence of transaction costs. 
 
A strong tie to the local community is an important factor because culture may set limits to an 
agricultural development economic activity as community values, norms and beliefs take 
long to adjust to external ideas or technologies due to inadequate information and lack of 
trust. This implies that inadequate information about agricultural development initiatives that 
are shared among community members (farmers) results in high transaction costs. High 
transaction costs due to incomplete information are also associated with being a native-born 
citizen, belonging to a specific ethnic or language group, and having a specific religious 
affiliation (it was observed that at least 90 percent of the farmers in the study area were 
Christians). 
 
With respect to close political connections, it was observed that most farmers selected for 




veterans. This took place because of opportunistic behaviours due to incomplete information 
among government officials that was shared with the public. Specifically, information costs 
are high because it is difficult to monitor the hidden agendas of politicians and 
administrators. 
 
Being a woman is important for aligning with the gender equality policies of the government. 
Women suffer from high transaction costs due to inadequate information on the production of 
vegetables and as a result, do not comply with accepted GAP as demanded by retailers and 
supermarkets.  
 
The other factors associated with moderate transaction costs include assistance from a 
government agency and other farmers, the experience of farming, and being a member of a 
business association, which implies that information is shared with farmers to some extent 
although not satisfactorily. 
 
It was also observed that the traditional system of farming for subsistence purposes was not 
conducive to the commercialisation of agriculture in the study area. This is because 
subsistence farming mainly focuses on providing household food security and selling 
surpluses, if any, and as a result does not promote commercial farming and income-
generating activities. Income is rather spent on buying basics such as food and clothes and 
paying school fees and medical expenses.  
 
In many cases, the extended family including grandparents, siblings, adopted children, 
cousins, and so on is the centre of local social organisation. This means that trust is placed 
first in the family and then in community members; those outside the community are trusted 
less or distrusted. Trust is core to new technology transfer and production and marketing 
information dissemination in the commercialisation of agriculture. The lack of trust in 
outsiders who are not part of the community is a big constraint on the development of the 
vegetable industry.  
 
Moreover, an obligation to take care of or whenever possible to employ family members 
irrespective of their background and skills is a big factor undermining the commercialisation 





Table 5.3 shows that the most trusted stakeholders in the study area are other traders in 
informal markets. This implies low transaction costs because the farmers meet the food 
standard as demanded by informal markets and farmers also determine the prices of produce 
(not price takers). 
 
Table 5.3: Ranking of farmers’ trust of vegetable industry stakeholders 
Factors Non-project n = 22 Project n = 56 Total number of 
farmers n = 78 
Presence of 
transaction 
costs Response Ranking Response  Ranking Response  Ranking 
Trust of people from the 
same ethnic or language 
group 
10 (45%) 5 15 (27%) 5 25 (32%) 5 High 
Trust of people from 
other ethnic or language 
groups 
5 (23%) 2 16 (29%) 1 21 (27%) 2 Moderate 
Trust of other farmers 8 (36%) 5 23 (41%) 5 31 (39%) 5 High 
Trust of traders 
(informal) 
7 (32%) 1 17 (30%) 1 24 (31%) 1 Low  
Trust of government 
officials 
8 (36%) 1 21 (38%) 5 29 (37%) 3 Moderate 
Trust of police 11 (50%) 5 21 (38%) 5 32 (41%) 5 High 
Trust of own labourers - Unknown - Unknown - Unknown High 
Note: 1 = very great extent, 5 = very small extent. Low (1), moderate (2 and 3), and high (4 
and 5) stand for strength of presence of transaction costs. 
 
The second most trusted stakeholders by farmers in the study area are people from other 
ethnic or language groups and government officials, associated with moderate transaction 
costs. With respect to other ethnic or language groups, farmers may share information with 
regard to vegetable production and marketing moderately because they believe that these 
people are less serious competitors. With respect to government officials, they are trusted 
more by non-project than project farmers. The lack of trust by project farmers implies that 
farmers, politicians, and administrators behave opportunistically due to information 
asymmetries and principal-agent problems in the development of the vegetable industry in 
north-central Namibia.  
 
The groups of stakeholders that are least trusted are people from the same ethnic or language 
group, other farmers, police or law enforcement officials, and farm labourers. People from 




as competitors in vegetable developmental initiatives, and as a result, incomplete information 
is shared among community members. In addition, it might also imply that there is poor 
social cohesion and networking among farmers because individual farmers want to benefit 
more from government support at the expense of other farmers. With respect to labourers 
(farm workers), transaction costs are expected to be high because it was observed that 
labourers were paid an average wage of N$480 per month, which was about half of the 
approved national minimum wage for farm workers of N$860 per month during the 
2014/2015, and that temporary workers were paid less than N$50 per day. Notably, labourers 
often take advantage of the high cost of measuring their characteristics and performance and 
enforcing a contract and engage in shirking or opportunistic behaviour (Mogues et al., 2012). 
Police are distrusted because, in some cases, during interviews, it was indicated that theft of 
produce was common. 
 
One of the questions that need to be addressed is whether cultural embeddedness can enhance 
the development of agriculture, specifically vegetable production, in north-central Namibia. 
Relationships with neighbouring countries such as Angola show how political, cultural, and 
economic activities are interrelated. For instance, the cultural and political link with Angola 
is important for trading agricultural produce across the border. A similar culture exists in 
northern Namibia and southern Angola, and Angola also supported the ruling party, the South 
West Africa People’s Organisation, in the struggle for Namibian independence. As a result, 
the Namibian government has targeted Angola as the main trading partner (Knutsen, 
2003:575). It was observed in the study that a small quantity of vegetables such as potatoes, 
tomatoes, and onions was traded across the border to relatively large markets in Angola. 
Exports to Angola during 2014/2015 were, however, hindered by customs formalities and 
lack of trust from Angolan traders or agents. As a result, payment for produce is made only in 
cash. Trust among trading partners is important in order to reduce opportunistic behaviour 
and the need to monitor and control the trading partner.  
 
5.2.4 Prevailing consumer concerns  
It is also important to note that the literature reviewed (Fiebiger et al., 2010; Kirsten, 
Dorward et al., 2009; Ortmann & King, 2010) and interviews conducted with experts in the 
horticultural industry have revealed that globally consumers are concerned about the 
environment in which vegetables have been grown and are ready to pay high prices for 




issues, such as environment-friendly products, absence of residue from pesticides, non-
genetically modified products, and organic products, all of which are difficult to measure due 
to moral hazard problems (information asymmetry) at the level of the product itself (see 
Table 5.4).  
 
Table 5.4: Major global consumer concerns 
Consumer concerns The main effect of transaction characteristics 
Food safety (non-genetically modified products) High searching costs 
Organic products High monitoring and searching costs 
Environment-friendly products (no pesticide residuals) High searching and enforcement costs 
Social accountability (fair trade) High searching and enforcement costs 
Traceability High searching costs 
Price of produce High negotiation costs 
 
5.3 Market transaction and forms of governance structures in the development of the 
vegetable industry 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the institutional arrangements depend on the type of governance 
structure (market, hybrid, and hierarchy) through which a transaction is channelled (Menard, 
2017). The four forms of coordination mechanisms identified in the study area are spot 
markets, contractors, wholesalers (hybrids), and commission agents (hybrids). The results of 
the survey with respect to the most used coordination mechanism are presented in Table 5.5. 
However, there is no regulation or policy that obliges farmers to select a specific governance 
structure when selling their produce. It is important to note that farmers in the study area use 
the type of governance structure depending on the level of transaction costs.  
 





Non-project n = 22 Project n = 56 Total n = 78 Ranking 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Spot markets 
(informal) 
13 59 44 79 57 73 1 
Contractors 7 32 14 25 21 27 2 
Commission 
agents 
0 0 5 9 5 6 3 
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 





5.3.1 Spot market-based transactions 
As can be seen from Table 5.5, the spot market arrangement is the most used by farmers to 
sell their vegetables. The spot market-based coordination mechanism is described by Eaton et 
al. (2008:20) as the ‘default’ marketing option for small-scale farmers in rural areas. It was 
found that vegetable farmers in the study area preferred to sell their horticultural produce 
through informal markets, for example on the local open markets, at roadside stalls, within 
the community (local trade), and in urban settlements. The vegetables are mainly sold by 
women, children, or young men to customers. Farmers sell directly to the buyers or informal 
traders such as hawkers and vendors, who are important actors in the trading of fresh 
produce. In informal markets, the prices obtained are generally low when compared to formal 
markets (supermarkets, shops, and petrol station outlets). Nonetheless, small-scale farmers 
prefer the informal marketing channel because they cannot meet the stringent international 
quality standards and, consistently, the quantity demands set by modern supermarkets and 
retailers (Ortmann & King, 2010). In many cases, however, high transaction costs are caused 
by high transport costs experienced by both farmers and traders.  
 
5.3.2 Contractor-based transactions 
Contractor-based transactions in this study referred to marketing arrangements between 
farmers and retailers or supermarkets or institutional buyers such as catering companies and 
restaurants. However, farmers from the study area in many cases do not meet the quality and 
quantity standards of the retailers or supermarkets and as a result, limited vegetables from the 
study area were supplied through this type of market arrangement. The retailers or 
supermarkets in Namibia depend more on vegetable imports from South Africa (in 2017 
vegetable imports stood at 66 percent of domestic consumption [NAB, 2017]). Locally, 
supermarkets also source their vegetables from commercial farmers around the country 
(mainly from the Tsumeb and Mariental districts).  
 
5.3.3 Commission agent-centred transactions 
Commission agent-centred transactions in this study referred to marketing arrangements 
between farmers and commission agents. The commission agents rent the marketing facilities 
of the AMTA trading centre in Ongwediva where the trading parties meet. It is much more 
efficient for traders (agents) to purchase from the farmers at a central locale than to visit 
individual farmers. The farmers must arrange their transport to the marketing hub. The 




the farmers arrive with their vegetables in search of trading partners on the market floor. 
Alternatively, agents search for farmers and negotiate the price of fresh produce and the 
commission for the agents for their efforts in looking for buyers for the farmers’ crops. At the 
time of the study, farmers were limited to only two commission agents at the AMTA trading 
centre in Ongwediva, making it difficult to negotiate and search for trading partners. 
 
Although market agents sell fresh produce on behalf of farmers and charge a mutually 
negotiated commission17 fee based on the gross sale (gross income) of the consignment, the 
farmer still retains full property rights of the vegetables until they are sold. Once the fresh 
produce (fruit or vegetables) is sold, ownership is transferred from producer to buyer. The 
buyers include individual buyers, supermarkets and retailers, and institutional buyers such as 
catering companies. The price formation or discoveries are the main coordinating mechanism 
that guides the actions between farmers and commission agents. In some cases, the price is 
high on the first day and decreases on the second day and so forth, as a result reducing the 
initial agreed-upon total gross income on the fresh produce between the farmers and 
commission agents. In other cases, payment for vegetables from the commission agents to the 
farmers is delayed. This situation has created distrust among small-scale farmers about the 
effective functioning of the commission agent-centred system, especially the Olushandja 
(non-project) farmers as they lack the ability to monitor the agents until payment for their 
vegetables are received.  
 
5.3.4 Wholesale-centred transactions 
The wholesale-centred marketing arrangement in this study referred to the transactions 
between farmers and wholesale agents. In this system, the wholesale agent gains full property 
right of the fresh produce once exchange with the farmers has taken place and retains this 
right until the vegetables are sold. The wholesale agent then sells in bulk or large quantities to 
retailers, supermarkets, and institutional buyers such as catering companies and restaurants. 
The result is less negotiation and lower bargaining transaction costs. However, the farmers 
from the study area did not meet the quality and quantity standards of the wholesale agents 
and as a result, no vegetables were supplied from the study area. The wholesale agents, 
 
17 Currently, all agents using AMTA floor space deduct a total of 12 percent from the value of fresh produce 
sold. Breakdown is as follows: 7 percent goes to the agent(s), 3.6 percent must be paid to AMTA and 1.4 




therefore, depend more on the vegetable supply from commercial farmers around the country 
(mainly from the Tsumeb and Mariental districts) and imports from South Africa.  
 




























Figure 5.2: Farmers, governance structures and information flow for the vegetable 
industry in north-central Namibia 
 
 
5.4 Transaction attributes and governance structures in the vegetable industry 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the three attributes of a transaction that exert a systematic 
influence on economic behaviour in determining the optimal institutional arrangement are the 
frequency with which transactions recur, uncertainty, and the degree of asset specificity 
(Williamson, 1985). The details of the methods of data collection were discussed in chapters 
1 and 2 and will not be repeated here. As transaction costs are difficult to measure, this study 
used the empirical results of the survey and directly observable data to describe and estimate 
transaction costs as well as the theoretical discussion. This section presents the matching of 




investment or lack thereof by farmers and the government. The transaction characteristics 
were assessed following the specific types of asset specificity that were elicited using proxies 
as discussed in Chapter 2. Due to difficulties in measuring transaction costs, several 
transaction attributes of governance structures were not included in Table 5.6 but are rather 
discussed in the succeeding subsections.  
 
Table 5.6 presents the transaction attributes and associated governance structures as reported 
by the project and non-project farmers during the survey. The last column presents the 
presence or strength of transaction attributes in each governance structure as gleaned from 
interviews with several key role players in the vegetable industry. Respondents included 
farmers, managers, traders, agronomic boards and government agencies officials (namely 
from the NAB, AGRIBUSDEV, and AMTA), farmers’ union officials (namely from the 
Namibia National Farmers Union and the Namibia Agricultural Union), OHPA officials, 
Agribank officials, extension officials and other public service officials (especially from the 
Ministry of Land Reform, the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Agriculture), traditional 
leaders, local government officials, and academicians. Interviews took place in the form of 
multiple office visits or by means of telephone and the internet (e-mails). In addition, the 
strength or presence of transaction costs in the last column follows Williamsons’ (1991) 
model whereby low (+), moderate (++), and high (+++) indicate the transaction cost strength 
relative to each governance structure. Notably, the final strength or presence of transaction 







Table 5.6: Matching transaction characteristics and governance structures in the 
vegetable industry 
Asset specificity and governance 
structure 
Number of respondents Presence of 
transaction costs 
Non-project 
n = 22 
Project 
n = 56 
Total 
n = 78 
Total 
(%) 
Physical assets:           
Own a vehicle           
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 
Contractors 6 7 13 17 Moderate 
Spot markets  8 7 15 19 Low 
Commission agents 0 2 2 3 High 
Invest in storage facilities 
    
  
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 
Contractors 5 4 9 12 Moderate 
Spot markets  10 38 48 62 Low 
Commission agents 0 3 3 4 High 
Invest in packing material 
    
  
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0   
Contractors 2 2 4 5 Moderate 
Spot markets  8 20 28 36 Low 
Commission agents 0 2 2 3 High 
Site assets: 
    
  
Secure land tenure 
    
  
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 
Contractors 3 3 6 8 Moderate 
Spot markets  8 35 43 55 Low 
Commission agents 0 0 0 0 High 
Delays in inputs supply 
    
  
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 
Contractors 2 2 4 5 Moderate 
Spot markets  9 27 36 46 Low 
Commission agents 0 4 4 5 High 
Limited access to water 
    
  
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 
Contractors 4 1 5 6 Moderate 
Spot markets  8 6 14 18 Low 
Commission agents 0 0 0 0 High 
Human assets: 
    
  
Horticultural experience of less 
than five years 
    
  
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 
Contractors 1 2 3 4 Moderate 
Spot markets  1 8 9 12 Low 




Horticultural experience of more 
than five years 
    
  
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 
Contractors 4 6 10 13 Moderate 
Spot markets  14 42 56 72 Low 
Commission agents 0 4 4 5 High 
Uncertainty: 
    
  
Contract or agreement with the 
buyer (endogenous) 
    
  
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 
Contractors 2 2 4 5 Moderate 
Spot markets  3 5 8 10 Low 
Commission agents 0 1 1 1 High 
Knowledge of price before selling 
(exogenous) 
    
  
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 
Contractors 1 8 9 12 Moderate 
Spot markets  6 41 47 60 Low 
Commission agents 0 4 4 5 High 
Note: Temporary asset specificity was not measured in Table 5.6, but the assessment was 
done by looking at physical assets invested in by farmers or traders and the government. 
Whether the investments in assets affected the timing of delivery and the value of vegetables 
was also assessed. 
 
5.4.1 Presence of transaction costs in spot market-based governance 
Overall, the transaction attributes and transaction costs of the governance structures of 
vegetable markets in the study area are characterised by low asset specificity, frequency, and 
uncertainty between farmers and buyers in spot (informal) markets when compared to the 
other three modes of organisation. The low frequency implies that farmers have limited 
access to cold storage facilities, making it difficult for transactions to be repeated on 
consecutive days between the trading parties.  
 
With respect to physical asset specificity, most of the respondents (62 percent) indicated that 
they invested more in storage facilities at a farm level while only 36 percent invested in 
packing materials. Only 19 percent of farmers who used the spot market governance structure 
owned vehicles that were used to transport crops to urban centres. Thus, in many cases, high 






With respect to site-specificity, the farmers indicated that they believed that their occupancy 
of land was secure. They also indicated that they experienced delays in input supply such as 
fertilisers and seeds, which are mainly imported from South Africa. This implies high 
transaction costs due to high transport costs. In addition, access to water for irrigation was 
also found to be a major problem for farmers along the Olushandja Dam during the dry 
season (drought years) when the level of water in the dam drops significantly, resulting in 
increased investment in extra pipes and increased fuel costs to pump water up the slope. With 
respect to human asset specificity, while 72 percent of farmers using the spot market 
coordination mechanism indicated that they had at least five years’ experience in vegetable 
production and marketing, this amounts to an average of less than 10 years, confirming that 
horticultural production in north-central Namibia is still in its infancy.   
 
Uncertainty was difficult to measure during the study. Nevertheless, observations and 
interviews with producers and traders revealed key factors highlighting high levels of 
uncertainty with respect to endogenous (behavioural) and exogenous (environmental) factors. 
With respect to endogenous factors, farmers did not sign any contract with buyers so no 
delayed payment was expected. With respect to exogenous factors, manipulation of prices by 
buyers was a big problem according to the farmers, except in cases of lower quality fresh 
produce when buyers negotiated for lower prices.  
 
5.4.2 Presence of transaction costs in contractor-based governance 
The contractor-based market arrangement is the second most used governance structure. 
However, farmers in north-central Namibia struggle to meet the quality and quantity 
standards of retailers and supermarkets; as a result, limited vegetables from the study area 
were supplied through this type of market arrangement. Retailers and supermarkets in 
Namibia depend more on vegetable imports from South Africa.18 Retailers and supermarkets 
also source their vegetables from commercial farmers around the country (mainly from the 
Tsumeb and Mariental districts). Overall, the transaction attributes and transaction costs of 
the governance structures of vegetable markets in the study area are characterised by 
moderate asset specificity, frequency, and uncertainty between farmers and contractors when 
compared to the other three modes of organisation. The details of asset specificity are 
summarised in Table 5.6. Contractor-based transactions overall seem to be characterised by 
 




moderate frequency as farmers do not supply contractors consistently. It was observed that 
trading took place more because of personal relationships and trust between contractors and 
farmers than because of market forces. The level of exogenous uncertainty of transactions 
between contractors and farmers is moderate, possibly because there is a risk of the 
government forcing contractors to buy crops locally before they import. The level of 
endogenous uncertainty is also moderate, possibly because of a lack of trust between 
contractors and farmers, especially with respect to quality standards, consistent supply, and 
lower prices offered to farmers. 
 
5.4.3 Presence of transaction costs in commission agent-centred governance 
Overall, the transaction attributes and transaction costs of the governance structures of 
vegetable markets in the study area are characterised by high asset specificity, frequency, and 
uncertainty between farmers and commission agents when compared to the other three modes 
of organisation. However, it was found that transactions within a particular season could be 
repeated between the trading parties. 
 
With respect to site asset specificity, the land in the area is communal and can be used for 
multiple farming activities. Farmers who acquire land (demarcated crop farmland) in this area 
are investing in an asset that is generally specific to the production of crops. It was observed 
that in the Omusati Region, the area along the Calueque-Oshakati Canal and specifically the 
area around the Olushandja Dam was suitable for vegetable production due to access to 
irrigation water. It was also observed that the climatic conditions allowed the production of 
vegetables that were relatively free from serious crop diseases, pests, and frost found in other 
vegetable-producing areas of Namibia.  
 
With respect to physical assets, the government has invested in physical infrastructure and 
marketing facilities such as the AMTA fresh produce hub in Ongwediva in order to create 
market access for small-scale farmers. The physical marketing infrastructure includes storage 
facilities and packing and floor space, enabling producers to transact with either commission 
or wholesale agents who are renting the facilities. The farmers from the study area, however, 
complained about the high transport cost to the fresh marketing hub, the cost of these 
facilities, and the low prices paid for their fresh produce. As a result, they were hesitant to 




are highly specific and have a low prospect of being used for non-fresh produce outside the 
fresh produce industry. The details of human asset specificity are summarised in Table 5.6. 
 
High exogenous uncertainty exists between commission agents and farmers because there is a 
risk of not sourcing vegetables from the study area and farmers are not producing based on an 
agreed cropping programme or based on GAP. A high level of endogenous uncertainty also 
exists between commission agents and farmers because farmers believe that prices are being 
manipulated even when fluctuations are the result of normal changes in demand and supply. 
This governance structure was also associated with high levels of delayed payments to 
producers by commission agents. In some cases, producers revealed that they received lower 
gross income compared to their initial agreement with the agents, an example of opportunistic 
behaviour by the agents. According to the agents, however, this was a result of their not 
finding buyers in time for the farmers’ vegetables, resulting in price reduction every day until 
the product was sold. In some instances, farmers were called after several days when their 
produce had reached substandard quality levels to collect their products as agents could not 
find buyers. Thus, the commission agent-centred governance structure transactions are 
associated with high levels of withholding important information from the producer by the 
agent. This relationship has resulted in high levels of risk for the farmers and less trust in the 
commission agent-centred governance mechanism. At the time of this study, AMTA officials 
revealed that to reduce risk and encourage farmers to use government fresh produce facilities, 
they bought the vegetables from the farmers, and ownership was transferred to AMTA 
(government). The risk of the product not reaching the buyers is, however, still high as this 
risk is not transferred to the commission agents.  
 
5.4.4 Presence of transaction attributes and wholesale-centred governance 
Wholesale-centred transactions did not take place at the time of this study for targeted 
farmers. However, at the time of the study, a single wholesale agent was identified at the 
AMTA marketing hub in Ongwediva. It was observed that the wholesale agent governance 
structure was associated with a lower level of uncertainty as ownership and the associated 
risk of fresh produce (vegetables) were transferred at the trading post. In cases where 
producers of fresh produce did not meet the required quality standards, they were rejected. 
The wholesale agent prefers to source vegetables from commercial farmers in Namibia or 




the trading post, the prices offered for fresh produce were certain, but the prices were also 
affected by fluctuations between the market forces of supply and demand.  
 
5.5 Estimation of type of transaction costs associated with the governance structure 
The focus in this section is on the type of transaction costs incurred by each type of 
coordination mechanism or governance mode of organisation. Generally, transaction costs 
can be divided into different types.19 These costs are classified by Hobbs (1997) and Staal et 
al., (1997) as follows: search, screening and information costs, negotiation, bargaining and 
transferring costs, and monitoring and enforcement costs.  
 
In Table 5.7, the same methodological approach as in Table 5.6 is illustrated. Since 
transaction costs are difficult to measure, this section presents the presence or strength of 
transaction costs based on a combination of survey data and discussions with experts. 
  
 
19 Hobbs (1997:1083) classifies the components of transaction costs in relation to the transaction: information 
costs as arising before the transaction, negotiation costs as the costs of physically carrying out the 
transactions and monitoring costs as the costs of ensuring that the terms of the transactions are adhered to. 
Building on Coase’s (1937) definition, Staal et al. (1997:782) suggest that transaction costs include the 
following, among others: the costs of searching for partners with whom to exchange, screening potential 
partners to ascertain their trustworthiness, bargaining with potential trading partners (and in some cases 
officials who can hold up trade) to reach an agreement, transferring the product (this typically involves 
transportation, processing, packaging and securing title if necessary), monitoring the agreement to see that its 




Table 5.7: Searching, screening and information costs, negotiation, bargaining and 
transferring costs, and monitoring and enforcement costs and associated governance 
structure 
Transaction costs 






n = 22 
Project 
n = 56 
Total 
n = 78 
Total 
(%) 
Negotiation, bargaining, and transferring 
costs      
Before selling did you know the buyer?           
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 
Contractors 0 2 2 3 Moderate 
Spot markets  9 9 18 23 Low 
Commission agents 0 0 0 0 High 
Searching, screening, and information 
costs       
Do you search for trading partners?        
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 
Contractors 2 2 4 5 High 
Spot markets  3 23 26 33 Low 
Commission agents 0 0 0 0 Moderate 
Do you experience problems with price 
determination?       
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 
Contractors 2 3 5 6 Moderate 
Spot markets  11 25 36 46 Low 
Commission agents 0 2 2 3 High 
Monitoring and enforcement costs       
Do you keep records?       
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 
Contractors 4 7 11 14 Moderate 
Spot markets  13 47 60 77 Low 
Commission agents 0 5 5 6 High 
Have you received training on vegetable 
production?       
Wholesalers 0 0 0 0 Not applicable 
Contractors 4 7 11 14 Moderate 
Spot markets  12 42 54 69 Low 
Commission agents 0 3 3 4 High 
 
5.5.1 Negotiation, bargaining, and transferring costs 
Negotiation and bargaining costs were measured in terms of knowledge of the selling price 
by farmers when selling products through each governance mode of organisation (Table 5.7). 
Only 23 percent indicated that they knew the price when using the spot market and 3 percent 




price takers with less negotiation and bargaining by them. Moreover, it is possible that the 
traders, particularly the contractor-based organisation, do not trust the farmers as they are not 
acquainted with the farmers and the farmers possibly cannot meet the required standards and 
supply produce consistently. Overall, the commission agent-based organisation incurred the 
highest transaction costs based on the assessment of three transaction attributes among the 
market coordination mechanisms in north-central Namibia. 
 
5.5.2 Searching, information, and screening costs 
Searching and information costs were measured in terms of searching for trading partners and 
price-setting (Table 5.7). With respect to searching for trading partners, 33 percent of those 
using the spot market indicated they searched for trading partners while only 5 percent of 
those using contractors searched for trading partners. With respect to price setting, 55 percent 
of farmers indicated that they experienced problems with price setting across all governance 
structures. Those involved in spot market organisation travelled most to the market in search 
of price information. Overall, the contractor-based organisation entailed the highest 
transaction costs as a result of searching and information costs. 
 
5.5.3 Monitoring and enforcement costs 
Monitoring and enforcement costs were measured in terms of whether farmers kept both 
physical and financial records of vegetable enterprises (Table 5.7). Of those who used spot 
market organisation, 77 percent indicated that they kept records. Of those farmers who used 
contractor-based transactions and commission agent-based transactions, only 14 percent and 
5 percent indicated that they kept records of crop production. It was observed that monitoring 
difficulties associated with product quality were a reality as buyers relied on safety 
information provided by farmers, which could not be verified scientifically. This means that 
the contractor-based organisation must rely on farmers for information regarding their 
produce, such as the origin of the produce, how it was produced, whether there was any 
incidence of disease at the time or the use of genetically modified plant materials or seeds. 
This information and other food safety requirements are needed in order to maintain 
consumer confidence. For instance, customers may require assurances from retailers, who 
will require these assurances from farmers. Thus, the traceability of produce along the 
vegetable supply chain is extremely important. More detailed records may be necessary, for 
example physically inspecting the production practices of farms or requiring them to adopt 




The second indicator to measure monitoring and enforcement costs was whether farmers 
were trained in vegetable production (Table 5.7). Of those farmers who used contractor-based 
transactions and commission agent-based transactions, only 14 percent and 5 percent 
indicated that they were trained in vegetable production. This probably implies a lack of a 
crop programme and poor implementation of GAP. For instance, it was observed that no 
proper guidelines were in place to monitor the progress of project farmers and the 
achievements of a service provider (i.e. a contracted commercial farmer who provided 
services to small-scale project farmers). In this respect, the Green Scheme Project is poorly 
implemented, without proper monitoring, evaluation, enforcement, and commitment from the 
state. This leads to delays in services provided to project farmers, such as ploughing and 
input supply (e.g. fertilisers and seeds), as a result of declining gross income and profits as 
well as making it difficult to sign contracts with retailers or supermarkets where consistent 
supply is demanded.  
 
5.6 Summary  
In Namibia, the political challenge of alleviating poverty via agricultural activities is to 
increase household food security, create employment, and enhance income generation of 
previously disadvantaged communities by addressing inequality among citizens. This 
requires a political will that supports and promotes agricultural policies through small-scale 
agriculture. The development of the vegetable industry in north-central Namibia is influenced 
by poor implementation of government regulation with respect to the Green Scheme Policy. 
It is further influenced by factors such as land ownership, access to water, availability of 
skilled labour, access to power (energy), availability of government subsidies, payment of 
taxes, and market failures associated with input and output markets. It was observed that the 
barriers experienced by new entrants were especially that the vegetable industry is prone to 
high input costs, a lack of knowledge, and a low level of support by the government, 
especially of non-project farmers.  
 
Moreover, the study found that vegetable farmers in the study area were not well coordinated 
through, for instance, cropping programmes or planting or contract production and harvesting 
schedules to meet the food safety quality standards of the global market. As a result, 
vegetable farmers are not trained in global GAP and most do not have adequate skills to 
produce certain vegetables of their choice; this makes it hard for them to produce optimally to 




In addition, key macroeconomic factors that cause the Namibian vegetable industry to be less 
competitive include the exchange rate of the Namibian dollar, the effects of inflation on 
commodity prices, changes in the oil price, the influence of the South African economy on 
the Namibian economy and the global financial crisis. It is also important to note that cultural 
embeddedness may set limits to an agricultural development economic activity as community 
values, norms and beliefs take long to adjust to external ideas or technologies due to 
inadequate information and lack of trust of outsiders. Investing in social capital as a resource 
would make it possible to form farmers’ organisations or groups that would enable 
government and other stakeholders to raise awareness, provide training (such as global GAP) 
and implement cropping programmes, which are conditions necessary for the 
commercialisation of the vegetable industry in north-central Namibia. 
 
From the brief overview of the theoretical context given in Chapter 2, one sees that asset 
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency are important parameters for the definition of efficient 
institutional arrangements that aim at minimising transaction costs. The institutional 
arrangements depend on the type of governance structure (market, hybrid, and hierarchy) and 
their associated transaction characteristics. 
 
The main governance structures found in the study area are spot markets, contractors, and 
commission agents. The transaction attributes and transaction costs of the governance 
structures of vegetable markets in the study area are characterised by (1) low asset specificity, 
frequency, and uncertainty between farmers and buyers in spot (informal) markets; (2) 
moderate asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty between farmers and contractors; and 
(3) high asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty between farmers and commission agents 
(hybrid organisation). The results of this study thus stress that farmers in the study area 
experience high transaction costs due to information asymmetries and principal-agent 
problems between farmers and buyers, which result in the vegetable industry’s being less 
efficient or less competitive for both domestic and export markets. As a result, there is a need 
to promote institutional change or innovation that would sustainably improve the linking of 




CHAPTER 6: A MODEL FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
VEGETABLE INDUSTRY IN NORTH-CENTRAL NAMIBIA 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters contribute to empirical studies by showing that several institutional 
issues within the community and its organisation could lead to the failure of agricultural 
development initiatives introduced by the state or the private sector (the market). The 
problem is that most government interventions in the vegetable industry in north-central 
Namibia are not aligned with community institutions, agro-climatic conditions, and market 
realities, resulting in failure of agricultural projects and wasting of taxpayers’ money 
invested, for example, in physical infrastructure. This chapter aims to describe the main 
proposed interrelationship interventions among market, state, and community institutions that 
would promote the development of the vegetable production system in north-central Namibia. 
The chapter relates to Objective 4 of this study as presented in Chapter 1.  
 
The primary concern is with the opportunistic behaviour of individuals or the community as 
collective, government officials, or politicians in the commercialisation of agriculture in 
developing high-value crops. The discussion also focuses on the findings of the study with 
respect to propositions 1 and 2 as presented in Chapter 1, with emphasis on information 
asymmetries and principal-agent problems among actors in the north-central Namibia 
vegetable industry. The chapter aims to contribute to the analysis of the transaction costs of 
market, state, and community institutions in the development of agriculture. The chapter 
describes the model that was designed for the further development of the vegetable industry. 
The chapter ends with a summary. 
 
6.2 Data and information used 
The thematic analysis presented in this section draws on information from discussions with 
farmers and selected key informants and succeeding discussion of the market, state, and 
community institutions in the development of agriculture presented in previous chapters. The 
main proposed interrelationship interventions that would promote the development of the 
vegetable production system with respect to minimising transaction costs in the value chain 
are presented. For example, the sources of information asymmetries from the community are 
traditional leaders and farmers, from market actors are traders and agents, and from the state 




failure, community failure, and state failure and as a result of agricultural development 
failure. The chapter is related to both propositions 1 and 2 of this study as presented in 
Chapter 1. 
 
6.3 Proposed framework for the development of the vegetable industry 
It is important to choose the appropriate coordination mechanisms to minimise transaction 
costs to fully integrate farmers with the market. The approach of assessing the transaction 
costs involved in the interrelationship of the market, state, and community institutions in 
agricultural development shows that there is a need to introduce a vertically integrated 
(backward and forward) firm. A vertically integrated firm minimises transaction costs in a 
crop value chain (Karaan, 1999; McCann, 2013), but this type of coordination mechanism 
was found to be lacking in the vegetable value chain in Namibia. These interventions and the 
introduction of a private company in the vegetable production system are summarised in 
Figure 6.1 below. The challenges and solutions with respect to the model framework in 
improving agricultural development in north-central Namibia’s high-value crop (vegetables) 
value chain are discussed. Understanding the constraining factors in the vegetable production 
system would allow planners and policy-makers to review and implement agricultural 
programmes and projects that would improve the living standards of people and contribute to 
GDP. The focus is on agricultural projects and their contribution to agricultural 
commercialisation, the role of public-private partnerships in agricultural commercialisation, 
and obstacles associated with information asymmetries and principal-agent problems among 






Figure 6.1: A model of the proposed solutions to relationships in the state, market and 
community institutions network 
 
The model in figure 6.1 shows how transaction costs are reduced in the vegetable industry in 
north-central Namibia (see also section 6.4). From the model, it can be deduced that the 
solutions to the relationship between community, market, and state institutions in north-
central Namibia can be discussed as follows: 
• Between the market and community institutions, there are no clearly defined property 




production. Thus, to ensure that a solution that is sustainable for water resources, clear 
property rights including pricing and distribution to the farmers have to be clearly 
defined from the current status where there is no pricing system for water from the 
canal and the dam. Another problem is that the land belongs to the state (communal 
land) and is governed by the customary laws which restrict property rights. The 
solution to this problem is that property rights for land have to be clearly defined to 
allow for a land market which will create land ownership that can be used for 
collateral to allow farmers to access credit for investment and production. The 
government will need to create institutions that will support registration, transfer, and 
administration of property rights to enable farmers to invest in high-value crop 
production. The detail on solutions to customary land in north-central Namibia is 
given in chapter 7. 
 
• Between the state and the community institutions, there is a problem of norms, values, 
and beliefs which have been developed over time which makes transformation and 
adaptation to new ideas and innovations to take long. This can be ameliorated through 
the introduction of innovations and technologies by the state (e.g. high yielding 
varieties, appropriate and locally produced fertilisers, and mechanisation) that are 
compatible and align with the farmers’ norms and values. These innovations and 
technologies should incentivise as well as attract farmers to be willing to transform 
and adapt their practices through employment creation and income generation. The 
government needs to continue building the capacity of farmers so that they are able to 
adjust and adapt to new and changing innovations and technology. More detail on the 
relationship between community and state and agricultural projects are discussed in 
subsection 6.3.1. 
 
• Between the market and the state, the government has and continues to invest in 
physical and marketing infrastructure. However, there is a continued problem of 
access to input and output markets for small-scale farmers. Inputs are mostly imported 
from South Africa, as a result, local small-scale farmers experience high transport 
costs and other high transaction costs as a result of incomplete information among 
agents. The main local output market is Windhoek, the capital city which is located 




imports of high-quality standards from South Africa. The local small-scale farmers 
produced a small quantity of vegetables and experienced high transport costs when 
accessing domestic markets which make them less competitive in the local market. 
The solution to this problem is to introduce a vertically integrated company that will 
operate on contract production. The company will be able to source inputs in large 
quantities and benefit from discounts on volume and reduced transportation costs. 
This will allow local farmers to have access to the output market through the company 
which will have the capacity to supply to both domestic and export markets in large 
quantities as well as meet the required food standards as demanded by retailers and 
supermarkets. However, the government has to play a monitoring role in this 
partnership. The detail on the public-private-farmer partnership is discussed in 
subsection 6.3.4. 
 
6.3.1 Agricultural development projects 
One of the key challenges has been that agricultural projects are identified by politicians and 
traditional leaders and outsiders without aligning them with the agro-ecological realities of 
planting specific crops and considering indigenous knowledge and community institutions 
such as norms, taboos, beliefs, and the organisations that collectively serve the community. 
The communities identify the needs constraining their production, which, however, is not 
done by means of a participatory approach and is dominated by politicians who have their 
interests and political expedience at heart. Thus, some of the solutions proposed for the 
development of agricultural needs are not fit for purpose and often do not consider market 
and agro-ecological realities as well as community institutions. 
 
For instance, the state provides agricultural development projects such as high-value crop 
production (vegetables) to meet farmers’ needs, which sometimes bring with them 
technologies that are not aligned with communities’ prevailing practices. This causes the 
projects to be inaccessible and impossible to use as communities would have to abandon their 
current practices for the new technologies despite not being equipped to use those 
technologies. It was found that at the farm level and in the community at large, information 
was imperfect when obtaining data on crucial environmental, production, and marketing 
issues, such as technical requirements and specifications, and in respect of registration of land 
rights, buying and application of the right inputs (seeds, fertilisers, and chemicals), designing 




and awareness of the community. Only 14 percent of the farmers interviewed indicated that 
they had acquired adequate information on vegetable production. Thus, decisions on project 
implementation and management were made based on incomplete information from 
politicians and powerful social groups and traditional leaders) as well as voters (farmers).   
 
Due to incomplete information, politicians or administrators, traditional leaders, and farmers 
have been behaving opportunistically to accrue benefits for themselves from government 
projects with little or no financial outlay. The agenda of politicians in the projects is to 
become re-elected and to enrich themselves and their families. For example, during the 
period 2013/2018, AMTA senior managers were overpaid with a 27 percent variance above 
the 90th percentile of gazetted remuneration (Immanuel, 2019). In addition, the total salary 
bill of AMTA during 2017 was 61 percent (total expenditure was N$63 million per annum) 
of total expenditure, which is not sustainable for community development initiatives 
(Immanuel, 2019). Owing to information asymmetry and politicians’ self-interest and hidden 
agendas, they continue promising re-evaluation of inefficient projects, such as vegetable 
production, in order to maintain their support base of voters in the area for re-election. In this 
way, politicians promote agricultural initiatives that are not sustainable but that are relevant 
to food security and employment creation. This means that when the politicians and a 
selected few (traditional leaders) in the community identify the participants in rural projects, 
the interventions will not be sustainable as there will be a lack of ownership of these projects.  
 
The perceptions of community members, as gleaned from the interviews with the small-scale 
farmers, were that agricultural projects should be led by the state as the community 
collectively and individual members have no property rights. For example, the farming units 
in the Etunda Irrigation Project are state land that is leased to farmers on a contract basis and 
the contract has to be renewed after five years. This means that farmers do not have any 
property rights with respect to the agricultural land and thus invest less in their farming 
operations. The use and management of resources related to Green Scheme projects are 
entrusted to the government agency (AGRIBUSDEV). As a result, one can conclude that 
these projects lack collective interest, which results in inefficiency of projects. This implies 
that graduating farmers should have access to land with property rights in order to be able to 
invest in production. Therefore there is a need to have a policy that enables farmers to have 
property rights to land in communal areas. The details on customary land rights are discussed 




Table 6.1 shows how projects are currently identified in north-central Namibia and their main 
challenges and proposed solutions. It is important to note that when the community’s 
agricultural needs are identified, the process should be inclusive and participatory in order to 
come up with interventions that are fit for purpose and serve everyone. In the event of a new 
intervention being decided on, the community should receive training to capacitate it and the 
intervention should be aligned with the traditional practices that are being used and the agro-
ecological realities of the area. 
 
Table 6.1: Agricultural project identification, concerns, and possible solutions 
Agricultural project 
identification issues 
Concerns Proposed solutions Confirmation of 
inadequate 
information n = 78 
The project identified by 
politicians and traditional 
leaders 
The project not aligned 
with markets, agro-
ecological realities, and 
community institutions  
Project to be identified by 
communities and their 
organisation in a 
participatory manner 
Unknown 
Government project with 
new technologies not 
aligned with farmers’ 
indigenous knowledge 
Farmers forced to abandon 
their existing farming 
practices and cannot use 
new technologies 
Information to and training 
of farmers should allow a 
combination of new 





n = 67 (86%) in 
2014/2015 
Farmers perceive the 
agricultural project as 
government projects 
Farmers do not have 
property rights to 
agricultural projects 
Community or farmers 
should own the project 
Leasing in Etunda 
project n = 80 
(100%) in 2014/2015 
 
Moreover, a lack of collective action means that there is reduced community participation 
and that project management and leadership are left to project leaders. The project leaders are 
also inexperienced in vegetable production and therefore invest major resources such as time 
and energy in order to oversee the success of the project. Project leaders are also captured by 
politicians and work in the best interest of politicians who wish to maintain support. Thus, the 
role of community members in managing agricultural projects in north-central Namibia is 
almost non-existent, as a result constraining the commercialisation of agriculture in rural 
areas.  There is a need to remove bureaucracy in the management of agricultural projects. The 
project management will need to invest in corporate social responsibility such as training of 
the farmers in the surroundings to build trust. 
 
The successful implementation of agricultural projects such as the development of the 
vegetable industry would also depend on aligning community institutions (norms, values, 
beliefs, and taboos) with agricultural initiatives and associated new technologies to minimise 




should perceive the project as their own in order to avoid public resource wastage and 
physical and marketing infrastructures’ being white elephants. Thus, the successful 
implementation of agricultural projects depends on effective evaluation (Figure 6.2) and 
monitoring systems (Section 6.3.2). Currently, the process of evaluation is lacking in 
agricultural commercialisation initiatives in north-central Namibia. An extensive literature on 
evaluation processes in agricultural development exists, including the works of Jacobs (1988) 
and Rodriguez-Campos (2020). Figure 6.2 presents a general evaluation of the Etunda 
Irrigation Project for the periods 2014/2015 and 2016/2017. The background of this project 
was discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.3. 
 
Figure 6.2: Application of evaluation process to Etunda Irrigation Project 




6.3.2 Monitoring and incentive compatibility problems of agricultural projects 
Notably, incentive compatibility problems are prevalent between the farmers and the 
government agency (AGRIBUSDEV) entrusted with overseeing the management of the 
Etunda Irrigation Project. For example, because of adverse selection by government officials 
or project administrators, the selection of beneficiaries into the project is reported to be 
skewed towards politically well-connected individuals, family members and friends, and war 
veterans. As a result, the monitoring processes of the project are compromised and it is 
difficult to impose penalties for non-performance of farmers in the project. The selection 
process of the farmers to be part of the project has to be done in a transparent manner in 
which an independent body oversees the process.  
 
It was found that 86 percent of farmers from the Etunda Project blamed their crop failure on 
the high cost of production. While some farmers had a genuine case to argue, others had 
hidden agendas because of incentives for participating in the project as they wanted to 
continue to benefit from subsidies offered by the government. For instance, during the study, 
it was observed that irretrievable investment in physical infrastructure, such as irrigation 
systems, tractors and houses, and inputs were covered by the government for project farmers. 
These were incentives enjoyed by project farmers that discouraged them from graduating into 
private farmers. Opportunistic behaviour takes place because of moral hazard by farmers that 
cannot be proved by government officials or project administrators. Shirking and free-riding 
problems result in high transaction costs due to information asymmetry, which is a big 
constraint on the development of the vegetable industry. The government subsidies for the 
project beneficiaries have to be gradually reduced after the first production so that farmers 
prepare to stand on their own.    
 
It was found that there were no proper guidelines in place to monitor the progress of project 
farmers and the achievements of a service provider20 (i.e. a contracted commercial farmer 
who provides services to small-scale project farmers). In this respect, the Green Scheme 
Project is poorly implemented, without proper monitoring, evaluation, enforcement, and 
commitment from the state. This leads to delays in services provided to project farmers, such 
as ploughing and input supply (e.g. fertilisers and seeds), as a result of declining gross 
 
20 This means that a more information-rich commercial farmer shares his or her insights into farming business 
transactions on a continuing basis with a less well-off small-scale farmer who is only partly integrated into 




income and profits as well as making it difficult to sign contracts with retailers or 
supermarkets where consistent supply is demanded.  
 
Monitoring difficulties associated with produce quality are a reality as buyers rely on safety 
information provided by farmers, which cannot be verified scientifically. This means that 
supermarkets, retailers, and traders must rely on farmers for information regarding the 
produce, such as the origin of the produce, how it was produced, whether there was any 
incidence of disease at the time or use of genetically modified plant materials or seeds. This 
information and other food safety requirements are needed in order to maintain consumer 
confidence. For instance, when selling formally, retailers may require assurances from 
wholesalers, who will require these assurances from farmers. Thus, the traceability of 
produce along the vegetable supply chain is extremely important. More detailed records may 
be necessary, for example physically inspecting the production practices of farms or requiring 
farmers to adopt certain production practices such as global GAP.  
 
The transaction costs associated with monitoring activities in the vegetable supply chain are 
significantly high. These costs include the costs of auditing, produce inspection, and 
investment in monitoring devices. Therefore, the high cost of monitoring government 
activities and individual farmers is a factor that constrains the production and marketing of 
vegetables. Institutional arrangements to monitor government activities and farmers’ progress 
regarding agricultural projects should thus be put in place. An example would be creating 
internal motivation through competition among farmers and rewarding the best farmers. This 
would force individuals to practice and enhance self-monitoring and monitoring of others on 
what they are doing. However, this might involve significant monitoring costs. The 
alternative would be to employ a monitor for the project, which would also be expensive. 
 
6.3.3 Enforcement and commitment problems in the study area 
In north-central Namibia, like in many other rural communities, traditional institutions (such 
as norms, taboos, and beliefs) have been known to regulate individuals’ behaviour and the 
provision of public goods by allowing individuals within a community to work together in 
solidarity. Yet, from the community perspective, incomplete information is associated with 
problems of cooperation and commitment, causing free-riding and shirking, which undermine 
collective efforts of providing public goods. For example, government (extension) officials in 




ones who were targeted for the programme. This happens because of free-riding as no one is 
excluded from benefiting from the use of public resources such as subsidised tractor services 
for independent farmers around the Olushandja Dam. There is a need to categorise the 
beneficiaries into smaller groups that are easy to manage in the distribution of public goods 
such as subsidised tractor services.   
 
Owing to the high transaction cost associated with enforcement of rules at formal government 
institutions such as courts, most disputes or criminal cases are handled at the community 
level as no serious cases were reported during the interviews with the farmers. In addition, 
formal government institutions, such as courts to resolve disputes, are located far away from 
the project area, the nearest one being about 40 km away in Outapi, the administrative town 
in the region. With regard to farmers in the Etunda Irrigation Project, the enforcement of 
rules against transgressors is vested in AGRIBUSDEV as a leader in decision-making 
processes and individual cases such as theft of property are normally reported and handled by 
law enforcement (police).  
 
Moreover, ownership of projects by the government increases the incentive to cheat and steal 
state property from farmers and community members. In the case of the management of the 
Etunda Irrigation Project, a security company was appointed to guard the government 
property in the project. Because this was found to be costly, the security guards were mainly 
deployed in strategic places such as the main entrance to the project. The possibility of 
bribing individual guards is high since most security guards are paid low salaries (on average 
N$2 500 per month during the period 2016/2017).  
 
The interviews with the farmers revealed that the theft of vegetables while still on the field 
was more common with farmers around the Olushandja Dam. Communities can use 
community networking to report rule-breakers, who will be punished by traditional courts if 
found guilty. Since it is difficult to monitor the amount of effort and care that community 
members will exercise, even with effective institutional arrangements within the community, 
the costs of monitoring cannot be avoided completely, unless individuals regard the farming 
units of others as theirs. In this case, the community can also fail to reduce theft completely 
when farming units are considered as privately owned, such as with the experience of 





It was found that for the non-project farmers around the Olushandja Dam, enforcement 
against transgressors was sometimes handled by traditional authorities, for example in the 
case of land disputes, and sometimes by law enforcement (police), for example when the theft 
was reported. However, it is important to note that private individuals might opt to approach 
government institutions, such as a court, for dispute resolution. Enforcement costs are 
expected to be high when formal judicial processes are followed, such as courts to try 
transgressors. It is natural to expect government institutions to be more costly than collective 
procedures at the community level to try transgressors. The problem with solving disputes at 
the community level is that bodies at the village level may settle disputes in favour of the 
traditional leaders, or politicians or the communal body itself may be composed of more 
powerful members of the community who promote their interest (De Janvry et al., 2010), a 
situation that demands a monitoring and evaluation programme for agricultural projects in 
rural areas.  
 
6.3.4 Proposed public-private-farmer partnership 
The public-private partnership is a long-term strategic intervention that will be implemented 
over a period of 10 years. It is expected that an independent vertically integrated (backward 
and forward) firm will manage the production, marketing, and processing of fresh vegetables 
in the study area (Figure 6.3). The government is expected to continue to provide the 
company with production and marketing infrastructure and policy guidelines. The 
constructed physical and marketing infrastructure will remain government property. A 
memorandum of understanding should spell out the conditions for how the public-private-
farmer partnership would function, including precautions against business and physical risks 
as well as the allocation of shares among partners. For instance, the farmers, the government, 
and the company that runs the operations on a contractual basis should all share in the profit 
made. The proposed distribution of shares is 50 percent to the private company, 35 percent to 







Figure 6.3: A model of the firm-government-farmer relationship 
Source: Adapted by the author from Figure 6.1 
 
The vertically integrated (backward and forward) firm to be introduced will coordinate small-
scale vegetable farmers with regard to input and output markets through contract21 
production, as a result correcting the market failures experienced by high-value crop farmers. 
The contract will be renewed at least yearly, and a memorandum of understanding will be 
signed by all parties as the code of practice (agreement). The company is expected to provide 
expertise in vegetable production and marketing that would minimise the high transaction 
costs in the supply chain as well as reduce the costs associated with research and product 
development. Such expertise in turn is expected to be transferred to local farmers, as a result 
enhancing the development of the vegetable industry. The criteria to select farmers for the 
commercialisation of agriculture programmes should include performance (experience with 
 




crop production), availability of productive land, availability of irrigation water, and 
availability of experienced/skilled labour (growing, scouting, grading, and so on). 
 
The vertically integrated firm (a public-private partnership) will also design cropping 
programmes (crop calendar) and train farmers in global GAP. Awareness of the importance 
of global GAP among farmers will be a key factor in enhancing the competitiveness of the 
vegetable industry. The cropping programme will involve identifying the vegetables to be 
produced and scheduling or staggering production to avoid a glut on the market. Training will 
be provided free of charge by the company to farmers22 and some of their labourers. During 
training, proper planting techniques, spraying methods, fertiliser applications, and so on 
should be demonstrated, especially to new entrants.  
 
The company, among others, will pre-finance production inputs (seeds, fertilisers, and 
pesticides [the latter only when needed]) and supply marked crates for traceability purposes. 
The farmers will be responsible for other input costs, including labour, fuel, ploughing 
implements, and transport costs. The contract with respect to the cropping programme (crop 
calendar) should be crop-specific, taking into consideration the time from planting to 
harvesting. The high-quality fresh produce will be sold through the company to retailers or 
supermarkets. The farmers will pay for pre-financed inputs only after they have sold their 
high-value crops. During the rainy season, some farmers might fear planting – as they should 
– because there is a risk of heavy rains (floods) washing the seeds or seedlings away. In such 
cases, the farmers will have to inform the company immediately so that alternatives (for 
example imports) can be considered as the company would already have secured domestic or 
foreign buyers. The company field officers will also be responsible for monitoring and 
supervising the entire production process. The company field officers who inspect the crops 
and supervise the application of fertilisers and chemical spraying should also be entrusted 
with the recruitment of new farmers and extension of contracts with existing farmers. 
 
In the case of natural calamities, the company field staff will assess the extent to which loss 
has been incurred by each farmer. In this case, the government will be responsible for 
assisting farmers through social welfare programmes such as the disaster management 
programme. As a result, the risk will be shared between the farmers and the company and no 
 
22 If possible, farmers who can read and write, preferably with an education level of Grade 10, and have at least 




refund will be required for pre-financed inputs from the farmers. However, in cases where a 
farmer did not break even owing to the neglect of the crop, such as not irrigating as required, 
the farmer should bear all the costs and the company will not be held responsible. In the case 
of an outbreak of epidemics or pests, which requires emergency spraying or fertilisers, the 
company should cover the additional costs incurred. The reason for this is that before signing 
the contract, the farmers will be given estimates about inputs and outputs and will thus be 
able to determine their approximate gross income and profits. 
 
6.3.5 Information asymmetries and principal-agent problems among market, state, and 
community institutions 
The arrangement of the market, state, and community institutions is especially influenced by 
information asymmetries and principal-agent problems in the development of the vegetable 
industry in north-central Namibia. Figure 6.4 shows the background information exchange on 
arrangements of the market, state, and community institutions as gleaned from the vegetable 
production system in north-central Namibia. Figure 6.4 was adapted from the framework in 
Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.4: A model of the key relationships in the state, market and community 
institutions network 
 
Interventions for the development of the vegetable production system should include how 




• Between community and state: It is important to note that tacit knowledge matters in 
the process of agricultural commercialisation because farmers possess indigenous 
knowledge with regard to environmental and historical trends as well as social and 
institutional factors. Important information about local conditions such as climate 
(temperature, rainfall, floods, and droughts), poor soil fertility, culture, and 
community needs that are constraining the commercialisation of agriculture should be 
shared among the actors in agricultural development. For instance, the study found 
that rain-fed vegetable production was impossible in the study area because of erratic 
rainfall, with an average ranging from 350 mm to 500 mm in the region (DEA, 2002). 
Climate change is inevitable; droughts have been frequent, and intensity has increased 
in the study area, impacting water availability. Successive drought years have been 
reported to lower the water level of the Olushandja Dam, thereby affecting farmers 
who rely on irrigation water from the dam. This leads to high pumping costs (fuel) 
and high installation costs of extra pipes that as a result forced about 25 percent of 
farmers out of production during the 2014 drought spell. One, therefore, has to take 
into consideration that climate change (which causes droughts and extreme 
temperatures) constrains vegetable production. Therefore, there is a need to provide 
piped water or canal water closer to the farmers’ fields to ensure continuous and 
sustainable crop production.  
 
• Between community and market institutions: Farmers bring with them their socio-
cultural beliefs and norms, which make it difficult for them to accept certain practices 
that would improve their productivity. Their socio-cultural background, for example, 
is not linked to the formalised input market. It is suggested that farmers be trained and 
capacitated in the use of GAP and that the use of organic fertilisers is encouraged 
rather than being regarded as inferior. Information shared with farmers should enable 
them to access input, output, and credit markets. In addition, the development of 
agriculture and hence commercialisation, in this case in north-central Namibia, is 
constrained by poorly defined property rights and the high transaction costs associated 
with small-scale crop production and marketing. Thus, agricultural land and water 
rights or markets should be well defined in order to enhance commercial production. 
There is also a need to enforce the buying of local products by retailers or 




• Between state and market institutions: In Namibia, most developmental agricultural 
projects, such as vegetable production, have failed to achieve the desired results. This 
problem has been exacerbated by inefficient agricultural policy, which has failed to 
respond to information asymmetries and agency problems from actors (farmers and 
politicians) and administrators of the projects. The Namibian government also 
intervened by establishing market access for small-scale farmers in the country, but 
these interventions are not aligned with community norms and values and the 
organisation that collectively serves the community (the OHPA). For instance, the 
inadequate information shared with farmers does not enable them to meet the 
stringent requirements for fresh and processed food products as set by retailers and 
supermarkets who demand consistent quantity, high quality, food safety, timely 
deliveries, a certain size, and type of product and so on. The result is that farmers end 
up not using marketing hubs such as that of AMTA, thereby creating the impression 
that there is no market for the farmers despite the availability of market infrastructure. 
Thus, farmers could be organised into cooperatives in order to reduce the transport 
cost to output markets.  
 
6.4 Summary  
In order to enhance the commercialisation of agriculture in north-central Namibia, a model 
was developed. This model was designed considering that several institutional issues within 
the community and its organisation could lead to the failure of agricultural development 
initiatives introduced by the state and market institutions. The model introduced public-
private partnerships as a policy instrument linking small-scale farmers to input and output 
markets through contract production. The aim is to implement a vertically integrated system 
that minimises transaction costs in the vegetable supply chain as discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
This chapter also discussed the main problems of not aligning community institutions and 
their organisation with market realities and agro-ecological factors as these constrain the 
development of agricultural projects (vegetable production) in the rural areas of Namibia. 
The research results revealed that information asymmetries and principal-agent problems 
inhibited the development of agricultural projects in north-central Namibia, mainly because 
of the opportunistic behaviour of administrators (politicians), traditional leaders, farmers, and 
other market actors who want to benefit from government programmes at a limited cost. In 




programme to monitor the extent to which these projects have succeeded or failed. This is 
necessary to reduce the wastage of taxpayers’ money on unsuccessful agricultural projects. 
 
From the results of this study, one can conclude that lack of land ownership among small-
scale potential commercial farmers is one of the key factors that inhibit agricultural 
commercialisation in north-central Namibia. Thus, it is important to understand and propose 
strategic policy reforms of the customary land tenure system in Namibia that will promote the 





CHAPTER 7: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE 
SYSTEM ON THE SMALL-SCALE VEGETABLE COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES 
IN NORTH-CENTRAL NAMIBIA 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The prevailing customary land tenure system in north-central Namibia was found in the 
previous chapters to impede the development of small-scale high-value crop production. The 
land tenure system in Namibia is divided according to three different categories of land, 
namely freehold title whereby land is privately owned, leasehold23 whereby land is allocated 
by the government through the resettlement programme to previously disadvantaged 
communities, and the customary land tenure system whereby all land used by the indigenous 
Namibian communities falls under the authority of traditional chiefs in communal areas. 
However, the ultimate customary land tenure authority is vested in the government, which 
holds all communal land in trust for the indigenous people. In practice, commercial markets 
are allowed in freehold land and not allowed in customary tenure systems. This chapter 
focuses on the customary tenure system and associated agricultural development, especially 
how it impedes the commercialisation of agriculture in north-central Namibia.  
 
Land reform in Namibia has been devoted to redistributing commercial land mainly from 
white farmers to previously disadvantaged Namibians (mainly black farmers) since 
independence in 1990 for disadvantaged individuals to be resettled as farmers. In contrast, the 
land reform in communal areas under customary land tenure has received little attention 
during colonialism and post-colonialism in terms of commercialising agriculture under the 
customary tenure system. As a result, small-scale crop farmers in communal areas of 
Namibia are farming with limited investments to enhance agricultural commercialisation. 
Customary tenure in Namibia is therefore over-reliant on state and community institutional 
arrangements with limited roles of market institutions. This situation according to Hayami 
(1988) would lead to inefficiency and increase inequality in the overall socio-economic 
welfare of the people. Thus, Namibia needs a land policy that provides a clear position on the 
customary tenure system to promote the economic opportunities and social reform of rural 
farmers.  
 
23 Leasehold rights are defined as individual rights that are in effect for a defined period of time and 




The chapter relates to Objective 5 of this study as presented in Chapter 1. The chapter 
reviews the process of land reform in communal areas and suggests amendments to the 
Communal Land Reform Act No. 5 of 2002 to include articles that promote economic 
opportunities for small-scale farmers such as those specialising in vegetable production. It is 
also important to point out deficiencies in the approaches of government policy-makers and 
other development practitioners to land reform in communal areas of Namibia. The 
discussion also focuses on the findings of the study with respect to Proposition 2 as presented 
in Chapter 1, with emphasis on information asymmetries and principal-agent problems, 
especially among traditional leaders and politicians, in the allocation of land under the 
customary land tenure system in sub-Saharan Africa and north-central Namibia in particular.  
 
Certainly, this chapter is relevant to alleviating poverty and improving household food 
security through agricultural income-generating activities. The starting point is a brief 
discussion of customary land tenure in sub-Saharan Africa. This is followed by an overview 
of land tenure systems in Namibia with an emphasis on the customary tenure system. A 
discussion of the suggested improvements in customary tenure in Namibia to promote 
agricultural commercialisation activities in communal areas will follow.  
 
7.2 Data and information used 
In chapters 4, 5, and 6, land ownership in communal areas of north-central Namibia was 
identified as one of the key factors impeding the commercialisation of agriculture. This is 
mainly because agricultural land in rural areas is allocated, registered, and administered under 
customary tenure systems that prohibit land sales and limit land rentals. As a result, farmers 
cannot use their land as collateral to obtain credit from financial institutions. To explain the 
implications of and to suggest policy options for the customary tenure system in Namibia, 
this chapter reviews the customary tenure systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Both published and 
unpublished sources are considered in this chapter. Other methodological procedures were 
described in Chapter 1 and will not be repeated here.  
 
7.3 Customary land tenure systems in sub-Saharan Africa 
One of the most important factors in sustainable economic development is a supportive 
institutional environment, which is at Level 2 of Williamson’s (2000) social analysis. Most 
parts of sub-Saharan Africa are characterised by abundant land; however, scarcity of 




Heady & Jayne, 2014; Holden & Otsuka, 2014). However, a new study by Jayne et al., 
(2016) highlights the increasing prevalence of medium-sized farms, as the regional 
population grows and demand for land increases. The region is vulnerable to land scarcity 
problems because of its heavy dependence on agriculture for livelihood for most of its 
population (Tione & Holden, 2019:1). The global land issues relate to the alleviation of 
poverty, social inclusion, stability, investments, economic development, environmental 
protection, and natural resources management (Enemark et al., 2015: 7).  
 
Land tenure reform is defined in different ways in the literature. Adams et al. (1999) refer to 
land tenure reform as a planned change in terms and conditions, for example, the adjustment 
of the terms of contracts between land-owners and tenants or the conversion of more informal 
tenancy into formal property rights. Land tenure reform is also defined as the allocation and 
security of land rights through legal cadastral surveying, land transfers, and the management 
of boundary disputes (Enemark, 2005). Traditionally, in Africa, customary institutions are 
relevant in providing tenure security high enough to encourage investment (Deininger et al., 
2017:78). However, in recent years, both land rental and sales markets have been emerging in 
sub-Saharan Africa in response to population pressure, which in principle leads to 
reallocation of land from land-rich to land-poor households (Holden & Otsuka, 2014:91). 
Thus, there is a need for explicit policy actions to address the unique agricultural 
development challenges in densely populated rural areas (Jayne et al., 2014).  
 
It is estimated that approximately two-thirds of about 2.2 billion hectares of all cultivated 
land in sub-Saharan Africa is under customary tenure (Wily, 2011:468). The terms 
‘customary tenure’ or ‘community-based tenure’ means collectively owned land under the 
authority of traditional leadership (Chimhowu, 2019; Hull et al., 2019; Wily, 2011). 
Customary tenure is a set of traditional rights, rules, and norms that governs community 
allocation, use, access, and transfer of land and other natural resources (Freudenberger, 
2013). Given these definitions, customary tenure is embedded in social relationships 
(Cousins, 2007; Lavigne Delville, 2007). For instance, in most sub-Saharan African 
countries, customary land is governed under different forms of customary tenure systems by 
well-intentioned social and cultural rules or norms meant to grant equal access to families 
within groups with a common interest in land (Yaro, 2010:119). In practice, the customary 




the communally accepted rules that define access to land and land use rights and interests 
(FAO, 2002b).  
 
Customary tenure is not exclusively communal, but the communal paradigm remains in land 
policies and legislation of customary land tenure systems in most African countries (Banda, 
2011; Cotula, 2007). The communal land system is more associated with colonial influences 
while emphasising that landholding is regulated by traditional leaders using local institutions, 
based on customary norms and practices (Chitonge et al., 2017: 83). As a result, customary 
tenure systems draw their legitimacy from traditional practices and they are also affected by 
colonial and postcolonial influences (Cotula, 2007; Hull et al., 2019). Possibly, this means a 
dilution of the power and authority of traditional authorities and an extension of state power 
by statutory laws into a realm that has largely remained governed via local institutions 
including rules and norms (Chimhowu, 2019:900). Regrettably, customary authorities can be 
as corrupt, unfair, and partial as any other authority. For example, rural communities often do 
not protect the rights of minorities, women and the underprivileged, and powerful traditional 
leaders (chiefs) and politicians with vested interests may dominate the decision-making 
processes (Freudenberger, 2013). 
 
Customary tenure can be divided into the holding and the commons (Adams et al., 1999; Hull 
et al., 2019). The former refers to land occupied and used exclusively by individuals or 
households for residential, farming, or other activities while the latter is land shared by 
multiple users for grazing and gathering. Customary tenure systems are not only powerful 
forces in resource management but they can also be highly responsive to political, economic, 
social, technological, legal, and environmental changes in the world around them. For 
instance, adaptations take place in response to an increase in population growth, market 
forces of demand and supply, conflicts as well as political and climate changes 
(Freudenberger, 2013; Holden & Otsuka, 2014). Notably, the basis for the rejection of 
customary tenure systems is the idea that common property leads to unsound economic and 
environmental practices (Yaro, 2010:201-202). However, customary or communal tenure is 
the only check against landlessness among the poor households in the African rural areas; a 
pro-poor land policy should, therefore, strengthen customary rights to land (Chimhowu & 





It is important to differentiate between customary law and statutory law. The former refers to 
the rules about land made by communities while the latter refers to laws made at the national 
level to protect private properties by the government through parliaments (Wily, 2011). As a 
result of modern (colonial and postcolonial) administrations, especially sub-Saharan Africa 
has found it appropriate to rule that only land that is used for housing and farming can be 
eligible for being designated as property. The primary objective was to enable governments 
to declare land that was neither cleared nor farmed as unowned and therefore by default the 
property of the state and to enable governments to dispose of such land at will. As a result, 
governments, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, consider themselves as the de jure or de facto 
owner of the customary lands (Chimhowu, 2019; Hull et al., 2019).  
 
The losses in customary lands occur through the state’s reallocation of land for other 
purposes or to private persons (normally rich people) seeking large areas of land of their own, 
often for industrial agriculture or private commercial agriculture (Chimhowu, 2019; Chitonge 
et al., 2017). Under legal pluralism, people frequently observe customary and/or statutory law 
as the need commands (Cotula, 2007), giving rise to a continuum of various combinations of 
customary and statutory laws (Hull et al., 2019). As a result, modifications of the customary 
land tenure systems are viewed through various lenses by different stakeholders, with 
capitalists welcoming the positive aspects with respect to production and communitarianism 
very much, pointing to the negative concerns of inequality and landlessness (Atwood, 1990; 
Yaro, 2010).  
 
Under true reform in a customary tenure-rich region such as sub-Saharan Africa, rights that 
are derived both from customary systems and from statutory land tenure should be 
considered. This means that customary systems may allocate land rights among different 
users, but the state may at the same time allocate land rights and responsibilities to resources 
in the world around the users (Freudenberger, 2013). For example, in Malawi, the 
government instituted a legal framework that allowed households to trade their private or 
customary land following proper guidelines for land-use changes compared to most other 
Africa countries that completely prohibit land market activities (Tione & Holden, 2019). 
Inevitably, land market transactions, both rentals, and sales have become more active in most 





The process of land registration in communal areas ensures secure land rights and land 
administration (Chimhowu, 2019; Sanga, 2009; Yaro, 2010). It is reasonable to assume that 
when individuals are given formal recognition through land titling and access to investment, 
their living conditions can improve (Jayne et al., 2016). Having tenure rights is a necessary 
condition for accessing credit from financial institutions by using land as collateral 
(Deininger, et al., 2017; Sanga, 2009). The ability to use the land as collateral in formal credit 
markets is a benefit that is more relevant where the formal title exists and land transactions 
are feasible (Kaakunga & Ndalikokule, 2006). For land to serve as collateral, the lender must 
be assured that the borrower is certainly the owner and thus a secure title is registered (Feder 
& Feeny, 1991). If the borrower is unable to repay the loan from a particular financial 
institution, the property (land) will be transferred to the lender (Sanga, 2009:12).  
 
However, secure land rights and land administration are associated with high transaction 
costs (Blochert, 2006), and significant real costs are associated with land titling, 
documenting, and/or codifying complex local systems in remote and inaccessible areas in 
most developing countries (Freudenberger, 2013). Transaction costs include measurement 
costs, information costs, monitoring costs, and enforcement costs (Coase, 1937; Hobbs, 1997; 
Furubotn & Richter, 2000) as well as legal costs, searching costs, administrative costs, and 
uncertainty costs (Zevenbergen et al., 2007). In sub-Saharan Africa, the related transaction 
costs in rural factor markets partly depend on policies and institutions that facilitate local 
access to incomplete information, which is costly to collect, verify and disseminate 
(Fafchamps, 2004; Tione & Holden, 2019). This information is primarily used to build trust 
and reputation among potential partners when searching, screening, negotiating, or 
monitoring and enforcing contracts (Tione & Holden, 2019:2). Certainly, low-cost new 
technologies and rapid approaches to registration and formalisation have reduced the costs of 
registration and certification (Holden & Otsuka, 2014). 
 
Reviewing the legal status of customary land rights and land laws in 35 countries in Africa, 
Wily (2011:3-13) managed to categorise these countries, based on their statutory system of 
customary land rights and the specific effect thereof on common properties, as having land 
laws with positive, negative or mixed impacts. In terms of land law, the most positive 
countries include Uganda, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Southern Sudan. In terms of land law, 
the most negative countries include Cameroon, Mali, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho. In 




country’s land law is neither all bad nor all good. According to Wily (2011:13), uncertainty 
regarding land rights has three main sources: 
• Protection of customary rights may be provided but is legally applicable only to lands 
that are occupied and used, for example, family properties. This leaves most of the 
customary land resources involving forests, rangelands, wetlands, and other 
traditionally collectively owned lands without protection. 
• Customary rights may be protected but only if they are made subject to formal survey, 
registration, and titling.  
• New policies are in the process of being formulated with indications that positive 
improvements might be made.   
 
From a theoretical perspective, there appear to be three schools of thought, namely the 
replacement, adaptation, and conservative theories. The details of these theories are discussed 
by Hull et al. (2019: 6-11). The replacement theory supports the substitution of customary 
land rights (living, uncodified customary law) with titles (official, codified customary law, 
possibly including collective freehold titles or records, or individual freehold or limited real 
rights titles or records) to ensure tenure security. The conservative theory maintains that 
uncodified, living customary tenure systems provide sufficient tenure security and that titling 
reduces tenure security; the theory advocates conservation of much of the customary status 
quo. The adaptation theory lies between replacement and conservative theories. This theory 
advocates incremental changes to the land tenure system or the adoption of hybrid tenure 
systems in order to accommodate local and changing needs. Understanding these theories is 
relevant when governments make amendments to land rights under customary tenure systems 
in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Chimhowu (2019) introduced the concept ‘new-African customary tenure regime’ when 
referring to the more legible local land markets that are characterised by processes of 
economic globalisation. These reforms to customary tenure have been involved to varying 
extents five specific processes depending on country contexts, namely privatisation, 
marketisation, deregulation, re-regulation, and creation or emergence (Chimhowu, 2019). 





• Privatisation of ownership involves reform of state land through specific actions such 
as documenting and registering customary land users, adjudicating and assigning land 
rights to individuals or collectives, and physically surveying boundaries and other 
processes that make customary tenure more legible (Chimhowu, 2019). This means 
secure land title or rights under the customary tenure system. This type of land reform 
is found in African countries such as Ghana, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Namibia, South 
Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia (Wily, 2011).  
• Marketisation involves the introduction of a formal system of land valuation that 
facilitates transactions. However, in sub-Saharan African countries, many of the land 
reforms have not set up extensive standard pricing systems for rural land valuations 
(Chimhowu, 2019).  
• Deregulation is the neo-liberalisation of customary land, which simply means 
removing legal barriers to trade in the land as a commodity (Chimhowu, 2019). For 
example, in Rwanda land reforms have created a more formal land market (Schreiber, 
2017), while in Mozambique private investors have found it relatively easy to secure 
vast areas under 50-year leaseholds (Wily, 2011). 
• Re-regulation is a core process of neo-liberalisation of customary land that involves 
recognising, standardising, and incorporating customary land tenure practices within 
statutory law and reforming rights on customary land (Chimhowu, 2019). For 
example, some of the reforming rights on land include the Land Act of 1995 in 
Zambia, the Land Law of 1997 in Mozambique, the Rural Land Law of 1998 in Ivory 
Coast, the Land-use Planning Act of 2004 in Tanzania, the Organic Land Law of 2005 
in Rwanda and the Land Law of 2009 in Burkina Faso (Wily, 2011).  
• Creation or emergence is also described by Jessop (2002) as the flanking and 
supporting mechanisms that involve stabilising some of the contradictions as shaped 
by the neo-liberalisation of customary tenure. A good example of this type of reform 
is Mozambique’s Terras Comunitarias whereby this organisation works with 
communities to ensure that they register their land rights under a land lease known as 
Direito do Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra. In most countries in Africa, formal long-
term leases have been the common way of providing land to international and national 
investors in large land acquisitions or land grabs (Deininger & Byerlee, 2011; Holden 





If individuals, families, and communities in the customary sector are recognised as lawful 
owners of their land, they run the continuing and worsening risk of losing their land to others 
(Wily, 2011). The potential contradiction here lies in the fact that making land a formally 
tradable commodity means that many of the rural poor households can find themselves 
landless after all (Chimhowu, 2019; Chitonge et al., 2017; Collins & Mitchell, 2017; Holden 
& Otsuka, 2014). In particular, vulnerable groups (such as divorced women, widows, youth, 
tenants, and people living with HIV/AIDS) are at a disadvantage when it comes to 
registration of their right to occupy customary lands (Chimhowu, 2019; Freudenberger, 2013; 
Mwangi & Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003). These vulnerable groups may 
lose their land or their property rights to land-grabbing relatives, to distress sales to 
neighbours, to politically well-connected persons, or outsiders. For example, increasing 
population pressure and lack of access to land as a safety net for the youth have led to many 
of them migrating from rural areas to urban areas (Holden & Otsuka, 2014). The lack of a 
more comprehensive understanding of land issues in sub-Saharan African may have caused 
well-intended land reform laws to fail as these are subject to capture by politicians who serve 
their interests at the expense of poor households and other vulnerable groups among rural 
communities (Deininger & Byerlee, 2011; Holden & Otsuka, 2014; Mendelsohn et al., 2011; 
Sitko & Jayne, 2014). With this understanding of the customary land tenure system in sub-
Saharan Africa, it is important to understand the agricultural policy environment and 
customary land tenure system in Namibia. This is discussed next. 
 
7.4 Agricultural policy environment and customary land tenure systems in Namibia 
In Namibia, the acquisition of land is governed by Article 16 of the Namibian Constitution24 
as the primary protector of private property rights. The country’s land is classified into three 
categories, namely state, communal, and commercial land. State land constitutes around 20 
percent, communal land constitutes around 36 percent and commercial land constitutes 
around 44 percent of Namibia’s total area (Mendelsohn et al., 2011). State land is the 
property of the state, and all land that is not otherwise lawfully owned belongs to the state. 
This land is used for nature conversation, game parks, agricultural research farms, and 
military bases and also includes urban land owned by local authorities (LAC, 2005).  
 
24 Article 16(1) of the Namibian Constitution states that all persons have the right to acquire, own and dispose of 
all forms of property. In addition, Subsection (2) of the article grants the power to the state (government) to 





7.4.1 Agricultural commercial land in Namibia 
Commercial land includes privately-owned urban land within proclaimed boundaries, rural 
commercial farmland, or freehold agricultural land (LAC, 2005). The title and administration 
of land in commercial farming areas are vested in the registered owner of each farm 
(Kaakunga & Ndalikokule, 2006). Commercial or freehold land is surveyed and registered in 
the Deed Registry. This allows for the development of agricultural commercial land because 
it is privately owned. Thus, owners develop the land to ensure a high market value for their 
property. The Agricultural (Commercial25) Land Reform Act No. 6 of 1995 provides for the 
acquisition of commercial farmland according to a ‘willing seller-willing buyer’ land 
redistribution policy to address land reform.  
 
The Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act No 6 of 1995 aimed at the redistribution of 
freehold agricultural land whereby the government would buy freehold farms and resettle 
landless Namibians on those farms under state leasehold tenure. The main aim of land 
redistribution is to redress the past imbalances in land access among Namibians while 
empowering the majority economically by equalising income distribution (LAC, 2005). In 
this way, land market transactions play a significant role in transferring land rights from land-
abundant to labour-rich households, which may contribute greatly to both efficiency and 
equity (Deininger et al., 2017; Holden & Otsuka, 2014). Since independence in 1990, land 
reform in Namibia has been devoted to redistributing commercial land mainly from white 
farmers to previously disadvantaged Namibians (mainly black farmers) to be resettled as 
farmers. Resettlement is defined as the movement of people from an area with insufficient 
resources to one that is more likely to provide a satisfactory standard of living (National 
Resettlement Policy, 2001). The Resettlement Policy states that land acquired for 
resettlement purposes is provided to the beneficiaries on a long-term leasehold of 99 years 
and can be inherited by their relatives and family members. The challenge, in this case, is that 
currently, the leasehold right for 99 years cannot be used as collateral, thus making it difficult 
for financial institutions (commercial banks) to lend money to these resettled farmers 
(Kaakunga  & Ndalikokule, 2006). There is thus a need to review the Resettlement Policy to 
accommodate the land market so that leases can be used as collateral to obtain credit from 
financial institutions.  
 
 




7.4.2 Agricultural communal land 
Communal land, which is the focus of this study, includes all land used by indigenous 
Namibian communities but is owned by the state, who holds it in trust for these communities 
(LAC, 2003). It is estimated that at least 60 percent of Namibia`s population lives in 
communal areas (Bank of Namibia, 2012). The Communal Land Reform Act No. 5 of 200226 
and the Traditional Authorities Act No. 25 of 2000 constitute the most important policies for 
land management in communal areas in Namibia (Meijs & Kapitango, 2009). The Ministry of 
Lands and Resettlement continues administering communal land through the regional land 
boards and traditional authorities. Currently, the communal land boards are responsible for 
the registration of customary land rights and transfers, cancellations, and allocations, which is 
a continuous process. According to the Communal Land Reform Act, traditional leaders 
(chiefs) still have the responsibility of allocating and cancelling customary land rights, after 
which the land board must ratify the decision before it has legal effect.  
 
The Communal Land Reform Act No. 5 of 2002 recognises the land rights in communal areas 
of Namibia to be either customary land rights or rights of leasehold. The act declares that 
customary land tenure includes arable and residential land rights as well as provision for 
grazing, forests, and other natural resources. The customary land right is valid for the natural 
life of a holder and can be inherited by the surviving spouse and the children. The challenge 
is that residents (farmers) in communal areas do not have the same agricultural commercial 
opportunities as their counterparts in freehold areas. As a result, residents are forced to 
continue abiding by a customary system of land governance designed for subsistence and that 
serves the interests of senior traditional leaders and their allies. Thus, it is no longer practical 
for residents to develop or maintain their properties according to their wishes (Mendelsohn et 
al., 2011). 
 
In communal areas, leasehold rights can be used for specific commercial activities such as 
agricultural, tourism, or other purposes that the board approves, and rights are valid for more 
than 10 years and should be registered in the Deeds Registration System (Section 33 of the 
Communal Land Reform Act No. 5 of 2002). According to the Communal Land Reform Act, 
the Communal Land Boards have the power to grant rights of leasehold to any portion of 
 
26 In order to eliminate tenure insecurity in the communal areas, the government of Namibia introduced the 
registration of land rights in communal areas through the Communal Land Reform Act No. 5 of 2002. The 




communal land but this right of leasehold may only be granted if the traditional authority of a 
particular traditional community in whose communal area the land is situated consents to the 
right of leasehold. For example, the Communal Land Reform Act states that if the right of 
leasehold is granted for a community campsite and the area is larger than 50 hectares, the 
Minister of Lands must approve the application in writing before the right to leasehold is 
granted. The leasehold is for a maximum of 99 years and is also transferable as per Section 
38 (2) of the Communal Land Reform Act according to which the Communal Land Board 
must give written consent.  
 
According to the Communal Land Reform Act No. 5 of 2002 Section 40, in general, no 
person has a claim against the chief, the traditional authority, the Communal Land Board, or 
the state for improvements on land held under a customary land right or a right of leasehold. 
Moreover, ownership of land is not permitted; this means that no private ownership exists in 
communal areas. Communal land cannot be bought or sold and is kept in trust by the 
government. Communal land cannot be used as collateral for ensuring access to credit due to 
the customary land ownership structure. Notably, collateral itself may only be valuable where 
there is an active land market that permits easy land markets (Atwood, 1990). To enhance 
agricultural commercial activities and alleviate poverty, some sections in the Communal 
Land Reform Act need to be amended to improve communal farmers’ living conditions and 
to enhance commercialisation of agriculture, as discussed in the next section. 
 
7.5 Suggested improvements on customary land tenure to allow agricultural 
commercialisation activities in communal areas in Namibia 
7.5.1 Land tenure rights 
Article 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia states, “All persons shall have the 
right in any part of Namibia to acquire, own and dispose of all forms of immovable and 
movable property individually or in association with others and to beneath their property to 
their heirs or legatees” (Constitution the Republic of Namibia, 2000: 11). Thus, it suggested 
that customary land in communal areas of Namibia be formally surveyed, registered, and 
titled under the non-customary system or freehold land tenure. However, the transaction costs 
of legal change can threaten the success of the land reform process (Blochert, 2006:171). In 
agreement with Freudenberger (2013), land titling should not be imposed where it is not 




insecurity, intervening before disruptive conflicts take place or poor people are deprived of 
their livelihoods.  
 
Secure land in the form of land titles is a required condition for economic development 
(Werner & Bayer, 2017). In addition, land security confers value on land and provides 
incentives for landholders (farmers) to invest time, effort, and money in developing and 
managing their land (Mendelsohn et al., 2011). However, it is important to avoid 
modifications to the customary tenure system that creates incentives for corruption, 
favouritism, nepotism, or other negative outcomes that undermine the credibility of the 
system. As Namibia is a signatory to international conventions, the land rights of indigenous 
communities should also be respected based on international convention guidelines. Thus, it 
is important to design a plan on how to deal with conflicts on customary land tenure 
(Freudenberger, 2013) before changes are made to this system. 
 
From observations, it was clear that land rights were sold illegally in communal areas. This 
happened frequently to owners of communal properties that had recently been included in 
declared towns or urban areas (Mendelsohn et al., 2011:8). Thus, it is suggested that the 
Communal Land Reform Act No. 5 of 2002 Section 4027 be amended to allow customary 
land rights to be registered as legal deeds. This will allow land rights to be assigned as 
collateral security to financial institutions to secure capital to enhance commercial 
agricultural development among rural farmers. However, amendments to the Communal 
Land Reform Act should also stipulate how to protect poor or vulnerable community 
members, such as women, and to ensure that land rights are available as a social safety net. 
This is important because the continued availability of commonage is fundamental if 
communal land is to provide a safety net for people unable to acquire land elsewhere 
(Mendelsohn et al., 2011). 
 
7.5.2 Leasing of land 
In Namibia, the Communal Land Reform Act No. of 2002 recognises the provision and 
allocation of land under leasehold rights to beneficiaries. The act stipulates that any land used 
for commercial activity has to be registered as a leasehold. Nevertheless, holders of 
customary land rights, who make up by far the great majority of residents, are deterred from 
 
27 It is also important for local communities to participate in delineating territorial boundaries before the process 




using their land for income-generating activities unless they go through lengthy processes of 
converting their land to leaseholds (Mendelsohn et al., 2011). In addition, Namibian 
commercial financial institutions currently are not accepting registered leaseholds over state 
lands as collateral as they are not allowed to sell leaseholds in the event of a borrower’s 
defaulting (Werner & Bayer, 2017). According to Holden & Otsuka (2014), restricting land 
rentals may contribute to enhancing poverty and food insecurity among rural people. The 
land market should thus be gradually brought into the customary tenure system in line with 
community institutions. 
 
It is suggested that the Communal Land Reform Act No. of 2002 add a section that allows 
residents to apply for non-customary land use such as residential use, commercial farming, 
and industrial use and that these types of utilisation should be limited in time and be subject 
to consultations with the community. It is suggested that customary land under leasehold 
rights should be registered and valued to serve as collateral when farmers apply for credit 
from financial institutions. The leasehold rights should conform to the basic characteristics of 
leasehold agreements in the national context and must be transferable. Leasehold rights in 
communal areas should be granted for the same period as under the resettlement programme, 
namely between 10 and 99 years. It is suggested that leased land under the customary land 
tenure system be registered at the Deeds Registry Office according to the Deeds Registries 
Act No. 14 of 2015.  
 
It is expected that leasehold rights will enable small-scale farmers to be economically 
productive and to enter the mainstream economy using the lease agreements to access credit 
to support agricultural development (Werner & Bayer, 2017). This is in line with the National 
Resettlement Policy (2001: 6) that states that “the leasehold tenure system will be arranged so 
that the settlers can use the lease agreement as collateral agreements to get a loan from 
lending institutions for agricultural purposes”. The development of the land market in the 
small-scale farming sector in Namibia in both resettlement and non-freehold (communal) 
areas is a necessary condition for lessees of state land to use their land as collateral (Werner 
& Bayer, 2017).  
 
The registration of lease agreements is expected to generate significant transaction costs that 
may impede the full implementation of government policy and its legal framework (Werner 




information among beneficiaries about the process and the financial requirements for 
registration from implementing agencies. This incomplete information relates to the 
following issues, namely the value of land, the potential range of economic activities, and the 
lease process itself, including information about essential statutory requirements by 
institutions. As a result transaction costs associated with registration of lease agreements 
should be minimised for effective implementation of land markets in Namibia. 
 
7.5.3 Land markets 
Land markets and land regulations influence the distribution of wealth, real income, 
residential segregation, and economic efficiency significantly (Cheshire & Sheppard, 2004). 
Customary land sales markets are prohibited in most countries including Namibia because 
fear exists that such markets can lead to landlessness and concentration of land in fewer 
hands of politically well-connected individuals (Chitonge et al., 2017; Holden & Otsuka, 
2014; Mendelsohn et al., 2011; Sjaastad, 2003). However, land rental markets were found to 
be pro-poor in Malawi, Kenya, and Uganda; they helped to improve access to land for poor 
households and provided income-generating opportunities for landed households with limited 
non-land resources such as agricultural labour and farm management knowledge and skills 
(Holden & Otsuka, 2014). In Namibia, redistribution and land markets are currently only 
applicable to freehold farmers, but it is suggested that the same commercial land activities 
also be applied to non-freehold land in communal areas. This is especially relevant to small-
scale high-value farmers in north-central Namibia who are struggling to commercialise their 
fresh produce due to a lack of collateral as demanded by financial institutions.  
 
Historical experience with land markets has been associated with growing export markets for 
agricultural output, for instance, tree crops such as cocoa in West Africa, and a growth in 
demand for horticultural produce in rapidly urbanising parts of Africa (Chimhowu & 
Woodhouse, 2006:353). Thus, investment incentives in land improvements, especially tree 
planting, tend to enhance land tenure security in customary land areas in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Holden & Otsuka, 2014:93). Hence, it is important to develop land reform programmes and 
land policies that allow land markets that play a role in and promote efficiency, equity, and 
sustainability (Holden & Otsuka, 2014). Therefore, it is suggested that the government 
legalise the land market and the associated rental market to improve agricultural 
commercialisation in the communal areas of north-central Namibia to improve small-scale 




also be a means to prevent illegal land sales under the customary tenure system that currently 
take place mainly near urban areas in communal areas in Namibia. However, tenure security 
and the future livelihood of marginalised groups and vulnerable members of the community 




In most sub-Saharan countries, the majority of the rural population has access to land under 
customary tenure systems. Customary land is governed under different community 
institutions, including traditional rights and cultural rules or norms meant to grant equal 
access to families within groups with a common interest in land. Customary land tenure 
systems draw their legitimacy from traditional practices and are also affected by colonial and 
postcolonial influences. The customary land tenure authority is vested in the government that 
holds all communal land in trust for the indigenous people. Customary tenure systems are not 
only powerful forces in resource management, but they can be highly responsive to political, 
economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental changes in the same space. 
Adaptations may take place in response to an increase in population growth, market forces of 
demand and supply, conflicts, and political and climate changes.  
 
Under true reform in a customary system-rich region such as sub-Saharan Africa, both rights 
that are derived from customary systems and statutory land tenure should be considered. The 
process of land registration in communal areas ensures secure land rights and land 
administration. As a result, land market transactions, both rentals, and sales have become 
more frequent in most African countries. However, making land a formally tradable 
commodity means that many poor rural households may find themselves landless. This 
includes especially vulnerable groups that may lose their land or their property rights to land-
grabbing relatives, to distress sales to neighbours, to politically well-connected persons or 
outsiders. Land policies should protect these vulnerable groups when the land market is 
introduced under customary tenure systems. 
 
Customary land tenure in Namibia and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa is over-reliant on 
state and community institutional arrangements with limited roles of market institutions. The 
limited role played by market institutions, as indicated in previous chapters, would lead to 




Thus, there is a need to amend some sections of the Communal Land Reform Act No. 5 of 
2002 to enhance economic development and agricultural commercialisation.  
 
In light of this argument, it is proposed that the Communal Land Reform Act No. 5 of 2002, 
sections 33 and 40 especially, be amended to allow customary land rights to be registered as 
legal deeds. Amending the act will also allow land rights to be assigned as collateral security 
to financial institutions to secure capital in order to enhance commercial agricultural 
development among rural farmers. In practice, restricting land rentals may continue to 
enhance poverty and food insecurity among rural people, especially for small-scale high-
value crop farmers. Amendments to the Communal Land Reform Act should also specify 
how to protect vulnerable or poor people such as women and youth and to ensure that land 
rights are available as a social safety net. Land markets should be gradually implemented 
under the customary tenure system in line with community institutions.  
 







CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
8.1 Conclusion 
In developing countries, especially in southern Africa excluding small-scale farmers from 
agri-food chains would pose a real threat to farm households’ incomes, poverty alleviation, 
and rural development. Using an example of small-scale vegetable production enterprises in 
north-central Namibia, this study attempted to provide a better understanding of how several 
institutional issues within the community and its organisation led to the failure of agricultural 
development initiatives introduced by the state or the private sector (the market). This study 
intended to contribute to and fill the gap found in the literature by identifying and assessing 
the main transaction costs (information, enforcement, monitoring, and searching costs) 
inhibiting agricultural development because of inefficient systems – combining market, 
community, and state institutions. The research question that this study tried to answer was 
why it would make sense for the government to invest in services for small-scale fruit or 
vegetable farmers if these farmers would not increase production due to a lack of market 
access unless they could make a profit, which would probably imply heavy subsidisation of 
marketing infrastructures by taxpayers.  
 
A case study of vegetable production in north-central Namibia was conducted for this study. 
The data were collected from historical records from farmers, agricultural boards and 
marketing agencies, government officials, and farmers’ associations. Historical data were 
also obtained by selecting farmers for interviews and conducting in-depth interviews with 
experts (key informants) such as local traditional leaders, regional councillors, scheme 
officials, extension officials, and other researchers as well as by conducting a farm household 
survey. Field observations were made to collect first-hand information on the operation and 
impact of irrigation schemes on the welfare of the community.  
 
The analytical scheme considered two economic development models, namely Williamson’s 
(1985, 2010) TCE and Hayami’s (1988) economic development approach (combined market, 
state, and community institutions). These models were considered because both include the 
analysis of transaction costs in their structures. The Hayami model also considers the need to 
investigate institutional issues within the community and its organisation that could lead to 
the failure of development initiatives introduced by the state or the private sector (market). 
The choice of TCE was deemed important because transaction costs, especially information 




detailed conceptual framework was described in Chapter 1. The conceptual framework itself 
was specifically applied in chapters 5 and 6 to present the most important information on the 
commercialisation of agriculture (vegetable production) in north-central Namibia. 
 
Chapter 2 commenced with a brief review of the theory of TCE that was followed by a 
discussion of transaction costs and selected aspects of property rights, principal-agent 
relationships, and collective action relevant to the empirical parts of the study. This chapter 
discussed economic inefficiencies as a result of high transaction costs for the arrangement of 
the market, state, and community institutions. The chapter developed a series of lessons based 
on factors constraining the commercialisation of agriculture in developing countries. In 
Chapter 3, the discussion was based on the major challenges and opportunities facing the 
commercialisation of agriculture and policy analysis because market-led and state-led 
policies as well as community institutions failed in the development of agriculture in most 
developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa after these countries had gained their 
independence. Thus there is a need to involve the private sector in agricultural development 
in developing countries such as Namibia.  
 
Chapter 4 provided a description of the types of farmers and the socio-economic and agro-
ecological characteristics that constrained the development of vegetable production in the 
study area. Chapter 5 provided a discussion of the prevailing policy environment and social 
interaction as well as transaction characteristics and associated governance structures 
regarding the development of agriculture (particularly vegetables) in north-central Namibia. 
In Chapter 6, a model based on the interrelationship of the market, community institutions, 
and government objectives in the development of the vegetable industry is presented. The 
model aims to minimise transaction costs and enhance competitiveness in the development of 
the vegetable industry. In Chapter 7, the strategic policy option for further development of the 
agricultural sector in particular agricultural commercialisation in communal areas such as 
north-central Namibia was discussed. It is proposed that the Communal Land Reform Act 
(No. 5 of 2002) sections 33 and 40 should, especially, be amended to allow customary land 
rights to be registered as legal deeds with market value. This will allow land in communal 
areas to be used by small-scale commercial farmers as collateral when applying for finances 





Because the theory and the local variables influencing the specific study objectives were 
interrelated, it was not possible to assess or analyse each objective successively; they were 
investigated as a combination. It is now appropriate to discuss each of the specific objectives 
and the key findings with respect to the development of the vegetable industry in north-
central Namibia.  
 
The results of the study with regard to the first objective suggest that it is important to arrive 
at an optimal combination of the roles of community, market, and state in promoting the 
welfare of a country. The results support the conclusion presented in Chapter 3 that small-
scale farmers are facing challenges as actors in the commercialisation of agriculture in 
developing countries such as Namibia. Constraining factors include agro-ecological and 
socio-economic constraints, including limited access to markets for output, input, and credit 
owing to high transaction costs, poor agricultural organisation, and a lack of knowledge of 
vegetable production among farmers, which hamper the development of agriculture. In 
addition, state-led agricultural development and the market-liberalisation policies in sub-
Saharan Africa have been implemented poorly or not at all or those that have been 
implemented well have not delivered sustainable benefits. Hayami (1988) argues that market 
systems, rural community institutions, and government activities in economic development 
should be combined to achieve sustainable agricultural development in developing countries 
such as Namibia. Understanding the arrangement of the market, state, and community 
institutions is essential for describing the conceptual framework that was presented in 
Chapter 1. The usefulness of this approach can be applied in further studies of transaction 
costs in agricultural commercialisation in developing countries, especially in southern Africa. 
For instance, transaction characteristics leading to high transaction costs were identified in 
the supply chain of the vegetable industry in the study area. The forms of governance 
structures (market, hybrid, and hierarchy) were identified and matched with governance 
structures in the study area for small-scale vegetable farmers with limited government 
support (non-project) and those with government support (project). The community 
institutions and organisations in agricultural development were assessed. The behavioural 
attributes such as principal-agent relationship problems, information asymmetry, or 
opportunistic behaviour among actors in the study area were investigated. The lesson that can 
be gleaned from this objective is that transaction costs analysis can help to understand the 
influence on access to input and output markets as well as the sharing of information among 




The results of the study with regard to the second objective are related more to Preposition 1 
of this study as was presented in chapter 1 and suggest that the commercialisation of 
agriculture in north-central Namibia is influenced by both agro-ecological and socio-
economic constraints. These include poor soils, lack of land ownership, small farm size, low 
income, limited access to infrastructure and markets (input, output, and credit), irregular 
visits by extension officials and a lack of vehicle ownership, as well as cultural change, 
inadequate technologies and information asymmetries among value chain actors. In addition, 
the ownership of a vehicle (p=0.009) and distance from farm to the water source (p=0.073) 
were statistically significant in influencing the farmers’ decision to participate in the 
commercialisation of high-value crops in north-central Namibia. The results show that there 
is a need for policy intervention that addresses water rights and improved access to credit as 
well as encouraging production and marketing cooperative to reduce costs of accessing input 
and output markets. The type of farm or scheme is not statistically significant therefore it can 
be concluded that whether a farm belongs to the project or not, it does not influence their 
decision as to which market it will supply to. This suggests that the project farms have no 
greater inclination to produce for formal markets than non-project farms. Thus production for 
the formal market as the target of the government support has failed. 
 
The results of the study with regard to the third objective suggest that the transaction 
attributes and transaction costs of the governance structures of vegetable markets in the study 
area are characterised by (1) low asset specificity, frequency, and uncertainty between 
farmers and buyers in spot (informal) markets; (2) moderate asset specificity, frequency and 
uncertainty between farmers and contractors-centred agents; and (3) high asset specificity, 
frequency and uncertainty between farmers and commission-centred agents (hybrid 
organisation). The wholesale-centred transaction was not taking place at the time of this study 
for targeted farmers. The results thus stress the fact that farmers in the study area experience 
high transaction costs due to information asymmetries and principal-agent problems between 
farmers and buyers, which in turn result in the vegetable industry being less efficient or less 
competitive for both domestic and export markets. As a result, there is a need to strengthen 
the extension services as well as training farmers in the global GAP to be able to meet the 
quality standards as required by the retailers and supermarkets. 
 
The results of this study also suggest that the Green Scheme policy is poorly implemented. 




programmes components. In addition, there is a need to reform water policy with regard to 
irrigation and land policy to include a programme on how to resettle small-scale farmers 
graduating from government Green Scheme projects. Therefore, there is a need to create up-
to-date policies that facilitate the adjustment of small-scale farmers to the latest production 
technologies and agri-food systems in line with globalisation, agro-industrialisation, foreign 
direct investment, free trade agreements, and consumer preferences, and that comply with 
international food safety and quality standards, such as global GAP, for fruit and vegetables.  
Furthermore, key macroeconomic factors that cause the development of the Namibian 
vegetable industry to be less competitive include the exchange rate of the Namibian dollar, 
the effects of inflation on commodity prices, changes in the oil price, the influence of the 
South African economy on the Namibian economy and the global financial crisis. Both the 
monetary and fiscal policies of Namibia are dependent on what is happening in South Africa. 
The results also suggest that cultural embeddedness may limit agricultural development 
economic activity as community values, norms or beliefs take long to adjust to external ideas 
or technologies due to inadequate information. This implies that training is needed for 
farmers to be able to adjust to new and changing innovations and technologies that are 
relevant to agricultural development. 
 
The results of the study as regards the fourth objective suggest the need to develop a model 
for further developing the commercialisation of agriculture in north-central Namibia. The 
model was designed considering the agro-ecological and market realities as well as the role of 
the community. The model suggests public-private partnerships as a policy instrument linking 
small-scale farmers to input and output markets through contract production and minimising 
transaction costs, thereby overcoming the failure of the market, state, and community 
institutions.  
 
The results of the study also suggest that government interventions are not aligned with 
community needs for poverty reduction, the agro-climatic conditions of the study area, and 
the market realities of inputs and outputs, making the development of the vegetable industry 
less efficient due to high transaction costs. These problems are exacerbated by inefficient 
agricultural policy, which failed to respond to information asymmetries and principal-agent 
problems from actors (farmers, project administrators, or politicians). In this case, the results 




government is fraught with a poor understanding of community institutions and is not aligned 
with market reality, resulting in failure of projects and decline of economic welfare.” The 
inefficiencies in the vegetable (high-value crops) value chain are mainly associated with high 
information, monitoring and enforcement costs as projects are designed externally with little 
involvement of the community. A lack of ownership by the community thus resulted in the 
failure of agriculture projects, especially vegetable production in northern Namibia. 
Community organisations, norms, and values should be considered when the government is 
developing agricultural projects which will ensure ownership and sustainability of the 
projects. 
 
The results of objectives 3 and 4 also support Proposition 2 of the study: “The possibilities of 
government’s implementation of new agricultural development initiatives sustainably are 
constrained by the presence of information asymmetries and incentive compatibility problems 
and also agency problems that are the root cause of community institutions’ failing due to 
principal-agent relationships.” For instance, owing to information asymmetry and politicians’ 
self-interest and hidden incentives, politicians continue promising re-evaluation of inefficient 
projects, such as vegetable production, in order to maintain their support base from their 
voters in the area for re-election. High transaction costs in this case are associated with the 
reason why the property rights of beneficiaries of the project are poorly defined. Therefore, 
there is a need for policy intervention that addresses property rights for water and land 
ownership in the study area.  
 
Moreover, incentive compatibility problems are also prevalent between the farmers and the 
government agency (the AGRIBUSDEV) entrusted with overseeing the management of the 
project. For example, because of adverse selection by government officials or project 
administrators, the selection of beneficiaries into the project is reported to be skewed towards 
politically well-connected individuals, family members and friends, and war veterans. 
Farmers also have hidden agendas because of incentives for being in the project as they want 
to continue to benefit from subsidies offered by the government. Shirking and free-riding 
problems result in high transaction costs due to information asymmetries, which are a big 
constraint on the development of the vegetable industry. The selection of the project 
beneficiaries has to be done in a transparent manner in which an independent body oversees 
the process. These beneficiaries need to be categorised into smaller groups that are easy to 




from the farmers in the community, the project management needs to invest in corporate 
social responsibility activities such as capacity building. In addition, the government 
subsidies for the project beneficiaries have to be gradually reduced after the first production 
so that farmers prepare to stand on their own.    
 
The results of the study as regards the fifth objective suggests the need to formulate relevant 
strategic policy options for further development of the vegetable industry in north-central 
Namibia to enable the long-term survival of small-scale farmers in the highly demanding 
globally competitive markets for high-value horticultural crops. It is suggested that the 
Communal Land Reform Act (No. 5 of 2002) sections 33 and 40 should, especially, be 
amended to allow customary land rights to be registered as legal deeds with market value. 
This will allow the land rights to be assigned as collateral security to financial institutions to 
secure capital in order to enhance commercial agricultural development among rural farmers. 
However, amendments to the Communal Land Reform Act (No. 5 of 2002) should also 
specify how to protect vulnerable or poor people such as women and youth among 
community members and to ensure that land rights are available as a social safety net.  
 
8.2 Recommendations 
The study suggests that further research is required in order to accommodate a wider range of 
commodity diversity to apply the proposed model in an agricultural development context. 
Firstly, considering the limitations set for this research, it is recommended that a case study 
be conducted in other geographical areas with potential for vegetable production in Namibia, 
especially in the northern areas of the Kavango and Zambezi regions where access to water is 
ensured. The results are then to be compared with the current results, in which transaction 
costs are the basic unit of analysis, to determine inefficiencies in the commercialisation of 
agriculture in less favoured areas. Secondly, there is a need for an improved understanding of 
the contribution of small-scale farmers, given inadequate access to water, land, credit, and 
markets. Thirdly, there is a need to understand the structural functions, culture, norms, and 
values of community organisations regarding how they encourage the commercialisation of 
agriculture. Finally, there is a need for a better understanding of information asymmetries and 
principal-agent problems associated with actors in agricultural development initiatives in 
developing countries and how to integrate small-scale farmers into the commercialisation of 
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APPENDIX A: Farmers’ questionnaire 
 
TITTLE: Dynamics of institutional arrangements for small-scale vegetable 





The following questions have been set to understand Opportunities and Challenges of small 
scale horticultural production and marketing in the north central part of Namibia. The 
answers are confidential and will assist in formulation of policies, research and extension 
programmes that are appropriate to your area. In this interview schedule there is no wrong 
or correct answer. Your cooperation is therefore highly appreciated. 
 
B. GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
1.1 Date of interview_______________________ 
1.2 Name of enumerator______________________________________ 
1.3 Respondent’s name (OPTIONAL) ___________________________ 
1.4 Are you farm owner or farm manager _______________________________ 
1.5 Name of scheme  
1.  Olushandja or canal (Independent producer)______________________ 
2. Etunda (government green scheme producer)___________________________ 





C. FARMERS CHARACTERISTICS 
 
1.6 Gender of the respondent 
1. Male 
2. Female 
1.7 Head of household 
1. Male 
2. Female 
1.8 Age of head of household……..years 
1.9 Age of respondent…………….. years  
1.10 How many people live in the house? ……………………………  
1. Adult Male (more 18 years) ……………………………………V7 
2. Adult Female (more 18 years)…………………………………. 
3. Boys less than 18 but more than 2 years……………………… 
4. Girls less than 18 but more than 2 years ………………………… 
5. Babies (less than 2) …………………………………………… 
1.11 Marital status 
1. Single (unmarried) 
2. Married 



















1.12 Highest educational level of the respondent: In each category also indicate the total 
number of years attained 
1.  None 
2. Primary school (grade 1- 9) 
3. Grade 10 
4. Grade 12 
5. Tertiary (Certificate, Diploma, Degree) CIRCLE HIGHEST 
6. Non-formal (adult education) ……………… 
1.13 Employment status 1=Yes 2= No 
Variable 1=Yes 2=No 
1.  Full time farming  
2. Own business  
3. Private/ state:   
4.  Pensioner  
5. Others(specify)  
 
a) What is your occupation………………………………………… 
 
D. FARMING EXPERIENCE 
 
1.14 How long have you practiced production of horticultural products? …………… 
1.15 How many years have you lived on your current farm?............... 
1.16 How many years have you managed your current farm?............ 
1.17  How many years have you managed any previous farm/s?.................. 
1.18 How many years have you worked on a farm/s before becoming a manager? ...... 
1.19 Apart from the horticultural produce that you grow, what other things do you do on 
the farm to get extra money?................................................................................ 
1.20 What is your income from your farming activity per month 
1. 0-999 2. 1000-1999 3. 2000-2999 4. 3000-3999 5. 4000-4999 6. 5000+ 
      
1.21 As a farmer indicate your arithmetic ability. 
 Adding Subtracting Multiplying Dividing 
1. None     
2. Little     
3. Average     
4. Good     
 
E. LAND AND CLIMATE INFORMATION 
 
2.1 What is your farm size? ............................................ 
2.2 What type of land ownership are you using on the land? 
1. Private land (commercial farm) 
2. Private land (communal land) 
3. Leasing (communal land)  
4. Leasing (Green scheme) 
5. Others (specify)…………………………. 
2.3 Do you have secure tenure for your land? 1=Yes or 2=No 
(a) If No, state the reasons 
 ………………………………………………………………………… 
V14 Total no. of years  


















2.4 Is the agro-climatic condition favourable for farming vegetables? 1=Yes 2=No 
(a) If No, what do you do to improve farming conditions? …………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2.5 Considering your experience with access to land in your opinion is it possible to facilitate 
the process of registering as a horticulture farmer by paying a bribe: 1=Yes 2=No  
If yes, From who How much is the typical 
payment (N$) 
1. Traditional chiefs  
2. Government offices  
3. Others (Specify)  
2.6 Are there any steps in registration process as a horticulture farmer where payment of 
bribe is essential or else the process cannot be completed 1=Yes or 2=No 
If yes, which Steps How much is the typical 
payment (N$) 
  
2.7 Are there any other types of costs associated with registering as a horticulture farmer we 
have not asked about? 1=Yes or 2=No 
If Yes, specify………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2.8 From your experience, when someone is registering or applying as a horticulture farmer, 
which factors help the process and which make it more difficult? How large is each 
effect? (TICK ONE) 
Factor affecting the 



















1.Strong ties to local 
community 
      
2.Close political 
connections 
      
3.Membership in a 
business association 
      
4.Past experience starting 
a farm 
      
5.information or advice 
from others 
      
6.Help from government 
agency 
      
7.being a female       
8.Being a native born 
citizen 
      
9. Specific ethnic or 
language (specific)….. 
      
10. Specific religious 
affiliation Specify……. 
      
























F. CROP PRODUCTION 
 
3.1 Indicate average crop YIELD in GOOD YEARS during past 3 seasons (2010-13)  












Maize    
Cabbage    
Tomato    
Butternut    
Water melons    
Sweet potatoes    
Other 
(specify) 
   
*1 =most important, 2 =intermediate and 3 = Least important 










































Local Improved        
Maize           
Cabbage           
Tomato           
Butternut           
Water 
melons 
          
Sweet 
potatoes 
          
Other 
(specify) 












3.3 What is the source of inputs for vegetable production? 
inputs Source 
Labour 1.Number of Family 
labour ……….. 
 
2. Number of Hired 
labour ………… 
3. Number of 
Other (specify) 
………… 
    
Fertilizer 1.Agriculture office 2.Service provider 3.Other farmers 4.Market 5.Cooperative 6.Other 
specify 
 





















3.4 How many times do you visits inputs sources per whole production season?.................. 
3.5 Do you experience disruptions (delays) in input/material supply?  1=Yes or 2=No  
(a) If Yes what are the main reasons ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 










3.7 How much do you spend on each input per year? 
 
 
3.8 What kind of farming tools do you have?.................................................................... 
3.9 Do you think getting higher yields might in any way cause problems or concerns to you? 
1=Yes 2=No 








(a) If the production increases, what are the reasons? …………………………….. 
(b) If the production decreases, what are the reasons? …………………………….. 
3.11 Do you use crop rotation system? 1=Yes 2= No 
(a) If your answer to question 3.11 above is Yes, mention the sequence of crop rotation? 
3.12 In your opinion what opportunities exist in expanding vegetable production in this area? 
..................................................................................................
       Inputs     Cost/ unit (SPECIFY) 
      Labour (casual)  
      Labour (contract)  
      Fertilizer  
      Pesticide  
      Seeds  
      Fuel  
      Electricity  















3.13 What are the crop production constraints on your farm? Rank horizontally e.g. 1=most severe, 2=second severe etc. 
 
 
3.14 Do you sow your crops in time (according to sowing date)? 1=Yes 2=No 
(a) If the answer to question 3.14 above is No, why? 1=Yes 2=No 
Variable 1=Yes 2=No 
1.  Water shortage  
2. Hired labour shortage  
3.  Inability to get input on time (seed and 
fertilizer)  
 
4. Others(specify  
 
3.15 Do you have any form of insurance against theft, loss of income etc? 1=Yes 2=No 
Crop 
type 








Maize            
Cabbage            
Tomato            
Butternut            
Water 
melons 
           
Sweet 
potatoes 
           
Other 
(specify) 















G. IRRIGATION, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
4.1 What is your source, method, frequency of use and cost of irrigation for your vegetable 














2.Furrow 3.Sprinkler 4.Drip 









Rented pump ............................................ 
*Annual use cost includes fuel cost, wage (if employed labour is used) 
4.2 How many times do you irrigate your crop? (Indicate per week) .................. 
4.3 How far is your farm (land) from the water source?……………Km 
4.4 Who gives permission on water usage?  
1. Namwater 
2. Government (ministry of agriculture) 
3. Traditional authority 
4. Other (specify) 
4.5 Does your access to water limit the area that you cultivate in any season of the year? 1= 
Yes and 2= No 





4.6 Does irrigation water availability affect your decision on the type of crop you grow? 
1=Yes 2=No 




4.7 Do you make any payment for using water on irrigation? 1=Yes and 2=No 
(a) If Yes how much………………………………………………………………………. 
4.8 Have you ever faced any conflict with neighbouring farmers because of using irrigation 
water? 1=Yes 2= No 








4.9 Is there a land use change associated with the expansion of irrigated crop production? 




















(a) If your answer is Yes, do you think the change had negative effects on the local 
environment (deforestation, erosion, water of the dam, water pollution) 1=Yes 2 =No 




4.10 If there was a water supply problem in this community, how likely is it that people 
will cooperate to try to solve the problem? 
1. Very likely 
2. Somewhat likely 
3. Neither likely or unlikely 
4. Somewhat unlikely 
5. Very unlikely 
4.11 How did you judge the fertility level of your land after you started using irrigation 
water? 
1. increased  
2. decreased 








H. MARKETING AND GOVERNANCE 
 




































may sell your 
products? 
To whom 
do you sell?*** 
CHOOSE 
BELOW  
Maize          
Cabbage          
Tomato          
Butternut          
Water 
melons 
         
Sweet 
potatoes 
         
Other 
(specify) 
         
*1=Farmgate 2=Outapi 3=Oshakati 4=Oshikango 5=Windhoek 6=Other specify 
**1=On donkey/ ox cart, 2=own vehicle 3=hired vehicle 4=on foot (being carried) 5=others (specify) 
***1=Wholesale 2=Retailers, 3=Fellow farmers 4=institutions/organization such as schools, hospitals, hostels 5=Ongwediva hub 6=Village 









































































1. Farmgate        
2. Outapi        
3. Oshakati        
4. Oshikango        
5. Windhoek        
6. Other 
specify 
       
*1. Higher prices, 2. Lower prices 3. Same price 4. More buyers 5. More trust in buyers 6. 
Only option 7. Other (specify) 
5.3 Do you search for trading partner before selling you horticultural produce? 1=Yes 2=No 
(a) If Yes what were your total hours for negotiations before the selling of vegetable……….. 
5.4 Do you experience problems with price determination? 1=Yes 2=No 
5.5 What are your sources of vegetable price information? 
1. Other farmers only 
2. Traders only 
3. Radio only 
4. Bulletin board (in trading posts) only 
5. Other people in trading posts only  
6. Via mobile phone short messaging system  
7. Other farmers and radio, combined  
8. Other farmers, traders and radio combined  
9. Anybody who comes from the trading posts  
10. None 
11. Other specify………………………………………………………………………… 
 




(a) If the price increases, what are the reasons? ………………………………………………. 
(b) If the price decreases, what are the reasons? ……………………………………………… 
 







































contract terms or agreement 
1. Farmgate     
2. Outapi     
3. Oshakati     
4. Oshikango     
5. Windhoek     
6. Other 
specify 

































Maize          
Cabbage          
Tomato          
Butternut          
Water 
melons 
         
Sweet 
potatoes 
         
Other 
(specify) 













5.9 Is storage of vegetable a problem for you? 1=Yes or 2=No 
(a) If Yes, how much of the production of all the vegetable products are damaged in the field and 
after? 
1. %of loss before harvest……………………………………………… 
2. % loss after harvest………………………………………………… 
 
5.10 How do you store your vegetables?…………………………………………..…… 
5.11 Are you making use of the available cold storage facility, if so is there any payment 
involved?............................................................................................................. 
 
5.12 Is there any processing involved in your vegetable products?  1=Yes or 2=No  
(a) If Yes explain your processing processes……………………………………………….. 
5.13 Do you invest in packing materials for vegetables products 1=Yes or 2=No 
(a) If Yes how much do spend per year……………………………………………… 
5.14 Do you find buyers for all horticultural products you take to markets? 1=Yes 2=No 
(a) If No, (you do not find buyers for your product), what do you do?..................................... 
5.15 What do customers expect from you as a producer? 1=Yes 2=No 
Variable 1=Yes 2=No 
1. Quality products   
2. lower price  
3. Continuously supply  
4. Deliver product at their places  
5. Others(specify)  
5.16 Who are your main competitors in selling of vegetables? 1=Yes 2=No 
Variable 1=Yes 2=No 
1. Farmers in the same region  
2. Farmers from other region  
3. Imported products  
4. Others(specify)  
5.17 What do you do to cope with competition? 1=Yes 2=No 
Variable 1=Yes 2=No 
1. Produce enough for the target market  
2. Produce high quality products  
3. Produce off-seasons vegetables  
4. Store & sell when there are no similar products in the market  
5. Sell at low price  
6. Contract production  
7. Others specify  
5.18 Could you please place the following characteristics in ranked order of importance from 
lowest 1 and highest 5? 
Variable       Rank 
1. Yield  
2. Taste  





























4. storability  
5. Early maturity  
 
5.19 Do you advertise your vegetable products? 1=Yes 2=No 
Source 1=Yes 2=No 
1. Radio  
2. Newspaper  
3. Television (TV)  
4. Other specify  
  
(a) If Yes what are the challenges do you experience from advertising your products? 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
I. FINANCE OR CREDIT 
 
6.1 Do you borrow money for your farming activities 1=Yes 2=No 

















Own capital      
AgriBank of 
Namibia 
     
Commercial Banks 
(name……………) 
     
Family &friends      
Other specify      
* 1.Payment for hired labour 2.Purchase of fertilizer & seeds 3. Purchase of farm implements 
4.To start off farm business 5. Pay transport 
6.2 If you borrow money do you find it easy to paying back the loan? 1=Yes 2=No  
(a) If No what are your reasons?................................................................................................. 
6.3 What type of collateral have you put up to obtain the loan? 1=Yes 2=No 
Source 1=Yes 2=No 
1. House  
2. livestock  
3. Insurance  
4. life cover   
























6.4 How do you prefer to save your money?  1=Yes 2=No 
Source 1=Yes 2=No 
1. Keeping it with you   
2. Hiding it at home   
3. Savings account at the bank   
4. Post office savings at the bank  
5. Other specify  
 
I. PARTICIPATION IN GROUPS AND SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY 
 
7.1 Are you a member to any Community-Based Association e.g. women group, cooperative, 
league? 1=Yes or 2=No 





7.2 How much money or goods did you or your household contribute to this group in the past 12 
months? 
Group 1   Group 2  
 
7.3 What is the main benefit from joining this group? 
1. Improves my household’s current livelihood or access to services 
2. Important in times of emergency/in future 
3. Benefits the community 
4. Enjoyment/Recreation 
5. Spiritual, social status, self-esteem 
6. Other (specify) ......................................................................................................... 
 
7.4 How far is your farm or settlement from the following services 
Facility     Distance in Km 
1. Schools   
2. Water supply or sanitation  
3. Credit or Savings  
4. Health facilities  
5. Recreation facilities  
6. Extension services  
7. Main roads  






















7.5 On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means a very small extent and 5 means a very great extent, how 
much do you trust the people in this category? (CHOOSE BELOW) 
Variable Scale 
1. People from your ethnic or linguistic 
group/race/caste/tribe 
 
2. People from other ethnic or linguistic 
groups/race/caste/tribe 
 
3. Other farmers  
4. Shopkeepers (Traders)  
5. Government officials  
6. Police  
7 Others (specify)  
*1.To a very small extent 2. To a small extent  3. Neither small nor great extent 4. To a great 
extent 5.To a very great extent 
 
7.6 How well do people in your village/neighbourhood help each other out these days?  Use a 
five point scale, where 1 means always helping and 5 means never helping. 
Variable Scale 
1. Always helping  
2. Helping most of the time  
3. Helping sometimes  
4. Rarely helping  
5. Never helping  
7.7 Choose from the list the two differences most often cause problems in your village or 
neighbourhood? 
1. Differences in education 
2. Differences in landholding 
3. Differences in wealth/material possessions 
4. Differences in social status 
5. Differences between men and women 
6. Differences between younger and older generations 
7. Differences between long-term and recent residents 
8. Differences in political party affiliations 
9. Differences in religious beliefs 
10. Differences in ethnic background/ race/caste/tribe 
11. Other differences (specify)…………………………………. 
7.8 Are you personally happy with the progress being made on your vegetable business? 1=Yes 
2=No 
If Yes give the most important reason 
1. I am making enough of money out of it  
2. It has enhance my status in community 
3. I have sense of security of my family 




















If No give the most important reason 
1. I am not making enough money  
2. It has put me in debt 
3. I do not get any support from any sources 
4. Other specify 
 
J. INFORMATION AND TRAINING 
 
8.1 Before starting farming with vegetables did you seek information or advice from anyone 
about how to do it? (Multiple options possible). How much did this information or advice 
cost? 







1. Lawyer    
2. Friends or relative    
3. Government agency (specify)    
4. Fertilizer Distributor (specify)   
5. Shopkeepers (Traders) (Specify)   
6. None   
7. Others (Specify)   
 















8.2 What sources of information do you make use of in your day to day decisions on the farm? 
Source of 
information 








ie. How much 




Time to sell, 
where, what 
price etc. 







    
2. Local 
market 
    
3. Radio      
4. Television o     
5. Newspapers     
6. Groups or 
associations 
    
7. Business or 
work 
associates 
    
8. Community 
leaders 
    
9. Extension 
officials 
    
10. Internet     
11. Other 
(specify 
    
 
8.3 Do you keep records on your vegetable production? 1=Yes 2=No 
1. Production records ie. Quantity 
produced 
 
2. Financial records ie. Input purchases, 
income from sales 
 
3. Health records ie. diseases  
4. None  
5. Other (specify)  
 
8.4 Have you received training on vegetables production? 1=Yes 2=No 
1. Threshing/ shelling  
2. Storage  
3. Harvesting  
4. Drying  
5. Cleaning, sorting or grading  
























7. Milling  
8. Pricing  
9. Irrigation  
10. Farm planning / financial management  
11. None of the above  
12. Other (specify)  
 
8.5 Relatively speaking, indicate how you learnt TECHNICAL (production) and FINANCIAL 
knowledge and skills : 1=Yes or 2=No 




2. Watching  parents/relatives?   
3. Watching other farmers?   
4. Field days?   
5. Reading books, magazines, 
papers 
  
6. Radio/TV programmes?   
7.  Short courses/lectures?   
8.  Extension officials   
9. Others specify   
 
8.6 What specific training do you wish to receive on horticultural production in the future? 
Type of training Reasons why you need this help 
1. Vegetable production  
2. Fertilizers application  
3. Pesticides application  
4. Financial and record keeping  
5. Marketing of products  
6. Other (specify)  
 
8.7 Give any comment or information that you think is necessary to know about your 
farm.…………………………………………………………………… 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH 
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